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This chapter examines the process of development from an epoch of Malthusian stagnation to
a state of sustained economic growth. The analysis focuses on recently advanced uniﬁed growth
theories that capture the intricate evolution of income per capita, technology, and population over
the course of human history. Deciphering the underlying forces that triggered the transition from
stagnation to growth and the associated phenomenon of the great divergence in income per capita
across countries has been widely viewed as one of the most signiﬁcant challenges facing researchers
in the ﬁeld of growth and development. The inconsistency of non-uniﬁed growth models with the
main characteristics of the process of development across most of human history induced growth
theorists to advance an alternative theory that captures in a single uniﬁed framework the epoch
of Malthusian stagnation, the modern era of sustained economic growth, and the recent transition
between these distinct regimes. Uniﬁed growth theory reveals the underlying micro foundations
that are consistent with the growth process over the entire history of the human species, enhancing
the conﬁdence in the viability of the theory, its predictions and policy implications for the growth
process of less developed economies.
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1“A complete, consistent, uniﬁed theory...would be the ultimate triumph of human reason”
Stephen W. Hawking - A Brief History of Time.
1 Introduction
This chapter examines the recent advance of a uniﬁed growth theory that is designed to capture the
p r o c e s so fd e v e l o p m e n to v e rt h ee n t i r ec o u r s eo fh u m a nh i s t o r y .
The inconsistency of exogenous and endogenous neoclassical growth models with some of the most
fundamental features of process of development, has led recently to a search for a uniﬁed theory that
would unveil the underlying micro-foundations of the growth process in its entirety, capturing the epoch
of Malthusian stagnation that characterized most of human history, the contemporary era of modern
economic growth, and the underlying driving forces that triggered the recent transition between these
regimes and the associated phenomenon of the Great Divergence in income per capita across countries.
The evolution of economies over the major portion of human history was marked by Malthusian
Stagnation. Technological progress and population growth were miniscule by modern standards and
the average growth rate of income per capita in various regions of the world was even slower due to
the oﬀsetting eﬀect of population growth on the expansion of resources per capita. In the past two
centuries, in contrast, the pace of technological progress increased signiﬁcantly in association with the
process of industrialization. Various regions of the world economy departed from the Malthusian trap
and experienced initially a considerable rise in the growth rates of income per capita and population.
Unlike episodes of technological progress in the pre-Industrial Revolution era that failed to generate
sustained economic growth, the increasing role of human capital in the production process in the second
phase of the Industrial Revolution ultimately prompted a demographic transition, liberating the gains in
productivity from the counterbalancing eﬀects of population growth. The decline in population growth
and the associated enhancement in technological progress and human capital formation paved the way
for the emergence of the modern state of sustained economic growth.
The fundamental factors that generated the remarkable escape from the Malthusian trap have
been shrouded in mystery until recently and their signiﬁcance for the understanding of the contemporary
growth process have been under-explored.
• What accounts for the epoch of stagnation that characterized most of human history?
• What is the origin of the sudden spurt in growth rates of output per capita and population?
• Why had episodes of technological progress in the pre-industrialization era failed to generate
sustained economic growth?
• What was the source of the dramatic reversal in the positive relationship between income per
capita and population that existed throughout most of human history?
• What triggered the demographic transition?
• Would the transition to a state of sustained economic growth have been feasible without the
demographic transition?
• What are the underlying behavioral and technological structures that can simultaneously account
for these distinct phases of development and what are their implications for the contemporary
growth process of developed and underdeveloped countries?
1The perplexing phenomenon of the Great Divergence in income per capita across regions of the
world in the past two centuries presents an additional mystery about the growth process.
• What accounts for the sudden take-oﬀ from stagnation to growth in some countries in the world
and the persistent stagnation in others?
• Why has the positive link between income per capita and population growth reversed its course
in some economies but not in others?
• Why have the diﬀerences in per capita incomes across countries increased so markedly in the last
two centuries?
• Has the transition to a state of sustained economic growth in advanced economies adversely aﬀected
the process of development in less-developed economies?
Deciphering the fundamental determinants of the transition from stagnation to growth and the
great divergence has been widely viewed as one of the most signiﬁcant research challenges facing re-
searchers in the ﬁeld of growth and development.
The transitions from a Malthusian epoch to a state of sustained economic growth and the related
phenomenon of the Great Divergence, as depicted in Figure 2.1, have signiﬁcantly shaped the contempo-
rary world economy.1 Nevertheless, the distinct qualitative aspects of the growth process during most
of human history were virtually ignored in the shaping of neoclassical growth models, resulting in a
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Figure 2.1. The Evolution of Regional Income per Capita over the Years 1 - 2001
Sources: Maddison (2003)2
1The ratio of GDP per capita between the richest region and the poorest region in the world was only 1.1:1 in the year
1000, a 2:1 in the year 1500 and 3:1 in the year 1820. In the course of the ‘Great Divergence’ the ratio of GDP per capita
between the richest region (Western oﬀshoots) and the poorest region (Africa) has widened considerably from a modest
3:1 ratio in 1820, to a 5:1 ratio in 1870, a 9:1 ratio in 1913, a 15:1 in 1950, and a huge 18:1 ratio in 2001.
2According to Maddison’s classiﬁcation, “Western Oﬀshoots” consists of United States, Canada, Australia and New
Zealand.
2The preoccupation of growth theory with the empirical regularities that have characterized the
growth process of developed economies in the past century and of less developed economies in the
last few decades, has become harder to justify from a scientiﬁc viewpoint in light of the existence of
vast evidence about qualitatively diﬀerent empirical regularities that characterized the growth process
over most of human existence. Is there a scientiﬁcj u s t i ﬁcation for the use of selective observations,
only about the contemporary growth process, in formulating theory about the current growth process?
C o u l dw eb ec o n ﬁdent about the predictions of a theory that is not based on micro foundations that
are consistent with the main elements of the entire growth process? As argued by Copernicus, “it is as
thuoght an artist were to gather the hands, feet, head and other members for his images from diverse
models, each part perfectly drawn, buut not related to a single body, and since they in no way match
each other, the result would be monster rather than man”.3 The evolution of theories in older scientiﬁc
disciplines suggests that theories that are founded on the basis of a subset of the existing observations
and their driving forces, may be attractive in the short run, but non-robust and ultimately non-durable
in the long run.4 The attempts to develop uniﬁed theories in physics have been based on the conviction
that all physical phenomena should ultimately be explainable by some underlying unity.5 Similarly, the
entire process of development and its basic causes ought to be captured by a uniﬁed growth theory.
In recent years, it has been increasingly recognized that the understanding of the contemporary
growth process would be fragile and incomplete unless growth theory could be based on proper micro-
foundations that reﬂect the qualitative aspects of the growth process and their central driving forces.
Moreover, it has become apparent that a comprehensive understanding of the hurdles faced by less
developed economies in reaching a state of sustained economic growth would be futile unless the factors
that prompted the transition of the currently developed economies into a state of sustained economic
growth could be identiﬁed and their implications would be modiﬁed to account for the diﬀerences in the
growth structure of less developed economies in an interdependent world.
The transition from stagnation to growth and the associated phenomenon of the great divergence
have been the subject of an intensive research in the growth literature in recent years.6 The inconsistency
of exogenous and endogenous neoclassical growth models with the process of development along most
of human history, induced growth theorists to search for an alternative theory that could capture in a
single uniﬁed framework the contemporary era of sustained economic growth, the epoch of Malthusian
stagnation that had characterized most of human history, and the driving forces that brought about the
recent transition between these distinct regimes.
Imposing the constraint that a single theory should account for the entire intricate process of
development and its prime causes in the last thousands of years is a discipline that would enhance
the viability of growth theory. A uniﬁed theory of economic growth reveals the fundamental micro-
foundations that are consistent with the process of economic development over the entire course of
human history, rather that with the last century only, boosting the conﬁdence in growth theory, its
predictions and policy implications. Moreover, it improves the understanding of the underlying factors
3Quoted in Kuhn (1957).
4For instance, Classical Thermodynamics that lacked micro-foundations was ultimately superseded by the micro-based
Statistical Mechanics.
5Uniﬁed Field Theory, for instance, proposes to unify by a set of general laws the four distinct forces that are known
to control all the observed interactions in matter: electromagnetism, gravitation, the weak force, and the strong force.
The term uniﬁed ﬁeld theory was coined by Einstein, whose research on relativity had led him to the hypothesis that it
should be possible to ﬁnd a unifying theory for the electromagnetic and gravitational forces.
6The transition from Malthusian stagnation to sustained economic growth was explored by Galor and Weil (1999,
2000), Lucas (2002), Galor and Moav (2002), Hansen and Prescott (2002), Jones (2001), Stokey (2002), as well as others,
and the association of Great Divergence with the transition was analyzed by Galor and Mountford (2003).
3that led to the transition from stagnation to growth of the currently developed countries, shedding light
on the growth process of the less developed economies.
2 Historical Evidence
This section examines the historical evidence about the evolution of the relationship between income
per capita, population growth, technological change and human capital formation along three distinct
regimes that have characterized the process of economic development: The Malthusian Epoch, The
Post-Malthusian Regime, and the Sustained Growth Regime.
During the Malthusian Epoch that characterized most of human history, technological progress
and population growth were insigniﬁcant by modern standards. The level of income per capita had
a positive eﬀect on population and the average growth rate of income per capita in the long-run, as
depicted in Figure 2.2, was negligible due to the slow pace of technological progress as well as the
counterbalancing eﬀect of population growth on the expansion of resources per capita. During the
Post Malthusian Regime, the pace of technological progress markedly increased in association with
the process of industrialization, triggering a take-oﬀ from the Malthusian trap. The growth rate of
income per capita increased signiﬁcantly, as depicted in Figures 2.1 and 2.2, but the positive Malthusian
eﬀect of income per capita on population growth was still maintained, generating a sizeable increase
in population growth that oﬀset some of the potential gains in income per capita. The acceleration in
the rate of technological progress in the second phase of the Industrial Revolution, and its interaction
with human capital formation ultimately prompted the demographic transition. The rise in aggregate
income was not counterbalanced by population growth, enabling technological progress to bring about
sustained increase in income per capita.
2.1 The Malthusian Epoch
For thousand of years, humans were subjected to persistent struggle for existence. Survival, argued
Malthus (1798), necessitated a “perpetual struggle for room and food.” Resources generated by tech-
nological progress and land expansion were channeled primarily towards an increase in the size of the
population, with a minor long-run eﬀect on income per capita. Thus, as reﬂected in the viewpoint
of a prominent observer of the period, “the most decisive mark of the prosperity of any country is the
increase in the number of its inhabitants” (Smith 1776).
The evolution of population and output per capita across most of human history was consistent
with the Malthusian paradigm. The positive eﬀect of the standard of living on population growth
along with diminishing labor productivity kept income per capita in the proximity of a subsistence
level.7 Periods marked by the absence of changes in the level of technology or in the availability of
land, were characterized by a stable population size as well as a constant income per capita, whereas
periods characterized by improvements in the technological environment or in the availability of land
generated temporary gains in income per capita, leading ultimately to a larger but not richer population.
Technologically superior countries had eventually denser populations but their standard of living did
not reﬂect the degree of their technological advancement.
7This subsistence level of consumption may be well above the minimal physiological requirements that are necessary
in order to sustain an active human being.
42.1.1 Income per capita
During the Malthusian epoch the average growth rate of output per capita was negligible and the
standard of living did not diﬀer greatly across countries. As depicted in Figure 2.2 the average level of
income per capita during the ﬁrst millennium ﬂuctuated around $450 per year, and the average growth
rate of output per capita in the world was nearly zero.8 This state of Malthusian stagnation persisted
until the end of the 18th century. The average level of income per capita in the world economy remained
below $670 per year in the years 1000-1820 and the average growth rate of the world income per capita
was miniscule, creeping at a rate of about 0.05% per year (Maddison 2001).





































































Figure 2.2. The Evolution of the World Income Per Capita over the Years 1-2001
Source: Maddison (2001, 2003)
This pattern of stagnation was observed across all regions of the world. As depicted in Figure
2.1, the average level of income per capita in Western and Eastern Europe, the Western Oﬀshoots, Asia,
Africa, and Latin America was in the range of $400-450 per year in the ﬁrst millennium and the average
growth rates in each of these regions was nearly zero. This state of stagnation persisted until the end
of the 18th century across all regions and the average level of income per capita in the years 1000-1820
ranged from $418 per year in Africa, $581 in Asia, $692 in Latin America, and $683 in Eastern Europe,
to $1202 in the Western Oﬀshoots, and $1204 in Western Europe. Furthermore, the average growth rate
of output per capita over this period ranged from 0% in the impoverish region of Africa to a sluggish
rate of 0.14% in the prosperous region of Western Europe.
Despite the stability in the evolution of the world income per capita in the Malthusian epoch,
from a perspective of a millennium, wages and income per capita had ﬂuctuated signiﬁcantly within
regions deviating from their sluggish long-run trend over decades and sometimes over few centuries. In
particular, as depicted in Figure 2.3, real GDP per capita in England ﬂuctuated drastically over most
of the past millennium. It declined during the 13th century, and increased sharply during the 14th
and the 15th century in response to the catastrophic population decline in the aftermath of the Black
Death. This two-century rise in per capita real income stimulated population growth and brought about
a decline in income per capita in the 16th century back to its level in the ﬁrst half of the 14th century.
8Maddison’s estimates of income per capita are evaluated in terms of 1990 international dollars.
5Real income per capita increased once again in the 17th century and remained stable during the 18th











































Figure 2.3. Fluctuations in Real GDP Per Capita: England, 1260-1870
Source: Clark (2001)
2.1.2 Income and Population Growth
Population Growth and Income level
Population growth over this Malthusian era followed the Malthusian pattern as well. As depicted
in Figures 2.4 and 2.5, the slow pace of resource expansion in the ﬁrst millennium was reﬂected in a
modest increase in the population of the world from 231 million people in the year 1 to 268 million in
the year 1000; a miniscule average growth rate of 0.02% per year.9 T h em o r er a p i d( b u ts t i l lv e r ys l o w )
expansion of resources in the period 1000-1500, permitted the world population to increase by 63% over
this period, from 268 million in the year 1000 to 438 million in the year 1500; a slow 0.1% average
growth rate per year. Resource expansion over the period 1500-1820 had a more signiﬁcant impact on
the world population, that grew 138% from 438 million in the year 1500 to 1041 million in the year
1820; an average pace of 0.27% per year.10 This positive eﬀect of income per capita on the size of the
population was maintained in the last two centuries as well, as world population reached a remarkable
level of nearly 6 billion people.
9Since output per capita grew at an average rate of 0% per year over the period 0-1000, the pace of resource expansion
was approximately equal to the pace of population growth, namely, 0.02% per year.
10Since output per capita in the world grew at an average rate of 0.05% per year in the time period 1000-1500 as well
as in the period 1500-1820, the pace of resource expansion was approximately equal to the sum of the pace of population
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Figure 2.4. The Evolution of World Population and Income Per Capita over the Years 1 - 2000
Source: Maddison (2001)
Moreover, the gradual increase in income per capita during the Malthusian epoch was associated
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Figure 2.5. Population Growth and Income Per Capita in the World Economy
Source: Maddison (2001)
Fluctuations in Income and Population
Fluctuations in population and wages exhibited the Malthusian pattern as well. Episodes of
technological progress, land expansion, favorable climatic conditions, or major epidemics (that resulted
in a decline of the adult population), brought about a temporary increase in real wages and income per
11Lee (1997) reports positive income elasticity of fertility and negative income elasticity of mortality from studies
examining a wide range of pre-industrial countries. Similarly, Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1981) ﬁnd a strong positive correlation
between real wages and marriage rates in England over the period 1551-1801. Clark (2003) ﬁnds that in England, at the
beginning of the 17th century, the number of surviving oﬀspring is higher among households with higher level of income
and literacy rates, suggesting that the positive eﬀect of income on fertility is present cross-sectionally, as well.
7capita. In particular, as depicted in Figure 2.6, the catastrophic decline in the population of England
during the Black Death (1348-1349), from about 6 millions to about 3.5 millions people, increased signif-
icantly the land-labor ratio, tripling real wages in the subsequent 150 years. Ultimately, however, most
of this increase in real resources per capita was channelled towards increased fertility rates, increasing









































































Figure 2.6. Population and Real Wages: England, 1250-1750
Source: Clark (2001, 2002)
Population Density
Variations in population density across countries during the Malthusian epoch reﬂected primarily
cross country diﬀerences in technologies and land productivity. Due to the positive adjustment of
population to an increase in income per capita, diﬀerences in technologies or in land productivity
across countries resulted in variations in population density rather than in the standard of living.13
For instance, China’s technological advancement in the period 1500-1820 permitted its share of world
population to increase from 23.5% to 36.6%, while its income per capita in the beginning and the end
of this time interval remained constant at roughly $600 per year.14
This pattern of increased population density persisted until the demographic transition, namely,
as long as the positive relationship between income per capita and population growth was maintained.
In the period 1600-1870, United Kingdom’s technological advancement relative to the rest of the world
more than doubled its share of world population from 1.1% to 2.5%. Similarly, in the period 1820-1870,
the land abundant, technologically advanced, economy of the US. experienced a 220% increased in its
share of world population from 1% to 3.2%.15
12Reliable population data is not available for the period 1405-1525 and ﬁgure 2.6 is depicted under the assumption
maintained by Clark (2001) that population was rather stable over this period.
13Consistent with the Malthusian paradigm, China’s sophisticated agricultural technologies, for example, allowed high
per-acre yields, but failed to raise the standard of living above subsistence. Similarly, the introduction of the potato in
Ireland in the middle of the 17th century generated a large increase in population over two centuries without a signiﬁcant
improvements in the standard of living. Furthermore, the destruction of potatoes by fungus in the middle of the 19th
century, generated a massive decline in population due to the Great Famine and mass migration [Mokyr 1985].
14The Chinese population more than tripled over this period, increasing from 103 million in the year 1500 to 381 million
in the year 1820.
15The population of the United Kingdom nearly quadrupled over the period 1700-1870, increasing from 8.6 million in
8Mortality and Fertility
The Malthusian demographic regime was characterized by ﬂuctuations in fertility rates, reﬂecting
variability in income per capita as well as changes in mortality rates. Periods of rising income per capita
permitted a raise the number of surviving oﬀspring, inducing an increase in fertility rates along with a
reduction in mortality rates, due to improved nourishment, and health infrastructure. Periods of rising
mortality rates (e.g., the black death) induced an increase in fertility rates so as to maintain the number
of surviving oﬀspring that can be supported by existing resources.
The relationship between fertility and mortality during the Malthusian epoch was complex. De-
mographic patterns in England during the 14th and 15th centuries, as depicted in Figure 2.6, suggest
that an (exogenous) increase in mortality rates was associated with a signiﬁcant rise in fertility rates.
However, the period 1540-1820 in England, vividly demonstrates a negative relationship between mor-
tality rates and fertility rates. As depicted in Figure 2.7, an increase in mortality rates over the period
1560-1650 was associated with a decline in fertility rates, whereas a decline in mortality rates in the







































Figure 2.7. Fertility and Mortality: England 1540-1870
Source: Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1981)
Life Expectancy
Life expectancy at birth ﬂuctuated in the Malthusian epoch, ranging from 24 in Egypt in the
time period 33 - 258 AD, to 42 in England at the end 16th century. In the initial process of European
urbanization, the percentage of urban population increased six-fold from about 3% in 1520 to nearly
18% in 1750 (de Vries (1984) and Bairoch (1988)). This rapid increase in population density, without
signiﬁcant changes in health infrastructure, generated a rise in mortality rates and a decline in life
expectancy. As depicted in Figures 2.7 and 2.8, over the period 1580-1740 mortality rates increased by
50% from 0.022 to 0.032, and life expectancy at birth fell from 42 to 28 (Wrigley and Schoﬁeld, 1981).
A decline in mortality along with a rise in life expectancy began in the 1740s. Life expectancy at birth
rose from 28 to 41 in England and from 25 to 40 in France over the period 1740-1830 (Livi-Bacci 1997).
the year 1700 to 31.4 million in the year 1870. Similarly, the population of the United states increased 40-fold, from 1.0























Figure 2.8. Life Expectancy: England, 1540-1870
Source: Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1981)
2.2 The Post-Malthusian Regime
The pace of technological progress markedly increased along with the process of industrialization, in-
stigating a take-oﬀ from the Malthusian epoch.16 The growth rate of output per capita increased
signiﬁcantly, as depicted in Figures 2.1-2.3, but the positive Malthusian eﬀect of income per capita on
population growth was still maintained, generating a sizeable increase in population growth, as depicted
in Figure 2.4 and 2.5, oﬀsetting some of the gains in income.
The take-oﬀ of developed regions from the Malthusian regime was associated with the Industrial
Revolution and occurred in the beginning of the 19th century, whereas the take-oﬀ of less developed
regions occurred towards the beginning of the 20th century and was delayed in some countries well into
t h e2 0 t hc e n t u r y .T h eP o s t - M a l t h u s i a nR e g i m ee n d e dw i t ht h ed e c l i n ei np o p u l a t i o ng r o w t hi nW e s t e r n
E u r o p ea n dt h eW e s t e r nO ﬀshoots towards the end of the 19th century and in less developed regions in
t h es e c o n dh a l fo ft h e2 0 t hc e n t u r y .
2.2.1 Income Per Capita
During the Post-Malthusian Regime the average growth rate of output per capita increased signiﬁcantly
and the standard of living started to diﬀer considerably across countries. As depicted in Figure 2.2, the
average growth rate of output per capita in the world increased from 0.05% per year in the time period
1500-1820 to 0.53% per year in 1820-1870, and 1.3% per year in 1870-1913. The timing of the take-oﬀ
and its magnitude diﬀered across regions. As depicted in Figure 2.9, the take-oﬀ from the Malthusian
E p o c ha n dt h et r a n s i t i o nt ot h eP o s t - M a l t h u s i a nR e g i m eo c c u r r e di nW e s t e r nE u r o p e ,t h eW e s t e r n
Oﬀshoots, and Eastern Europe at the beginning of the 19th century, whereas in Latin America, Asia
(excluding China) and Africa it took place at the end of the 19th century.
16Ironically, it was only shortly before the time that Malthus wrote, that some regions in the world began to emerge
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Figure 2.9. The Diﬀerential Timing of the Take-oﬀ Across Regions.
Source: Maddison (2001)
Among the regions that took oﬀ at the beginning of the 19th century, the growth rate of income
per capita in Western Europe increased from 0.15% per year in the years 1500-1820 to 0.95% per year in
the time period 1820-1870, and the growth rates of income per capita of the Western Oﬀshoots increased
over this period from 0.34% per year to 1.42% per year. In contrast, the take-oﬀ in Eastern Europe was
more modest, and its growth rate increased from 0.1% per year in the period 1500-1820 to 0.63% per year
in the time interval 1820-1870. Among the regions that took-oﬀ towards the end of the 19th century,
the average growth rate of income per capita in Latin America jumped from a sluggish rate of 0.11%
per year in the years 1820-1870 to a considerable 1.81% per year in the time period 1870-1913, whereas
Africa’s growth rates increased more modestly from 0.12% per year in the years 1820-1870 to 0.64% per
year in time interval 1870-1913 and 1.02% per year in the period 1913-1950. Asia’s (excluding Japan,
China and India) take-oﬀ was modest as well, increasing from 0.13% per year in the years 1820-1870 to
0.64% per year in the 1870-1913 period.17
17Japan’s average growth rate increased from 0.19% per year in the period 1820-1870, to 1.48% per year in the period
11The level of income per capita in the various regions of the world, as depicted in Figure 2.1,
ranged in the year 1870 from $444 in Africa, $543 in Asia, $698 in Latin America, and $871 in Eastern
Europe, to $1974 in Western Europe and $2431 in the Western Oﬀshoots. Thus, the diﬀerential timing
of the take-oﬀ from the Malthusian epoch, increased the gap between the richest regions of Western
E u r o p ea n dt h eW e s t e r nO ﬀshoots to the impoverished region of Africa from about 3:1 in 1820 to
approximately 5:1 in 1870.
The acceleration in technological progress and the accumulation of physical capital and to a lesser
extent human capital, generated a gradual rise in real wages in the urban sector and (partly due to labor
mobility) in the rural sector as well. As depicted in Figure 2.10, the take-oﬀ from the Malthusian epoch
in the aftermath of the Industrial Revolution was associated in England with a modest rise in real wages
in the ﬁrst decades of the 19th century and a very signiﬁcant rise in real wages after 1870.18 Av e r y


































































Figure 2.10. Real Wages in England and France During the take-oﬀ from the Malthusian Epoch
Sources: Clark (2002) for England, and Levy-Leboyer and Bourguignon (1990) for France
2.2.2 Income and Population Growth
The rapid increase in income per capita in the Post-Malthusian Regime was channeled partly towards
an increase in the size of the population. During this Regime, the Malthusian mechanism linking higher
income to higher population growth continued to function, but the eﬀect of higher population on diluting
resources per capita, and thus lowering income per capita, was counteracted by the acceleration in
technological progress and capital accumulation, allowing income per capita to rise despite the oﬀsetting
eﬀects of population growth.
The Western European take-oﬀ along with that of the Western Oﬀshoots brought about a sharp
increase in population growth in these regions and consequently a modest rise in population growth in
the world as a whole. The subsequent take-oﬀ of less developed regions and the associated increase in
their population growth brought about a signiﬁcant rise in the population growth in the world. The
1870-1913. India’s growth rate increased from 0% per year to 0.54% per year over this period , whereas China’s take-oﬀ
was delayed till the 1950s.
18Stokey (2001)’s quantitative study attributes about half of the rise in real wage over the period 1780-1850 to the forces
of international trade. Moreover, technological change in manufacturing was 3 times as important as technological change
in the energy sector in contributing to output growth.
12rate of population growth in the world increased from an average rate of 0.27% per year in the period
1500-1820 to 0.4% per year in the years 1820-1870, and to 0.8% per year in the time interval 1870-1913.
Furthermore, despite the decline in population growth in Western Europe and the Western Oﬀshoots
towards the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, the delayed take-oﬀ of less
developed regions and the signiﬁcant increase in their income per capita prior to their demographic
transitions generated a further increase in the rate of population growth in the world to 0.93% per
year in the years 1913-1950 and a sharp rise to a high rate 1.92% per year in the period 1950-1973.
Ultimately, the onset of the demographic transition in less developed economies in the second half of
the 20th century, gradually reduced population growth rates to 1.66% per year in the 1973-1998 period
(Maddison 2001).
Growth in Income Per Capita and Population Growth
As depicted in Figure 2.11, the take-oﬀ in the growth rate of income per capita in all regions of
the world was associated with a take-oﬀ in population growth. In particular, the average growth rates
of income per capita in Western Europe over the time period 1820-1870 rose to an annual rate of 0.95%
(from 0.15% in the earlier period) along with a signiﬁcant increase in population growth to an annual
rate of about 0.7% (from 0.26% in the earlier period). Similarly, the average growth rates of income per
capita in the Western Oﬀshoots over the years 1820-1870 rose to an annual rate of 1.42% (from 0.34%
in the earlier period) along with a signiﬁcant increase in population growth to an annual rate of about
2.87% (from 0.43% in the earlier period).
A similar pattern is observed in Asia, and as depicted in Figure 2.11 in Africa and Latin America
as well. The average growth rates of income per capita in Latin America over the years 1870-1913
rose to an annual rate of 1.81% (from 0.1% in the period 1820-1870) and subsequently by 1.43% in
time interval 1913-1950 and 2.52% in the time period 1950-1973 along with a signiﬁcant increase in
population growth to an annual rate of 1.64% in the period 1870-1913, 1.97% in the years 1913-1950,
and 2.73% in the period 1950-1973, prior to the decline in the context of the demographic transition.
Similarly, the average growth rates of income per capita in Africa over the 1870-1913 period rose to an
annual rate of 0.64%, (from 0.12% in the period 1820-1870) and subsequently by 1.02% in the years
1913-1950 and 2.07% in the period 1950-1973 along with a monotonic increase in population growth
from a modest average annual rate of 0.4% in the years 1820-1870, to a 0.75% in the years 1870-1913,
1.65% in the years 1913-1950, 2.33% in the time interval 1950-1973, and a rapid average annual rate of
2.73% in the 1973-1998 period .
13Western  Offshoots





























































































































Figure 2.11. Regional Growth of GDP Per Capita and Population: 1500-2000
Source: Maddison (2001)
Ultimately, however, most regions experienced a demographic transition and thereby a transition
to a state of sustained economic growth that enabled economies to convert a larger share of the fruits
of factor accumulation and technological progress into the growth of output per capita.
Technological leaders and land-abundant regions during the Post-Malthusian era improved their
relative position in the world in terms of their level of income per capita as well as their population size.
The increase in population density of technological leaders persisted as long as the positive relationship
between income per capita and population growth was maintained. Western Europe’s technological
advancement relative to the rest of the world increased its share of world population by 16% from
12.8% in 1820 to 14.8% in 1870, where the regional technological leader, the United Kingdom, increased
its share of world population by 25% (from 2% to 2.5%) over this ﬁfty year period. Moreover, land
abundance and technological advancement in the Western Oﬀshoots (US, Australia, New Zealand and
Canada) increased their share of world population by 227% over a ﬁfty year period, from 1.1% in 1820
to 3.6% in 1870.
The rate of population growth relative to the growth rate of aggregate income declined gradually
over the period. For instance, the growth rate of total output in Europe was 0.3% per year between 1500
14and 1700, and 0.6% per year between 1700 and 1820. In both periods, two thirds of the increase in total
output was matched by increased population growth, and the growth of income per capita was only 0.1%
per year in the earlier period and 0.2% in the later one. In the United Kingdom, where growth was the
fastest, the same rough division between total output growth and population growth can be observed:
total output grew at an annual rate of 1.1% in the 120 years after 1700, while population grew at an
annual rate of 0.7%. Population and income per capita continued to grow after 1820, but increasingly
the growth of total output was expressed as growth of income per capita. Population growth was 40%
as large as total output growth over the time period 1820-1870, dropping further after the demographic
transition to about 20% of output growth over the 1929-1990 period.
Fertility and Mortality
The relaxation in the households’ budget constraints in the Post-Malthusian Regime permitted
an increase in fertility rates along with an increase in literacy rates and years of schooling. Despite the
decline in mortality rates, fertility rates (as well as population growth) increased in most of Western
Europe until the second half of the 19th century (Coale and Treadway (1986)).19 In particular, as
depicted in Figure 2.12, in spite of a century of a decline in mortality rates, the crude birth rates
in England increased over the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century. Thus, the Net
Reproduction Rate (i.e., the number of daughters per woman who reach the reproduction age) increased
for about the replacement level of 1 surviving daughters per women in 1740 to about 1.5 surviving

















































Figure 2.12. Fertility, Mortality and Net Reproduction Rate: England, 1730-1871
Source: Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1981)
It appears that the signiﬁcant rise in income per capita in the Post-Malthusian Regime increased
the desirable number of surviving oﬀspring and thus, despite the decline in mortality rates, fertility
increased signiﬁcantly so as to enable households to reach this higher desirable level of surviving oﬀspring.
Fertility Rates and Marriage Age
Fertility was controlled during this period, despite the absence of modern contraceptive methods,
19See Dyson and Murphy (1985) as well.
15partly via adjustment in marriage rates.20 As depicted in Figure 2.13, increased fertility was achieved
by earlier female’s age of marriages and a decline in fertility by a delay in the marriage age. The same
pattern is observed in the relationship between Crude Birth Rates and Female’s age of marriages, or
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Figure 2.13. Fertility Rates and Female’s Age of Marriage
Source: Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1983)
2.2.3 Industrialization and Urbanization
The take-oﬀ of developed and less developed regions from the Malthusian epoch was associated with
the acceleration in the process of industrialization as well as with a signiﬁcant rise in urbanization.
Industrialization
The take-oﬀ in the developed regions was accompanied by a rapid process of industrialization. As
depicted in Figure 2.14, Per-Capita Level of Industrialization (measuring per capita volume of industrial
production) increased signiﬁcantly in the United Kingdom since 1750, rising 50% over the 1750-1800
period, quadrupling in the years 1800-1860, and nearly doubling in the time period 1860-1913. Similarly
per-capita level of industrialization accelerated in the United States, doubling in the 1750-1800 as well as
1800-1860 periods , and increasing six-fold in the years 1860-1913. A similar pattern was experienced by
Germany, France, Sweden, Switzerland, Belgium, and Canada as of 1800, and industrialization nearly
doubled in the 1800-1860 period, further accelerating in the time interval 1860-1913.
The take-oﬀ o fl e s sd e v e l o p e de c o n o m i e si nt h e2 0 t hc e n t u r yw a sa s s o c i a t e dw i t hi n c r e a s e di n -
dustrialization as well. However, as depicted in Figure 2.14, during the 19th century these economies
experienced a decline in per capita industrialization (i.e., per capita volume of industrial production),
reﬂecting the adverse eﬀect of the sizable increase in population on the level of industrial production
per capita (even in the absence of an absolute decline in industrial production) as well as the forces of
globalization and colonialism, that induced less developed economies to specialize in the production of
raw materials.21
20This mechanism is reﬂected in the assertion of William Cobbett (1763 - 1835) — a leader of the campaign against the
changes brought by the Industrial Revolution —“...men, who are able and willing to work, cannot support their families,
and ought...to be compelled to lead a life of celibacy, for fear of having children to be starved.”
21The sources of the decline in the industrialization of less developed economies is explored by Galor and Mountford
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Figure 2.14. Per Capita Levels of Industrialization: (UK in 1900=100)
Source: Bairoch (1982)22
Urbanization
The take-oﬀ from Malthusian stagnation and the acceleration in the process of industrialization
increased signiﬁcantly the process of urbanization. As depicted in Figure 2.15, the percentage of the
population that lived in European cities with a population larger than 10,000 people nearly tripled over
the years 1750-1870, from 17% to 54%. Similarly, the percentage of the population in England that
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Figure 2.15. Percentage of the Population in Cities with Population larger than 10,000
Sources: Bairoch (1988) and de Vries (1984)
Robinson (2001) and Bertocchi and Canova (2002).
22Notes: Countries are deﬁned according to their 1913 boundaries. Germany from 1953 is deﬁned as East and West
Germany. India after 1928 includes Pakistan.
17This rapid processes of industrialization and urbanization was accompanied by a rapid decline in
the share of agricultural production in total output, as depicted in Figure 2.16. For instance, this share
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Figure 2.16. The Decline in the Percentage of Agricultural Production in Total Output: Europe: 1790-1910
Source: Mitchell (1981)
2.2.4 Early Stages of Human Capital Formation
The acceleration in technological progress during the Post-Malthusian Regime and the associated in-
crease in income per capita stimulated the accumulation of human capital in the form of literacy rates,
schooling, and health. The increase in the investment in human capital was induced by the gradual
relaxation in the households budget constraints (as reﬂected by the rise in real wages and income per
capita), as well as by qualitative changes in the economic environment that increased the demand for
human capital and induced households to invest in the education of their oﬀspring.
In the ﬁrst phase of the Industrial Revolution, human capital had a limited role in the production
process. Education was motivated by a variety of reasons, such as religion, enlightenment, social control,
moral conformity, sociopolitical stability, social and national cohesion, and military eﬃciency. The
extensiveness of public education was therefore not necessarily correlated with industrial development
and it diﬀered across countries due to political, cultural, social, historical and institutional factors. In
the second phase of the Industrial Revolution, however, the demand for education increased, reﬂecting
the increasing skill requirements in the process of industrialization.23
During the post-Malthusian regime, the average number of years of schooling in England and
Wales rose from 2.3 for the cohort born between 1801 and 1805 to 5.2 for the cohort born in the year
1852-1856 (Matthews et al., 1982). Furthermore, human capital as reﬂected by the level of health of
the labor force increased over this period. In particular, between 1740 and 1840 life expectancy at birth
rose from 33 to 40 in England (Figure 2.8), and from 25 to 40 in France.
The process of industrialization was ultimately characterized by a gradual increase in the rela-
tive importance of human capital in less developed economies as well. As documented by Barro and
23Evidence suggests that in Western Europe, the economic interests of capitalists were a signiﬁcant driving force behind
the implementation of educational reforms, reﬂecting the interest of capitalists in human capital formation and thus in
the provision of public education [Galor and Moav (2004)].
18Lee (2000) educational attainment increased signiﬁcantly across all less developed regions in the Post-
Malthusian Regime (that ended with the decline in population growth in the 1970s in Latin America
and Asia, and was still in motion in Africa at the end of the 20th century). In particular, the average
years of schooling increased from 3.5 in 1960 to 4.4 in 1975, in Latin America, from 1.6 in 1960 to 3.4
in 2000 in Sub-Saharan Africa, and from 1.4 in 1960 to 1.9 in 1975 in South Asia.
2.3 The Sustained Growth Regime
The acceleration in technological progress and industrialization in the Post-Malthusian Regime and its
interaction with the accumulation of human capital brought about a demographic transition, paving the
way to a transition to an era of sustained economic growth. In the post demographic-transition period,
the rise in aggregate income due to technological progress and factor accumulation has no longer been
counterbalanced by population growth, permitting sustained growth in income per capita in regions
that have experienced sustained technological progress and factor accumulation.
The transition of the developed regions of Western Europe and the Western Oﬀshoots to the
s t a t eo fs u s t a i n e de c o n o m i cg r o w t ho c c u r r e dt o w a r d sthe end of the 19th century, whereas the transition
of the less developed regions of Asia and Latin America occurred towards the end of the 20th century.
Africa, in contrast, is still struggling to make this transition.
2.3.1 Growth of Income Per Capita
During the Sustained Growth Regime the average growth rate of output per capita increased signiﬁcantly
in association with the decline in population growth. As depicted in Figure 2.11, the decline in population
growth in Western Europe as well as the Western Oﬀshoots was followed by a signiﬁcant increase in
income per capita and in many of the less advanced economies a signiﬁcant increase in income per capita
was followed by a demographic transition.
Income per capita in the last century has advanced at a stable rate of about 2% per year in



































Figure 2.17. Sustained Economic Growth: Western Europe and the Western Oﬀshoots, 1870-2001
Source: Maddison (2003)
19In contrast, less developed regions experienced a sustained growth rate of output per capita only
in the last decades. As depicted in Figure 2.18, the growth rate of output per capita in Asia has been
stable in the last 50 years, the growth rate in Latin America has been declining over this period, and



































Figure 2.18. Income Per Capita in Africa, Asia and Latin America, 1950-2001
Source: Maddison (2003)
The transition to a state of sustained economic growth in developed as well as less developed
regions was accompanied by a rapid process of industrialization. As depicted in Figure 2.14, the Per
Capita Level of Industrialization (measuring per capita volume of industrial production) doubled in the
time period 1860-1913 and tripled in the course of the 20th century. Similarly the per capita level of
industrialization in the United States, increased six-fold over the years 1860-1913, and tripled along the
20th century. A similar pattern was experienced by Germany, France, Sweden, Switzerland, Belgium,
and Canada where industrialization increased signiﬁcantly in the time interval 1860-1913 as well as over
the rest of the 20th century. Moreover, less developed economies that made the transition to a state of
sustained economic growth in recent decades have experienced a signiﬁcant increase in industrialization.
The transition to a state of sustained economic growth was characterized by a gradual increase in
the importance of the accumulation of human capital relative to physical capital as well as with a sharp
decline in fertility rates. In the ﬁrst phase of the Industrial Revolution (1760-1830), capital accumulation
as a fraction of GDP increased signiﬁcantly whereas literacy rates remained largely unchanged. Skills
and literacy requirements were minimal, the state devoted virtually no resources to raise the level of
literacy of the masses, and workers developed skills primarily through on-the-job training (Green 1990,
and Mokyr 1990, 1993). Consequently, literacy rates did not increase during the period 1750-1830
(Sanderson 1995)). As argued by Landes (1969, p. 340) “although certain workers - supervisory and
oﬃce personal in particular - must be able to read and do the elementary arithmetical operations in
order to perform their duties, large share of the work of industry can be performed by illiterates as
indeed it was especially in the early days of the Industrial Revolution.”
In the second phase of the Industrial Revolution, however, capital accumulation subsided, the
education of the labor force markedly increased and skills became necessary for production. The in-
vestment ratio which increased from 6% in 1760 to 11.7% in the year 1831, remained at around 11%
24Extensive evidence about the growth process in the last four decades is surveyed by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003).
20on average in the years 1856-1913 (Crafts 1985 and Matthews et al. 1982). In contrast, the average
years of schooling of the male labor force which did not change signiﬁcantly until the 1830s, tripled by
the beginning of the 20th century (Matthews et al. 1982, p 573). The signiﬁcant rise in the level of
income per capita in England as of 1865, as depicted in Figure 2.19, was associated with an increase in
the standard of living (Voth (2004), and an increase in school enrollment of 10-year olds from 40% in
1870 to 100% in 1900. Moreover, Total fertility Rates in England sharply declined over this period from










































Figure 2.19. The Sharp Rise in Real GDP Per Capita in the transition to Sustained Economic Growth:
England 1870-1915
Source: Clark (2001) and Feinstein (1972)
The transition to a state of sustained economic growth in the US, as well, was characterized by
a gradual increase in the importance of the accumulation of human capital relative to physical capital.
Over the time period 1890-1999 the contribution of human capital accumulation to the growth process
in the US nearly doubled whereas the contribution of physical capital declined signiﬁcantly. Goldin and
Katz (2001) show that the rate of growth of educational productivity was 0.29% per year over the 1890-
1915 period, accounting for about 11% of the annual growth rate of output per capita over this period.25
In the period 1915-1999, the rate of growth of educational productivity was 0.53% per year accounting
for about 20% of the annual growth rate of output per capita over this period. Abramovitz and David
(2000) report that the fraction of the growth rate of output per capita that is directly attributed to
physical capital accumulation declined from an average of 56% in the years 1800-1890 to 31% in the
period 1890-1927 and 21% in the time interval 1929-1966.
2.3.2 The Demographic Transition
The demographic transitions swept the world in the course of the last century. The unprecedented
increase in population growth during the Post-Malthusian regime was ultimately reversed and the de-
mographic transition brought about a signiﬁcant reduction in fertility rates and population growth in
various regions of the world, enabling economies to convert a larger share of the fruits of factor ac-
cumulation and technological progress into growth of income per capita. The demographic transition
enhanced the growth process via three channels: (a) Reduction of the dilution of the stock of capital
25They measure educational productivity by the contribution of education the educational wage diﬀerentials.
21and land. (b) Enhancement of the investment in the human capital of the population. (c) Alteration of
the age distribution of the population which temporarily increased the size of the labor force relative to
the population as a whole.
The Decline in Population Growth
T h ee v o l u t i o no fp o p u l a t i o ng r o w t hi nt h ew o r l de c o n o m y ,a sd e p i c t e di nF i g u r e2 . 5 ,h a sb e e n
non-monotonic. The growth of world population was sluggish during the Malthusian epoch, creeping at
an average annual rate of about 0.1% over the years 0-1820. The Western European take-oﬀ along with
that of the Western Oﬀshoots brought about a sharp increase in population growth in these regions
and consequently in the world as a whole. The annual average rate of population growth in the world
increased gradually reaching 0.8% in the years 1870-1913. The delayed take-oﬀ of less developed regions
and the signiﬁcant increase in their income per capita generated a further gradual increase in the rate
of population growth in the world, despite the decl i n ei np o p u l a t i o ng r o w t hi nW e s t e r nE u r o p ea n d
the Western Oﬀshoots, reaching a high level of 1.92% per year in the period 1950-1973, . Ultimately,
however, the onset of the demographic transition in less developed economies in the second half of the
20th century, reduced population growth to an average rate of about 1.63% per year in the 1973-1998
period.
T h et i m i n go ft h ed e m o g r a p h i ct r a n s i t i o nd i ﬀered signiﬁcantly across regions. As depicted in
Figure 2.20, the reduction in population growth occurred in Western Europe, the Western Oﬀshoots,
and Eastern Europe towards the end of the 19th century and in the beginning of the 20th century,
whereas Latin America and Asia experienced a decline in the rate of population growth only in the last
decades of the 20th century. Africa’s population growth, in contrast, has been rising steadily, although
this pattern is likely to reverse in the near future due to the decline in total fertility rate in this region
since the 1980s.
The Western Oﬀshoots experienced the earliest decline in population growth, from an average
annual rate of 2.87% in the period 1820-1870 to an annual average rate of 2.07% in the time interval
1870-1913 and 1.25% in the years 1913-1950.26 In Western Europe population growth declined from a
signiﬁcantly lower average level of 0.77% per year in the period 1870-1913 to an average rate of 0.42%
26Migration played a signiﬁcant role in the rate of population growth of these land-abundant countries.






































































Latin America Asia Africa
Figure 2.20. The Diﬀerential Timing of the Demographic Transition Across Regions
Source: Maddison (2001)
In contrast, in Latin America and Asia the reduction in population growth started to take place
in the 1970s, whereas the average population growth in Africa has been rising, despite a modest decline
in fertility rates.28 Latin America experienced a decline in population growth from an average annual
rate of 2.73% in the years 1950-1973 to an annual average rate of 2.01% in the period 1973-1998
Similarly, Asia (excluding Japan) experienced a decline in population growth from an average annual
rate of 2.21% in the time period 1950-1973 to an average annual rate of 1.86% in the 1973-1998 period.
Africa’s increased resources in the Post-Malthusian Regime, however, has been channeled primarily
towards population growth.
Africa’s population growth rate has increased monotonically from a modest average annual rate of
0.4% over the years 1820-1870, to a 0.75% in the time interval 1870-1913, 1.65% in the period 1913-1950,
2.33% in 1950-1973, and a rapid average annual rate of 2.73% in the 1973-1998 period . Consequently,
the share of the African population in the world increased by 41% in the 60 year period, 1913-1973
(from 7% in 1913 to 9.9% in 1973), and an additional 30% in the last 25 years, from 9.9% in 1973 to
12.9% in 1998. The decline in fertility in less developed regions, however, has been more signiﬁcant,
indicating a sharp forthcoming decline in population growth in the next decades.
Fertility Decline
T h ed e c l i n ei np o p u l a t i o ng r o w t hs t e mf r o mad e c line in fertility rates. As depicted in Figure
2.21, Total Fertility Rate over the period 1960-1999 plummeted from 6 to 2.7 in Latin America and
d e c l i n e ds h a r p l yf r o m6 . 1 4t o3 . 1 4i nA s i a . 29 Furthermore, Total Fertility Rate in Western Europe and
the Western Oﬀshoots declined over this period below the replacement level: from 2.8 in 1960 to 1.5
in 1999 in Western Europe and from 3.84 in 1960 to 1.83 in 1999 in the Western Oﬀshoots. (World
27As h a r p e rr e d u c t i o ni np o p u l a t i o ng r o w t ho c c u r r e di nt h eU n i t e dK i n g d o m ,f r o m0 . 8 7 %p e ry e a ri nt h ep e r i o d1 8 7 0 -
1913 to 0.27% per year in the period 1913-1950.
28As depicted in Figure 2.18, the decline in Total Fertility Rate in these countries started earlier. The delay in the
decline in population growth could be attributed to an increase in life expectancy as well as an increase in the relative
size of cohorts of women in a reproduction age.
29For a comprehensive discussion of the virtues and drawbacks of the various measures of fertility: TFR, NNR,a n d
CBR, see Weil (2004).
23Development Indicators, 2001). Even in Africa the Total Fertility Rate declined moderately from 6.55
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Figure 2.21. The Evolution of Total Fertility Rate Across Regions, 1960-1999
Source: World Development Indicators (2001).
The demographic transition in Western Europe occurred towards the turn of the 19th century.
A sharp reduction in fertility took place simultaneously in several countries in the 1870s, and resulted
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Figure 2.22. The Demographic Transition in Western Europe:
Crude Birth Rates and Net Reproduction Rates
Source: Andorka (1978) and Kuzynski (1969)
As depicted in Figure 2.22, Crude Birth Rates in England declined by 44%, from 36 (per 1000)
in 1875, to 20 (per 1000) in 1920. Similarly, live births per 1000 women aged 15-44 fell from 153.6 in
30Coale and Treadway (1986) ﬁnd that a 10% decline in fertility rates was completed in 59% of all European countries in
the time period 1890-1920. In particular, a 10% decline was completed in Belgium in 1881, Switzerland in 1887, Germany
in 1888, England and Wales in 1892, Scotland in 1894, Netherlands in 1897, Denmark in 1898, Sweden in 1902, Norway
in 1903, Austria in 1907, Hungary in 1910, Finland in 1912, Greece and Italy in 1913, Portugal in 1916, Spain 1920, and
Ireland in 1922.
241871-80 to 109.0 in 1901-10 (Wrigley, 1969). In Germany, Crude Birth Rates declined 37%, from 41
(per 1000) in 1875 to 26 (per 1000) in 1920. Sweden’s Crude Birth Rates declined 32%, from 31 (per
1000) in 1875 to 21 (per 1000) in 1920, and in Finland they declined 32%, from 37 in 1875 to 25 (per
1000) in 1920. Finally, although the timing of demographic transition in France represents an anomaly,
starting in the second half of the 18th century, France experienced an additional signiﬁcant reduction
in fertility in the time period 1865-1910, where Crude Birth Rates declined by 26%, from 27 (per 1000)
in 1965 to 20 (per 1000) in 1910.
The decline in the crude birth rates in the course of the demographic transition was accompanied
by a signiﬁcant decline in the Net Reproduction Rate (i.e., the number of daughters per woman who
reach the reproduction age), as depicted in Figure 2.22. Namely, the decline in fertility during the
demographic transition outpaced the decline in mortality rates, and brought about a decline in the
number of children who survived to their reproduction age.
Similar patterns are observed in the evolution of Total Fertility Rates in Western Europe, as
depicted in Figure 2.23. Total Fertility Rates (TFR) peaked in the 1870s and then decline sharply and
simultaneously across Western European States. In England, TFR declined by 51%, from 4.94 children
in 1875, to 2.4 in 1920. In Germany, TFR declined 57%, from 5.29 in 1885 to 2.26 in 1920. Sweden’s
TFR declined 61%, from 4.51 in 1876 to 1.77 in 1931, in Finland they declined 52%, from 4.96 in 1876
to 2.4 in 1931 and in France where a major decline occurred in the years 1750-1850, additional decline
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Figure 2.23. The Demographic Transition in Western Europe: Total Fertility Rates
Source: Chesnais (1992)
Mortality Decline
The mortality decline which preceded the decline in fertility rates in most countries in the world,
with the notable exceptions of France and the United States, has been, unjustiﬁably, viewed by demog-
raphers as the prime force behind the demographic transition. The evidence provided in section 3.3.1,
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Figure 2.24. The Mortality Decline in Western Europe, 1730-1920
Source: Andorka (1978)
The decline in mortality rates preceded the decline in fertility rates in Western European countries
in the 1730-1920 period, as depicted in Figures 2.22 and 2.24. The decline in mortality rates began in
England 140 years prior to the decline in fertility and in Sweden and Finland nearly 100 years prior to
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Figure 2.25. The Decline in Infant Mortality Rates Across Regions, 1960-1999
Source: World Development Indicators (2001).
A similar sequence of events emerges from the pattern of mortality and fertility decline in less
developed regions. As depicted in Figures 2.21 and 2.25, a sharp decline in infant mortality rates as
of 1960 preceded the decline in fertility rates in Africa that took place in 1980. Moreover, the existing
evidence shows a simultaneous reduction in mortality and fertility in the 1960-2000 period in all other
regions.31
31Extrapolation about mortality rates prior to 1960 suggests that a similar pattern appears in Asia and Latin America.
26Life Expectancy
The decline in mortality rates in developed countries since the 18th century, as depicted in
Figure 2.24, corresponded to a gradual increase in life expectancy generating a further inducement for
investment in human capital. As depicted in Figure 2.26, life expectancy at birth in England increased
at a stable pace from 32 years in the 1720s to about 41 years in the 1870s. This pace of the rise in life
expectancy increased towards the end of the 19th century and life expectancy reached the levels of 50
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Figure 2.26. The Evolution of Life Expectancy: England 1726-1996
Source: Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1981) for 1726-1871 and Human Mortality Database (2003) for 1876-1996
Similarly, the signiﬁcant decline in mortality rates across the developed regions in the last two
centuries and across less developed regions in the past century, corresponded to an increase in life
expectancy. As depicted in Figure 2.27, life expectancy increased signiﬁcantly in developed regions in
the 19th century, whereas the rise in life expectancy in less developed regions occurred throughout the
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Figure 2.27. The Evolution of Life Expectancy Across Regions, 1820-1999
Source: Maddison (2001).
27In particular, life expectancy nearly tripled in the course of the 20th century in Asia, rising from
a level of 24 years in 1960 to 66 years in 1999, reﬂecting the rise in income per capita as well as the
diﬀusion of medical technology. Similarly, life expectancy in Africa doubled from 24 years in 1900 to
52 years in 1999. The more rapid advancement in income per capita in Latin America generated an
earlier rise in life expectancy, and life expectancy increased modestly during the 19th century and more
signiﬁcantly in the course of the 20th century, from 35 years in 1900 to 69 years in 1999.
2.3.3 Industrial Development and Human Capital Formation
The process of industrialization was characterized by a gradual increase in the relative importance of
human capital for the production process. The acceleration in the rate of technological progress increased
gradually the demand for human capital, inducing individuals to invest in education, and stimulating
further technological advancement. Moreover, in developed as well as less developed regions the onset of
the process of human capital accumulation preceded the onset of the demographic transition, suggesting
that the rise in the demand for human capital in the process of industrialization and the subsequent
accumulation of human capital played a signiﬁcant role in the demographic transition and the transition
to a state of sustained economic growth.
Developed Economies32
As observed by Abramowitz (1993 p. 224), “In the nineteenth century, technological progress
was heavily biased in a physical capital-using direction...the bias shifted in an intangible (human and
knowledge) capital-using direction and produced the substantial contribution of education and other
intangible capital accumulation to this century productivity growth.” Furthermore, as argued by Goldin
(2001), “The modern concept of the wealth of nations emerged by the early twentieth century. It was
that capital embodied in the people – human capital – mattered.”
In the ﬁrst phase of the Industrial Revolution, the extent of public education was not correlated
with industrial development and it diﬀered across countries due to political, cultural, social, historical
and institutional factors. Human capital had a limited role in the production process and education
served religious, social, and national goals. In contrast, in the second phase of the Industrial Revolution
the demand for skilled labor in the growing industrial sector markedly increased, human capital forma-
tion was designed primarily to satisfy the increasing skill requirements in the process of industrialization,
and industrialists became involved in shaping the education system.
Notably, the reversal of the Malthusian relation between income and population growth during
the demographic transition, corresponded to an increase in the level of resources invested in each child.
For example, the literacy rate among men, which was stable at around 65% in the ﬁrst phase of the
Industrial Revolution, increased signiﬁcantly during the second phase, reaching nearly 100% at the end
of the 19th century (Clark 2003), and the proportion of children aged 5 to 14 in primary schools increased
signiﬁcantly in the second half of the 19th century, from 11% in 1855 to 74% in 1900. A similar pattern
is observed in other European societies (Flora et al. 1983). In particular, as depicted in Figure 2.28,
the proportion of children aged 5 to 14 in primary schools in France increased signiﬁcantly in the second
half of the 19th century, from 30% in 1832 to 86% in 1901.
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Figure 2.28. The Fraction of Children Age 5-14 in Public Primary Schools, 1820-1940
Source: Flora et al. (1983)
Evidence about the evolution of the return to human capital over this period are scarce and
controversial. They do not indicate that the skill premium increased markedly in Europe over the
course of the 19th century (Clark 2003). One can argue that the lack of clear evidence about the
increase in the return to human capital over this period is an indication for the absence of a signiﬁcant
increase in the demand for human capital. This partial equilibrium argument, however is ﬂawed. The
return to human capital is an equilibrium price that is aﬀected both by the demand and the supply of
human capital. Technological progress in the second phase of the Industrial Revolution brought about
an increase in the demand for human capital, and indeed, in the absence of a supply response, one
would have expected an increase in the return to human capital. However, the signiﬁcant increase in
schooling that took place in the 19th century, and in particular the introduction of public education
that lowered the cost of education, generated a signiﬁcant increase in the supply of educated workers.
Some of this supply response was a direct reaction of the increase in the demand for human capital,
and thus may only operate to partially oﬀset the increase in the return to human capital. However, the
r e m o v a lo ft h ea d v e r s ee ﬀect of credit constraints on the acquisition of human capital (as reﬂected by the
introduction of public education) generated an additional force that increased the supply of educated
labor and operated towards a reduction in the return to human capital.33
A. The Industrial Base for Education Reforms in the 19th Century
Education reforms in developed countries in the 18th and the 19th century provide a profound
insight about the signiﬁcance of industrial development in the formation of human capital (and thus
in the onset of the demographic transition) in the second half of the 19th century. In particular, the
variation in the timing of the establishment of a national system of public education between England and
Continental Europe is instrumental in isolating the role of industrial forces in human capital formation
from other forces such as social control, moral conformity, enlightenment, sociopolitical stability, social
and national cohesion, and military eﬃciency.
33This argument is supported indirectly by contemporary evidence about a higher rate of returns to human capital in
less developed economies than in developed economies (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2002). The greater prevalence of
credit markets imperfections and other barriers for the acquisition of skills in less developed economies generated only a
partial supply response to industrial demand for human capital, contributing to this diﬀerential in the skill premium.
29England In the ﬁrst phase of the Industrial Revolution (1760-1830), capital accumulation increased
signiﬁcantly without a corresponding increase in the supply of skilled labor. The investment ratio
increased from 6% in 1760 to 11.7% in the year 1831 (Crafts 1985, p. 73). In contrast, literacy rates
remained largely unchanged and the state devoted virtually no resources to raising the level of literacy
of the masses. During the ﬁrst stages of the Industrial Revolution, literacy was largely a cultural skill
or a hierarchical symbol and had limited demand in the production process.34 For instance, in 1841
only 4.9% of male workers and only 2.2% of female workers were in occupations in which literacy was
strictly required (Mitch 1992, pp. 14-15). During this period, an illiterate labor force could operate
the existing technology, and economic growth was not impeded by educational retardation.35 Workers
developed skills primarily through on-the-job training, and child labor was highly valuable.
The development of a national public system of education in England lagged behind the conti-
nental countries by nearly half a century and the literacy rate hardly increased in the period 1750-1830
(Sanderson 1995, pp. 2-10).36 As argued by Green (1990, pp. 293-294), “Britain’s early industrialization
h a do c c u r r e dw i t h o u td i r e c ts t a t ei n t e r v e n t i o na n dd e v e l o p e ds u c c e s s f u l l y ,a tl e a s ti ni t se a r l ys t a g e s ,
within a laissez-faire framework. Firstly, state intervention was thought unnecessary for developing
technical skills, where the initial requirements were slight and adequately met by traditional means.
Secondly, the very success of Britain’s early industrial expansion encouraged a complacency about the
importance of scientiﬁc skills and theoretical knowledge which became a liability in a later period when
empirical knowledge, inventiveness and thumb methods were no longer adequate.” Furthermore, as ar-
gued by Landes (1969, p. 340) “although certain workers - supervisory and oﬃce personnel in particular
- must be able to read and do the elementary arithmetical operations in order to perform their duties,
large share of the work of industry can be performed by illiterates as indeed it was especially in the
early days of the industrial revolution.”
England initiated a sequence of reforms in its education system since the 1830s and literacy
rates gradually increased. The process was initially motivated by a non-industrial reasons such as
religion, social control, moral conformity, enlightenment, and military eﬃciency, as was the case in other
European countries (e.g., Germany, France, Holland, Switzerland) that had supported public education
much earlier.37 However, in light of the modest demand for skills and literacy by the capitalists, the
level of governmental support was rather small.38
In the second phase of the Industrial Revolution, the demand for skilled labor in the growing
industrial sector markedly increased and the proportion of children aged 5 to 14 in primary schools
increased from 11% in 1855 to 25% in 1870 (Flora et al. 1983). Job advertisements, for instance, suggest
that literacy became an increasingly desired characteristic for employment as of the 1850s (Mitch 1993,
p. 292). In light of the industrial competition from other countries, capitalists started to recognize
the importance of technical education for the provision of skilled workers. As noted by Sanderson
1995, pp. 10-13), “reading ...enabled the eﬃcient functioning of an urban industrial society laced with
letter writing, drawing up wills, apprenticeship indentures, passing bills of exchange, and notice and
34See Mokyr (1993, 2001).
35Some have argued that the low skill requirements even declined over this period. For instance, Sanderson (1995, p. 89)
suggests that “One thus ﬁnds the interesting situation of an emerging economy creating a whole range of new occupations
which require even less literacy and education than the old ones.”
36For instance, in his parliamentary speech in defense of his 1837 education bill, the Whig politician, Henry Brougham,
reﬂected upon this gap: “It cannot be doubted that some legislative eﬀo r tm u s ta tl e n g t hb em a d et or e m o v ef r o mt h i s
country the opprobrium of having done less for education of the people than any of the more civilized nations on earth”
(Green (1990, pp.10-11)).
37The proximity of the education acts in the UK to major wars suggests that the provision of public education was
partly a compensation for the services of soldiers.
38Even in 1869 the government funded only one-third of school expenditure (Green, 1990, pp. 6-7).
30advertisement reading.” Moreover, manufacturers argued that: “universal education is required in order
to select, from the mass of the workers, those who respond well to schooling and would make a good
f o r e m a no nt h es h o pﬂoor” (Simon 1987, p. 104).
As it became apparent that skills were necessary for the creation of an industrial society, replacing
previous ideas that the acquisition of literacy would make the working classes receptive to radical and
subversive ideas, capitalists lobbied for the provision of public education for the masses.39 The pure
laissez-faire policy failed in developing a proper educational system and capitalists demanded government
intervention in the provision of education. As James Kitson, a Leeds iron-master and an advocate of
technical education explained to the Select Committee on Scientiﬁc Instruction (1867-1868): “...the
question is so extensive that individual manufacturers are not able to grapple with it, and if they went to
immense trouble to establish schools they would be doing it in order that others may reap the beneﬁt”
(Green, 1990, p. 295).40
An additional turning point in the attitude of capitalists towards public education was the Paris
Exhibition of 1867, where the limitations of English scientiﬁc and technical education became clearly
evident. Unlike the 1851 exhibition in which England won most of the prizes, the English performance in
Paris was rather poor; of the 90 classes of manufacturers, Britain dominated only in 10. Lyon Playfair,
who was one of the jurors, reported that: “a singular accordance of opinion prevailed that our country
has shown little inventiveness and made little progress in the peaceful arts of industry since 1862.”
This lack of progress “upon which there was most unanimity conviction is that France, Prussia, Austria,
Belgium and Switzerland possess good systems of industrial education and that England possesses none”
(Green 1990, p. 296).41
In 1868, the government established the Parliamentary Select Committee on Scientiﬁc Educa-
tion. This was the origin of nearly 20 years of various parliamentary investigations into the relationship
between science, industry, and education, that were designed to address the capitalists’ outcry about
the necessity of universal public education. A sequence of reports by the committee in 1868, the Royal
Commission on Scientiﬁc Instruction and the Advancement of Science during the period 1872-75, and
by the Royal Commission on Technical Education in 1882, underlined the inadequate training for super-
visors, managers and proprietors, as well as workers. They argued that most managers and proprietors
did not understand the manufacturing process and thus, failed to promote eﬃciency, investigate inno-
vative techniques or value the skills of their workers (Green 1990, pp. 297-298). In particular, W. E.
Forster, the Vice President of the committee of the Council of Education told The House of Commons:
“Upon the speedy provision of elementary education depends our industrial prosperity...if we leave our
work-folk any longer unskilled...they will become overmatched in the competition of the world” (Hurt
1971, pp. 223-224). The reports made various recommendations which highlighted the need to rede-
ﬁne elementary schools, to revise the curriculum throughout the entire school system, particularly with
respect to industry and manufacture, and to improve teacher training.
In addition, in 1868, secondary schools were investigated by the Schools Inquiry Commission,
which found a very unsatisfactory level for the vast majority of schools that employed untrained teach-
ers and used antiquated methods. Their main proposal was to organize a state inspection of secondary
39There was a growing consensus among workers and capitalists about the virtues of reform. The labor union movement
was increasingly calling for a national system of non-sectarian education. The National Education League (founded in
1869 by radical Liberals and Dissenters) demanded a free, compulsory, non-sectarian national system of education (Green,
1990, p. 302).
40Indeed, the Factory Act of 1802 required owners of textile mills to provide elementary instruction for their apprentices,
but the law was poorly enforced (Cameron (1989, p. 216-217)).
41Moreover, the Nussey brothers, who had written a report on woolen textiles at the Exhibition, returned to Leeds to
start a movement for a Yorkshire College of Science.
31schools and to provide eﬃcient education geared towards the speciﬁc needs of its consumers. In particu-
lar, the Royal Commission on Technical Education of 1882 conﬁrmed that England was being overtaken
by the industrial superiority of Prussia, France and the United States and recommended the introduction
of technical and scientiﬁc education into secondary schools.
It appears that the government gradually yielded to the pressure by capitalists as well as labor
unions, as reﬂected by its increased contributions to elementary as well as higher education. In the 1870
Education Act, the government assumed responsibility for ensuring universal elementary education,
although it did not provide either free or compulsory education at the elementary level. The Act created
a national provision without an integrated system, where voluntary schools existed beside state schools.
In 1880, prior to the signiﬁcant extension of the franchise of 1884 that made the working class the
majority in most industrial countries, education was made compulsory throughout England. The 1889
Technical Instruction Act allowed the new local councils to set up technical instruction committees, and
the 1890 Local Taxation Act provided public funds that could be spent on technical education (Green,
1990, p. 299).
School enrollment of 10-year olds increased from 40% in 1870 to 100% in 1900, the literacy rate
among men, which was stable at around 65% in the ﬁrst phase of the Industrial Revolution, increased
signiﬁcantly during the second phase reaching nearly 100% at the end of the 19th century (Clark 2002),
and the proportion of children aged 5 to 14 in primary schools increased signiﬁcantly in the second half
of the 19th century, from 11% in 1855 to 74% in 1900 (Flora et al. 1983). Finally, the 1902 Balfour Act
marked the consolidation of a national education system and created state secondary schools (Ringer
1979 and Green 1990, p. 6) and science and engineering and their application to technology gained
prominence (Mokyr 1990, 2002).
Continental Europe The early development of public education occurred in the western countries
of continental Europe (e.g., Prussia, France, Sweden, and the Netherlands) well before the Industrial
Revolution. The provision of public education at this early stage was motivated by several goals such as
social and national cohesion, military eﬃciency, enlightenment, moral conformity, sociopolitical stability
as well as religious reasons. However, as was the case in England, massive educational reforms occurred in
the second half of the 19th century due to the rising demand for skills in the process of industrialization.
As noted by Green (1990, pp. 293-294) “In continental Europe industrialization occurred under the
tutelage of the state and began its accelerated development later when techniques were already becoming
more scientiﬁc; technical and scientiﬁc education had been vigorously promoted from the center as an
essential adjunct of economic growth and one that was recognized to be indispensable for countries
which wished to close Britain’s industrial lead.”
In France, indeed, the initial development of the education system occurred well before the Indus-
trial Revolution, but the process was intensiﬁed and transformed to satisfy industrial needs in the second
phase of the Industrial Revolution. The early development of elementary and secondary education in
the 17th and 18th centuries was dominated by the Church and religious orders. Some state intervention
in technical and vocational training was designed to reinforce development in commerce, manufacturing
and military eﬃciency. After the French Revolution, the state established universal primary schools.
Nevertheless, enrolment rates remained rather low. The state concentrated on the development of sec-
ondary and higher education with the objective of producing an eﬀective elite to operate the military and
governmental apparatus. Secondary education remained highly selective, oﬀering general and technical
instruction largely to the middle class (Green 1990, pp. 135-137 and 141-142)). Legislative propos-
als during the National Convention quoted by Cubberley (1920, pp. 514-517) are revealing about the
32underlying motives for education in this period: “...Children of all classes were to receive education,
physical, moral and intellectual, best adapted to develop in them republican manners, patriotism, and
t h el o v eo fl a b o r ...T h e ya r et ob et a k e ni n t ot h eﬁelds and workshops where they may see agricultural
andmechanicaloperationsgoingon...”
The process of industrialization in France and the associated increase in the demand for skilled
labor, as well as the breakdown of the traditional apprenticeship system, signiﬁcantly aﬀected the
attitude towards education. State grants for primary schools were gradually increased in the 1830s and
legislation made an attempt to provide primary education in all regions, extend the higher education,
and provide teacher training and school inspections. The number of communities without schools
fell by 50% from 1837 to 1850 and as the inﬂuence of industrialists on the structure of education
intensiﬁed, education became more stratiﬁed according to occupational patterns (Anderson 1975 p. 15,
31). According to Green 1990, p.157): “[This] legislation...reﬂected the economic development of the
period and thus the increasing need for skilled labor.” The eagerness of capitalists for rapid education
reforms was reﬂected by the organization of industrial societies that ﬁnanced schools specializing in
chemistry, design, mechanical weaving, spinning, and commerce (Anderson 1975, p 86, 204).
As was the case in England, industrial competition led industrialists to lobby for the provision
of public education. The Great Exhibition of 1851 and the London Exhibition of 1862 created the
impression that the technological gap between France and other European nations was narrowing and
that French manufacturers ought to invest in the education of their labor force to maintain their tech-
nological superiority. Subsequently, the reports on industrial education by commissions established in
the years 1862 to 1865 reﬂected the plea of industrialists for the provision of industrial education on
a large scale and for the implementation of scientiﬁc knowledge in the industry. “The goal of modern
education...can no longer be to form men of letters, idle admirers of the past, but men of science,
builders of the present, initiators of the future.”42 (Anderson 1975, p. 194).
Education reforms in France were extensive in the second phase of the Industrial Revolution,
and by 1881 a universal, free, compulsory and secular primary school system had been established and
technical and scientiﬁc education further emphasized. Illiteracy rates among conscripts tested at the
age of 20 declined gradually from 38% in 1851-55 to 17% in 1876-80 (Anderson 1975, p. 158)), and
the proportion of children aged 5 to 14 in primary schools increased from 51.5% in 1850 to 86% in
1901 (Flora et al. 1983)). Hence, the process of industrialization, and the increase in the demand for
skilled labor in the production process, led industrialists to support the provision of universal education,
contributing to the extensiveness of education as well as to its focus on industrial needs.
In Prussia, as well, the initial steps towards compulsory education took place at the beginning of
the 18th century well before the Industrial Revolution. Education was viewed at this stage primarily as a
method to unify the state. In the second part of the 18th century, education was made compulsory for all
children aged 5 to 13. Nevertheless, these regulations were not strictly enforced due to the lack of funding
associated with the diﬃculty of taxing landlords for this purpose, and due to the loss of income from
child labor. At the beginning of the 19th century, motivated by the need for national cohesion, military
eﬃciency, and trained bureaucrats, the education system was further reformed, establishing provincial
and district school boards, making education a secular activity and compulsory for a three-year period,
and reconstituting the Gymnasium as a state institution that provided nine years of education for the
elite (Cubberly 1920 and Green 1990).
The process of industrialization in Prussia and the associated increase in the demand for skilled
labor led to signiﬁcant pressure for educational reforms and thereby to the implementation of universal
42L’Enseignement professionnel, ii (1864), p. 332, quoted in Anderson (1975).
33elementary schooling. Taxes were imposed to ﬁnance the school system and teacher training and certiﬁ-
cation were established. Secondary schools started to serve industrial needs as well, and the Realschulen,
which emphasized the teaching of mathematics and science, was gradually adopted, and vocational and
trade schools were founded. Total enrolment in secondary school increased sixfold from 1870 to 1911
(Flora et al. 1983). “School courses...had the function of converting the occupational requirements
of public administration, commerce and industry into educational qualiﬁcations...” (Muller 1987, pp.
23-24). Furthermore, the Industrial Revolution signiﬁcantly aﬀected the nature of education in German
universities. German industrialists who perceived advanced technology as the competitive edge that
could boost German industry, lobbied for reforms in the operation of universities, and oﬀered to pay to
reshape their activities so as to favor their interest in technological training and industrial applications
of basic research (McClelland 1980, p. 300-301).
The structure of education in the Netherlands also reﬂected the interest of capitalists in the skill
formation of the masses. In particular, as early as the 1830s, industrial schools were established and
funded by private organizations, representing industrialists and entrepreneurs. Ultimately, in the latter
part of the 19th century, the state, urged by industrialists and entrepreneurs, started to support these
schools (Wolthuis, 1999, pp. 92-93, 119, 139-140, 168, 171-172).
United States The process of industrialization in the US also increased the importance of human
capital in the production process. Evidence provided by Abramowitz and David (2000) and Goldin and
Katz (2001) suggests that over the period 1890-1999, the contribution of human capital accumulation to
the growth process of the United States nearly doubled.43 As argued by Goldin (2001), the rise of the
industrial, business and commerce sectors in the late 19th and early 20th centuries increased the demand
for managers, clerical workers, and educated sales personnel who were trained in accounting, typing,
shorthand, algebra, and commerce. Furthermore, in the late 1910s, technologically advanced industries
demanded blue-collar craft workers who were trained in geometry, algebra, chemistry, mechanical draw-
ing, etc. The structure of education was transformed in response to industrial development and the
increasing importance of human capital in the production process, and American high schools adapted
to the needs of the modern workplace of the early 20th century. Total enrolment in public secondary
schools increased 70-fold from 1870 to 1950. (Kurian, 1994).44
B. Human Capital, Factor Prices and Inequality
In the ﬁrst phase of the Industrial Revolution, prior to the implementation of signiﬁcant education
reforms, physical capital accumulation was the prime engine of economic growth. In the absence of
signiﬁcant human capital formation, the concentration of capital among the capitalist class widened
43It should be noted that literacy rates in the US were rather high prior to this increase in the demand for skilled labor.
Literacy rates among the white population were already 89% in 1870, 92% in 1890, and 95% in 1910 (Engerman and
Sokoloﬀ (2000)). Education in earlier periods was motivated by social control, moral conformity, and social and national
cohesion, as well as required skills for trade and commerce. In particular, Field (1976) and Bowles and Gintis (1975) argue
that educational reforms are designed to sustain the existing social order, by displacing social problems into the school
system.
44As noted by Galor and Moav (2004), due to diﬀerences in the structure of education ﬁnance in the US in comparison
to European countries, capitalists in the US had only limited incentives to lobby for the provision of education and
support it ﬁnancially. Unlike the central role that government funding played in the provision of public education in
European countries, the evolution of the education system in the US was based on local initiatives and funding. The
local nature of the education initiatives in the US induced community members, in urban as well as rural areas, to play a
signiﬁcant role in advancing their schooling system. American capitalists, however, faced limited incentives to support the
provision of education within a county in an environment where labor was mobile across counties and the beneﬁts from
educational expenditure in one county may be reaped by employers in other counties. “The impetus to expand education
to the secondary level was primarily a grassroots movement led by parents, employers, and even young people themselves”
(Goldin (1999)).
34wealth inequality. Once education reforms were implemented, however, the signiﬁcant increase in the
return to labor relative to capital, as well as the signiﬁcant increase in the real return to labor and the
associated accumulation of assets by the workers, brought about a decline in inequality.
Evidence suggests that in the ﬁrst phase of the Industrial Revolution, prior to the implementation
of education reforms, capital accumulation brought about a gradual increase in wages along with an
increase in the wage-rental ratio. Education reforms in the second phase of the Industrial Revolution
were associated with a sharp increase in real wages along with a sharp increase in the wage-rental ratio.45
Finally, wealth inequality widened in the ﬁrst phase of the Industrial Revolution and reversed its course
in the second phase, once signiﬁcant education reforms were implemented.
As documented in Figure 2.29, over the time period 1823-1915, wealth inequality in the UK
reached a peak around 1870 and declined thereafter, in close association with the patterns of enrolment
rates and factor prices, depicted in Figures 2.28 and 2.29.46 It appears that the decline in inequality is
associated with the signiﬁcant changes that occurred around 1870 in the relative returns to the main
factors of production possessed by capitalists and workers. These changes in factor prices reﬂect the
increase in enrolment rates — in particular the process of education reforms from 1830 to 1870 and its





























































































Figure 2.29. Wealth Inequality and Factor Prices: England 1820-1920
Source: Williamson (1985) for inequality and Clark (2002, 2003) for factor prices
Similar patterns of the eﬀect of education on factor prices and therefore on inequality are observed
in France as well. As argued by Morrisson and Snyder (2000), wealth inequality in France increased
during the ﬁrst half of the 19th century, and started to decline in the last decades of the 19th century in
close association with the rise in education rates depicted in Figure 2.28, the rise in real wages depicted
in Figure 2.10, and a declining trend of the return to capital over the 19th century. The decline in
inequality in France appears to be associated with the signiﬁcant changes in the relative returns to the
main factors of production possessed by capitalists and workers in the second part of the 19th century
As depicted in Figures 2.10, based on the data presented in Levy-Leboyer and Bourguignon (1990), real
wages as well as the wage-rental ratio increased signiﬁcantly as of 1860, reﬂecting the rise in the demand
45It should be noted that the main source of the increase in real wages was not a decline in prices. Over this period
nominal wages increased signiﬁcantly as well.
46It should be noted that the return to capital increased moderately over this period, despite the increase in the supply
of capital, reﬂecting technological progress, population growth, and accumulation of human capital.
35for skilled labor and the eﬀect of the increase in enrolment rates on the skill level per worker.
The German experience is consistent with this pattern as well. Inequality in Germany peaked
towards the end of the 19th century (Morrisson and Snyder 2000) in association with a signiﬁcant
increase in the real wages and in the wage-rental ratio from the 1880s (Spree 1977 and Berghahn 1994),
which is in turn related to the provision of industrial education in the second half of the 19th century.
The link between the expansion of education and the reduction in inequality is present in the US
as well. Wealth inequality in the US, which increased gradually from colonial times until the second half
of the 19th century, reversed its course at the turn of the century and maintained its declining pattern
during the ﬁrst half of the 20th century (Lindert and Williamson 1976). As argued by Goldin (2001), the
emergence of the “new economy” in the early 20th century increased the demand for educated workers.
The creation of publicly funded mass modern secondary schools from 1910 to 1940 provided general and
practical education, contributed to workers productivity and opened the gates for college education.
This expansion facilitated social and geographic mobility and generated a large decrease in inequality
in economic outcomes.
C. Independence of Political Reforms in the 19th Century
The 19th century was marked by signiﬁcant political reforms along with the described education
reforms. One could therefore challenge the signiﬁcance of the industrial motive for education reform,
suggesting that political reforms during the 19th century shifted the balance of power towards the
working class and enabled workers to implement education reforms against the interest of the industrial
elite, has no empirical support. However, political reforms that took place in the 19th century had
no apparent eﬀect on education reforms over this period, strengthening the hypothesis that indeed
industrial development, and the increasing demand for human capital, were the trigger for human
capital formation and the demographic transition.47 Education reforms took place in autocratic states
that did not relinquish political power throughout the 19th century, and major reforms occurred in
societies in the midst of the process of democratization well before the stage at which the working class
constituted the majority among the voters.
In particular, the most signiﬁcant education reforms in the UK were completed before the voting
majority shifted to the working class. The patterns of education and political reforms in the UK during
the 19th century are depicted in Figure 2.30. The Reform Act of 1832 nearly doubled the total electorate,
but nevertheless only 13% of the voting-age population were enfranchised. Artisans, the working classes,
and some sections of the lower middle classes remained outside of the political system. The franchise
was extended further in the Reform Acts of 1867 and 1884 and the total electorate nearly doubled in
each of these episodes. However, working-class voters did not become the majority in all urban counties
until 1884 (Craig 1989).
The onset of England’s education reforms, and in particular, the fundamental Education Act
of 1870 and its major extension in 1880 occurred prior to the political reforms of 1884 that made the
working class the majority in most counties. As depicted in Figure 2.30, a trend of signiﬁcant increase
in primary education was established well before the extension of the franchise in the context of the
1867 and 1884 Reform Acts. In particular, the proportion of children aged 5 to 14 in primary schools
increased ﬁve-fold (and surpassed 50%) over the three decades prior to the qualitative extension of the
franchise in 1884 in which the working class was granted a majority in all urban counties. Furthermore,
the political reforms do not appear to have any eﬀect on the pattern of education reform. In fact,
the average growth rate of education attendance from decade to decade over the period 1855 to 1920
47See for instance, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), where the extension of the franchise during the 19th century is
viewed as a commitment devise ensuring future income redistribution from the elite to the masses.
36reaches a peak at around the Reform Act of 1884 and starts declining thereafter. It is interesting to note,
however, that the abolishment of education fees in nearly all elementary schools occurs only in 1891,
after the Reform Act of 1884, suggesting that the political power of the working class may have aﬀected
the distribution of education cost across the population, but consistent with the proposed thesis, the
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Figure 2.30. The Evolution of Voting Rights and School Enrolment
Source: Flora et al. (1983)
In France, as well, the expanding pattern of education preceded the major political reform that
gave the voting majority to the working class. The patterns of education and political reforms in France
during the 19th century are depicted in Figure 2.30. Prior to 1848, restrictions limited the electorate
to less than 2.5% of the voting-age population. The 1848 revolution led to the introduction of nearly
universal voting rights for males. Nevertheless, the proportion of children aged 5 to 14 in primary schools
doubled (and exceeded 50%) over the two decades prior to the qualitative extension of the franchise
in 1848 in which the working class was granted a majority among voters. Furthermore, the political
reforms of 1848 do not appear to have any eﬀect on the pattern of education expansion.
A similar pattern occurs in other European countries. Political reforms in the Netherlands did
not aﬀect the trend of education expansion and the proportion of children aged 5 to 14 in primary
schools exceeded 60% well before the major political reforms of 1887 and 1897. Similarly, the trends of
political and education reforms in Sweden, Italy, Norway, Prussia and Russia do not lend credence to
the alternative hypothesis.
Less Developed Economies
The process of industrialization was characterized by a gradual increase in the relative importance
of human capital in less developed economies as well. As depicted in Figure 2.31, educational attainment
increased signiﬁcantly across all less developed regions. Moreover, in line with the pattern that emerged
among developed economies in the 19th century, the increase in educational attainment preceded the
decline in total fertility rates. In particular, the average years of schooling in Africa increased by 44%
(from 1.56 to 2.44) prior to the onset of decline in total fertility rates in 1980, as depicted in Figure
2.23, whereas the available data for Asia and Latin America demonstrates a simultaneous increase in
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Figure 2.31. The Evolution of Average Years of Education: 1960-2000
Source: Barro and Lee (2000)
2.3.4 International Trade and Industrialization
The process of industrialization in developed economies was enhanced by the expansion of international
trade. During the 19th century, North-South trade, as well as North-North trade, expanded signiﬁcantly
due to a rapid industrialization in Northwest Europe as well as the reduction of trade barriers and
transportation costs and the beneﬁts of the gold standard. The ratio of world trade to output was
about 2% in 1800, but then it rose to 10% in 1870, to 17% in 1900 and 21% in 1913 (Estavadeordal,
Frantz, and Taylor 2002). While much of this trade occurred between industrial economies a signiﬁcant
proportion was between industrial and non-industrial economies. As shown in Table 2.1, before 1900
nearly 50% of manufactured exports were to non-European and non-North American economies. By the
end of 19th century a clear pattern of specialization emerged. The UK and Northwest Europe were net
importers of primary products and net exporters of manufactured goods, whereas the exports of Asia,
Oceania, Latin America and Africa were overwhelmingly composed of primary products. (Findlay and
O’Rourke 2001).
Table 2.1. Regional Shares of World Trade in Manufactures
Source: Yates (1959)
1876-1880 1896-1900 1913
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports
U.K. and Ireland 37.8% 9.1% 31.5% 10.4% 25.3% 8.2%
Northwest Europe 47.1% 18.1% 45.8% 20.3% 47.9% 24.4%
Other Europe 9.2% 13.3% 10.3% 12.2% 8.3% 15.4%
U.S. and Canada 4.4% 7.7% 7.4% 9.6% 10.6% 12.1%
Rest of the World 1.5% 51.8% 5.0% 47.5% 7.9% 39.9%
38Atlantic trade as well as trade with Asia, in an era of colonialism, had a major eﬀects on European
growth starting in the late 16th century (Acemoglu et al. 2003). Furthermore, later expansion of inter-
national trade contributed further to the process of industrialization in the UK and Europe (O’Rourke
and Williamson 1999). For the UK, the proportion of foreign trade to national income grew from about
10% in the 1780s to about 26% over the years 1837-45, and 51.5% in the time period 1909-13 (Kuznets
1967). Other European economies experienced a similar pattern as well. The proportion of foreign
trade to national income on the eve of World War I was 53.7% in France, 38.3% in Germany , 33.8% in
Italy, and 40.4% in Sweden (Kuznets 1967, Table 4). Furthermore, export was critical for the viability
of some industries, especially the cotton industry, where 70% of the UK output was exported in the
1870’s. The quantitative study of Stokey (2001) suggests that trade was instrumental for the increased
share of manufacturing in total output in the UK, as well as for the signiﬁcant rise in real wages. Thus
while it appears that technological advances could have spawned the Industrial Revolution without an
expansion of international trade, the growth in exports increased the pace of industrialization and the
growth rate of output per capita.48
2.4 The Great Divergence
The diﬀerential timing of the take-oﬀ from stagnation to growth across countries and the corresponding
variations in the timing of the demographic transition led to a great divergence in income per capita as
well as population growth.
The last two centuries have witnessed dramatic changes in the distribution of income and pop-
ulation across the globe. Some regions have excelled in the growth of income per capita, while other
regions have been dominant in population growth. Inequality in the world economy was negligible till
the 19th century. The ratio of GDP per capita between the richest region and the poorest region in the
world was only 1.1:1 in the year 1000, a 2:1 in the year 1500 and 3:1 in the year 1820. As depicted in
Figure 2.32, there has been a ‘Great Divergence’ in income per capita among countries and regions in
the past two centuries. In particular, the ratio of GDP per capita between the richest region (Western
oﬀshoots) and the poorest region (Africa) has widened considerably from a modest 3:1 ratio in 1820, to
a 5:1 ratio in 1870, a 9:1 ratio in 1913, a 15:1 in 1950, and a huge 18:1 ratio in 2001.
48Pomeranz (2000), provides historical eviden c ef o rt h ev i t a lr o l eo ft r a d ei nt h e‘ t a k eo ﬀ’ of the European economies. He
argues that technological and development diﬀerences between Europe and Asia were minor around 1750, but the discovery






























Figure 2.32. The Great Divergence
Source: Maddison (2001)
An equally momentous transformation occurred in the distribution of world population across
regions, as depicted in Figure 2.33. The earlier take-oﬀ of Western European countries increased the
amount of resources that could be devoted for the increase in family size, permitting a 16% increase in
the share of their population in the world economy within a 50 year period (from 12.8% in 1820 to 14.8%
in 1870). However, the early onset in the Western European demographic transition and the long delay
in the demographic transition of less developed regions well into the 2nd half of the twentieth century
led to a 55% decline in the share of Western European population in the world, from 14.8% in 1870
to 6.6% in 1998. In contrast, the prolongation of Post-Malthusian period among less developed regions
in association with the delay in their demographic transition well into the second half of 20th century,
channeled their increased resources towards a signiﬁcant increase in their population. Africa’s share of
world population increased 84%, from 7% in 1913 to 12.9% in 1998, Asia’s share of world population
increased 11% from 51.7% in 1913 to 57.4% in 1998, and Latin American countries increased their share

























































Figure 2.33. Divergence in Regional Populations
40Thus, while the ratio of income per capita in Western Europe to that in Asia has tripled in the last two
centuries, the ratio of Asian to European population has doubled.49
The divergence that has been witnessed in the last two centuries has been maintained across
countries in the last decades as well (e.g., Jones 1997 and Pritchett 1997). Interestingly, however,
Sala-i-Martin (2002) has shown that the phenomenon has not been maintained in recent decades across
people in the world, (i.e., when national boundaries are removed).
3 The Fundamental Challenges
The discovery of a uniﬁed theory of economic growth that could account for the intricate process of
development in the last thousands of years is one of the most signiﬁcant research challenges facing
researchers in the ﬁeld of growth and development. A uniﬁed theory would unveil the underlying
micro-foundations that are consistent with entire the process of economic development, enhancing the
conﬁdence in the viability of growth theory, its predictions and policy implications, while improving
the understanding of the driving forces that led to the recent transition from stagnation to growth and
the Great Divergence. Moreover, a comprehensive understanding of the hurdles faced by less developed
economies in reaching a state of sustained economic growth would be futile unless the forces that initiated
the transition of the currently developed economies into a state of sustained economic growth would be
identiﬁed and modiﬁed to account for the diﬀerences in the structure of less developed economies in an
interdependent world.
The evidence presented in section 2 suggests that the preoccupation of growth theory with the
empirical regularities that have characterized the growth process of developed economies in the past
century and of less developed economies in the last few decades, has become harder to justify from a
scientiﬁc viewpoint. Could we justify the use of selective observations about the recent course of the
growth process and its principal causes in the formulating exogenous and endogenous neoclassical growth
models? Could we be conﬁdent about the predictions of a theory that is not based on micro-foundations
that match the major characteristics of the entire growth process? The evolution of theories in older
scientiﬁc disciplines suggests that theories that are founded on the basis of a subset of the existing
observations are fragile and non-durable.
3.1 Mysteries of the Growth Process
The underlying determinants of the stunning recent escape from the Malthusian trap have been shaded
in mystery and their signiﬁcance for the understanding of the contemporary growth process has been
explored only very recently. What are the major economic forces that led to the epoch of Malthusian
stagnation that had characterized most of human history? What is the origin of the sudden spurt
in growth rates of output per capita and population that occurred in the course of the take-oﬀ from
stagnation to growth? Why had episodes of technological progress in the pre-industrialization era
failed to generate sustained economic growth? What was the source of the dramatic reversal in the
positive relationship between income per capita and population that existed throughout most human
history? What are the main forces that prompted the demographic transition? Would the transition
to a state of sustained economic growth be feasible without the demographic transition? Are there
49Over the period 1820-1998, the ratio between income per capita in Western Europe and Asia (excluding Japan) grew
2.9 times, whereas the ratio between the Asian population (excluding Japan) and the Western European population grew
1.7 times [Maddison, 2001].
41underlying uniﬁed behavioral and technological structures that can account for these distinct phases of
development simultaneously and what are their implications for the contemporary growth process?
The mind-boggling phenomenon of the Great Divergence in income per capita across regions of
the world in the past two centuries, that accompanied the take-oﬀ from an epoch of stagnation to a
state of sustained economic growth, presents additional unresolved mysteries about the growth process.
What accounts for the sudden take-oﬀ from stagnation to growth in some countries in the world and the
persistent stagnation in others? Why has the positive link between income per capita and population
growth reversed its course in some economies but not in others? Why have the diﬀerences in income
per capita across countries increased so markedly in the last two centuries? Has the pace of transition
to sustained economic growth in advanced economies adversely aﬀected the process of development in
less-developed economies?
The transitions from a Malthusian epoch to a state of sustained economic growth and the emer-
gence of the Great Divergence have shaped the current structure of the world economy. Nevertheless,
neoclassical growth models abstracted from these the signiﬁcant aspects of the growth process. In
recent years, however, it has been increasingly recognized that the understanding of the contempo-
rary growth process would be fragile and incomplete unless growth theory would be based on proper
micro-foundations that reﬂect the growth process in its entirety.
3.2 The Incompatibility of Non-Uniﬁed Growth Theories
Existing (non-uniﬁed) growth models are unable to capture the growth process throughout human his-
tory. Malthusian models capture the growth process during the Malthusian epoch but are incompatible
with the transition to the Modern Growth Regime. Neoclassical growth models (with endogenous or
exogenous technological change), in contrast, are compatiable with the growth process of the developed
economies during the Modern Growth Regime, but fail to capture the evolution of economies during
the Malthusian epoch, the origin of the take-oﬀ from the Malthusian epoch into the Post-Malthusian
Regime, and the sources of the demographic transition and the emergence of the modern growth regime.
Moreover, the failure of non-uniﬁed growth models in identifying the underlying factors that led to the
transition from stagnation to growth limits their applicability for the contemporary growth process of
the less developed economies and thereby for the current evolution of the world income distribution.
3.2.1 Malthusian and Post-Malthusian Theories
The Malthusian Theory
The Malthusian theory, as was outlined initially by Malthus (1798), captures the main attributes
of the epoch of Malthusian stagnation that had characterized most of human existence, but is utterly
inconsistent with the prime characteristics of the modern growth regime.50
The theory suggests that the stagnation in the evolution of income per capita over this epoch
reﬂected the counterbalancing eﬀe c to fp o p u l a t i o ng r o w t ho nt h ee x p a n s i o no fr e s o u r c e s ,i na ne n v i r o n -
ment characterized by diminishing returns to labor. The expansion of resources, according to Malthus,
would lead to an increase in population growth, reﬂecting the natural result of “passion between the
sexes”.51 In contrast, when population size would grow beyond the capacity of the available resources,
50The Malthusian theory was formalized recently. Kremer (1993) models a reduced-form interaction between population
and technology along a Malthusian equilibrium, and Lucas (2002) presents a Malthusian model in which households
optimize over fertility and consumption, labor is subjected to diminishing returns due to the presence of a ﬁxed quantity
of land, and the Malthusian level of income per capita is determined endogenously.
51As argued by Malthus (1798), “The passion between the sexes has appeared in every age to be so nearly the same,
that it may always be considered, in algebraic language as a given quantity.”
42it would be reduced by the “preventive check” (i.e., intentional reduction of fertility) as well as by the
“positive check” (i.e., the tool of nature due to malnutrition, disease, and famine).
According to the theory, periods marked by the absence of changes in the level of technology or
in the availability of land, were characterized by a stable population size as well as a constant income
per capita. In contrast, episodes of technological progress, land expansion, and favorable climatic
conditions, brought about temporary gains in income per capita, triggering an increase in the size of
the population which led ultimately to a decline in income per capita to its long-run level. The theory
proposes therefore that variations in population density across countries during the Malthusian epoch
reﬂected primarily cross-country diﬀerences in technologies and land productivity. Due to the positive
adjustment of population to an increase in income per capita, diﬀerences in technologies or in land
productivity across countries resulted in variations in population density rather than in the standard of
living.
The Malthusian theory generates predictions that are largely consistent with the characteristics
of economies during the Malthusian epoch, as described in Section 2.1: (a) Technological progress or
resource expansion would lead to a larger population, without altering the level of income in the long
run. (b) Income per capita would ﬂuctuate during the Malthusian epoch around a constant level. (c)
Technologically superior countries would have eventually denser populations but their standard of living
in the long run would not reﬂect the degree of their technological advancement. These predictions,
however, are irremediably inconsistent with the relationship between income per capita and population
that has existed in the post-demographic transition era as well as with the state of sustained economic
growth that had characterized the Modern Growth Regime.
Uniﬁed theories of economic growth, in contrast, incorporate the main ingredients of the Malthu-
sian economy into a broader context focusing on the interaction in this epoch between technology and
the size of the population and the distribution of its characteristics, that generate the main ingredients
of the Malthusian epoch but lead to an inevitable take-oﬀ to the Post Malthusian Regime.
The Post-Malthusian Theory
The Post-Malthusian theories capture the acceleration of the growth rate of income per capita
a n dp o p u l a t i o ng r o w t ht h a to c c u r r e di nt h eP o s t - M a l t h u s i a nR e g i m ei na s s o c i a t i o nw i t ht h ep r o c e s so f
industrialization. They do not capture, however, the stagnation during the Malthusian epoch and the
economic forces that gradually emerged in this era and brought about the take-oﬀ from the Malthusian
trap. Moreover, these theories do not account for the factors that ultimately originated the demographic
transition and the transition to a state of sustained economic growth.52
These theories suggest that the acceleration in technological progress and the associated rise in
income per capita was only channeled partly towards an increase in the size of the population. Although,
the Malthusian mechanism linking higher income to higher population growth continued to function, the
eﬀect of higher population on diluting resources per capita, and thus lowering income per capita, was
counteracted by the acceleration in technological progress and capital accumulation, allowing income
52Models that are not based on Malthusian elements are unable to capture the long epoch of Malthusian stagnation in
which output per capita ﬂuctuates around a subsistence level. For instance, an interesting research by Goodfriend and
McDermott (1995) demonstrates that exogenous population growth increases population density and hence generates a
greater scope for the division of labor inducing the development of markets and economic growth. Their model, therefore
generates a take-oﬀ from non-Malthusian stagnation to Post-Malthusian Regime in which population and output are
positively related. The model lacks Malthusian elements and counter-factually it implies therefore that since the emergence
of a market economy over 5000 years ago growth has been strictly positive. Moreover, it does not generate the forces that
would bring about the demographic transition and ultimately sustained economic growth. In the long-run the economy
remains in the Post-Malthuisan regime in which the growth of population and output are positively related. Other non-
Malthusian models that abstracts from population growth and generate an acceleration of output growth along the process
of industrialization include Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997).
43p e rc a p i t at or i s ed e s p i t et h eo ﬀsetting eﬀects of population growth.
Kremer (1993), in an attempt to defend the role of the scale eﬀect in endogenous growth models,
examines a reduced-form of the coevolution of population and technology in a Malthusian and Post
Malthusian environment, providing evidence for the presence of a scale eﬀect in the pre-demographic
transition era. 53 Kremer’s Post-Malthusian theory does not identify the factors that brought about
the take-oﬀ from the Malthusian trap, as well as the driving forces behind the demographic transition
and the transition to a state of sustained economic growth.
Uniﬁed theories capture the main characteristics of the Post-Malthusian Regime, and generate,
in contrast, the endogenous driving forces that brought about the take-oﬀ from the Malthusian epoch
into this regime and ultimately enabled the economy to experience a demographic transition and to
reside in a state of sustained economic growth.
3.2.2 Theories of Modern Economic Growth
Exogenous growth models (e.g. Solow 1956) that have focused primarily on the role of factor accu-
mulation in the growth process, as well as endogenous growth models (e.g., Romer 1990, Grossman
and Helpman 1991, and Aghion and Howitt 1992) that have devoted their attention to the role of
endogenous technological progress in the process of development, were designed to capture the main
characteristics of the Modern Growth Regime. These models, however, are inconsistent with the pattern
of development that had characterized economies over most of human existence. They do not account
for Malthusian epoch the economic factors that brought about the take-oﬀ from the Malthusian regime
into the Post-Malthusian Regime, and the forces that brought about the demographic transition and
ultimately the state of sustained economic growth.54
Modern non-uniﬁed growth theory has not developed the research methodology that would enable
researchers to shed light on the principal factors that would enable less developed economies that are in a
state of Malthusian stagnation, or in a post-Malthusian regime to take-oﬀ to a state of sustained economic
growth. Moreover, most endogenous and exogenous growth models are inconsistent with the changes in
t h ed e m o g r a p h i cr e g i m ea l o n gt h ep r o c e s so fd e v e l o p m e n t . 55 With few exceptions non-uniﬁed growth
models do not generate the hump-shaped relationship between income per capita and population growth
in the process of development. Most growth models with endogenous population have been oriented
toward the modern regime, capturing the recent negative relationship between population growth and
income per capita, but failing to capture the positive eﬀect of income per capita on population growth
that had characterized most human existence and the economic factors that triggered the demographic
transition.56
53Komlos and Artzrouni (1990) simulates an escape from a Malthusian trap based on the Malthusian and Boserupian
interaction between population and technology.
54Non-uniﬁed growth models are inconsistent with the process of development in the Malthusian epoch. Moreover, as
long as the neoclassical production structure of non-decreasing returns to scale is maintained, they could not be modiﬁed
to account for the Malthusian epoch by the incorporation of endogenous population growth. Suppose that the optimal
growth model would be augmented to account for endogenous population. Suppose further that the parameters of the
model would be chosen so as to assure that the level of income per capita would reﬂect the level that existed during the
Malthusian epoch and population growth will be near replacement level as was the case during this era. This equilibrium
would not possess the prime characteristic of a Malthusian equilibrium. Namely, technological progress would raise income
per capita permanently since adjustments in population growth would not oﬀset this rise of income (as long as the return
to labor is characterized by non-diminishing returns to scale).
55In fact, most endogenous growth models that focus exclusively on the modern growth regime are inconsistent with
the demographic structure within this regime, predicting a positive eﬀect of population growth on (the growth rate of)
income per capita. A notable exception is Dalgaard and Kreiner (2001).
56Earlier papers that captures aspects of the cross-section relationship between income per capita and fertility includes
Ben Zion and Razin (1975), Barro and Becker, (1989) and Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990), and recent ones include
Deopke and De la Croix (2003) and Moav (2005).
443.3 Theories of the Demographic Transition and Their Empirical Validity
The theories of the demographic transition attempt to capture the determinants of the signiﬁcant reduc-
tion in fertility rates and population growth that characterized the world in the past century, following
the unprecedented increase in population growth during the Post-Malthusian regime, enabling economies
to convert a increasing share of the beneﬁts of factor accumulation and technological progress into growth
of output per capita.
There are several factors that could have theoretically triggered a demographic transition. The
simultaneity of the demographic transition across Western European countries suggests that a common
cause may have originated the various transitions. Was it an outcome of a simultaneous decline in
mortality rates across Western European countries? Was it associated with a nearly simultaneous rise
in income across Western European countries? An outcome of the rise in the relative wages of women
in the second phase of the Industrial Revolution? Or was it a consequence of the universal rise in the
demand for education and the associated decline in child labor in the second phase of the Industrial
Revolution? Historical evidence suggests that demographers’ explanation of the demographic transition
- the decline in mortality - is highly implausible. Moreover, Becker’s emphasis on the role of rising
income in the demographic transition is inconsistent with the evidence. Empirical evidence suggests
that the rise in the demand for human capital is the most signiﬁcant force behind the demographic
transition and it is therefore a critical building block in existing uniﬁed theories.
3.3.1 The Decline in Infant and Child Mortality
The decline in infant and child mortality rates that preceded the decline in fertility rates in most
countries in the world, with the notable exceptions of France and the US, has been demographers’
favorite explanation for the onset of the decline in fertility in the course of the demographic transition.57
Nevertheless, it appears that this simplistic viewpoint is based on weak theoretical reasonings and is
inconsistent with historical evidence.
Existing theories suggest that parents generate utility from the number (and possibly the quality)
of their surviving oﬀspring. A decline in mortality rates, therefore, would be expected to lead to a
corresponding reduction in total fertility rates, but not necessarily to a reduction in the number of
children reaching adulthood. While it is highly plausible that mortality rates were among the factors
that aﬀected the level of total fertility rates along human history, historical evidence does not lend
credence to the argument that the decline in mortality rates accounts for the reversal of the positive
historical trend between income and fertility. A careful examination of the various factors that aﬀect
fertility rates (i.e., mortality rate, income level, the return to investment in child quality, and the gender
wage gap) reveals that this argument is inconsistent with the evidence.
The decline in mortality rates does not appear to be the trigger for the decline in fertility in
Western Europe. As demonstrated in Figures 2.23 and 2.24, the mortality decline in Western Europe
started nearly a century prior to the decline in fertility and it was associated initially with increasing
fertility rates in some countries and non-decreasing fertility rates in other countries
In particular, as demonstrated in Figure 3.1, the decline in mortality started in England in the
1730s and was accompanied by a steady increase in fertility rates until 1820. The signiﬁcant rise in
income per capita in the Post-Malthusian Regime increased the desirable number of surviving oﬀspring
and thus, despite the decline in mortality rates, fertility increased signiﬁcantly so as to reach this higher
57The eﬀe c to ft h ed e c l i n ei nm o r t a l i t yr a t e so nt h ep r o l o n g a t i o no fp r o d u c t i v el i f ea n dt h u so nt h er e t u r nt oh u m a n
capital is discussed in section 3.3.3.
45desirable level of surviving oﬀspring.58 As depicted in Figure 3.1, the decline in fertility during the
demographic transition occurred in a period in which this pattern of increased income per capita (and
its potential positive eﬀect on fertility) was intensiﬁed, while the pattern of declining mortality (and
its adverse eﬀect on fertility) maintained the trend that existed in the 140 years that preceded the
demographic transition, suggesting that in the absence of the intervention of a third factor fertility
would have risen further.59 Thus, the reversal in the fertility patterns in England as well as other
Western European countries in the 1870s suggests that it is very likely that the demographic transition



































































Figure 3.1. Fertility, Mortality and Real Wages, England 1730-1920
Source: Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1981), Clark (2002), and Andorka (1978)
Furthermore, most relevant from an economic point of view is the cause of the reduction in net
fertility (i.e. the number of children reaching adulthood). The decline in the number of surviving oﬀ-
spring that was observed during the demographic transition (e.g., Figure 2.22) is unlikely to follow from
mortality decline. Mortality decline would lead to a reduction in the number of surviving oﬀspring if
the following set implausible of conditions would be met:61 (i) there exists a signiﬁcant precautionary
demand for children, i.e., individuals are signiﬁcantly risk averse with respect to their expected number
of surviving oﬀspring and they hold a buﬀe rs t o c ko fc h i l d r e ni nah i g hm o rtality environment (highly
improbable from an evolutionary perspective), (ii) risk aversion with respect to consumption is smaller
than risk aversion with respect to fertility (evolutionary theory would suggest the opposite), (iii) se-
quential fertility (i.e., replacement of non-surviving children) is modest,62 and (iv) parental resources
58The argument is valid even if fertility rates would have remained unchanged over this period.
59One could argue that the decline in mortality was not internalized into the decision of household who had diﬃculties
separating temporary decline from a permanent one. This argument is highly implausible given the fact that mortality
declined monotonically for nearly 140 years prior to the demographic transition. It is inconceivable that six generations of
household did not update information about mortality rates in their immediate surrounding, while keeping the collective
memories about mortality rates two centuries earlier.
60The mortality channel is inconsistent with additional evidence: the decline in fertility started in France and the US
prior to the decline in mortality rates
61In particular, the theoretical analysis of Kalemli-Ozcan (2002) generates a reduction in net fertility in reaction to a
decline in mortality assuming (implicitly) that all these implausible conditions are satisﬁed. Eckstein et al. (1999) argue
in their structural quantitative analysis of the demographic transition in Sweden, that mortality decline played a role in
the demographic transition. Their underlying theoretical structure, however, requires conditions (iii) and (iv) as well as
speciﬁc interactions between mortality, wages, and the return to human capital.
62Doepke (2005) shows that regardless of the degree of risk aversion, the feasibility of sequential fertility is suﬃcient to
preclude the decline in net fertility in reaction to a decline in mortality.
46saved from the reduction in the number of children that do not survive to adulthood do not lead to a
rise in fertility.63
A quantitative analysis by Doepke (2005) supports the viewpoint that a decline in infant mortality
rates was not the trigger for the decline in net fertility during the demographic transition. Utilizing the
mortality and fertility data from England in the time period 1861—1951, he shows that the decline in
child mortality in this time period should have resulted in an rise in net fertility rates, in contrast to the
evidence, suggesting that other factors generated the demographic transition. Similar conclusions about
the insigniﬁcance of the mortality decline in the decline in fertility during the demographic transition is
reached in the quantitative analysis of Fernandez-Vilaverde (2003).
3.3.2 The Rise in the Level of Income Per Capita
The rise in income per capita prior to the demographic transition has led some researchers to argue that
the demographic transition was triggered by the rise in income per capita and its asymmetric eﬀects
on the income of households on the one hand and the opportunity cost of raising children on the other
hand.
Becker (1981) advanced the argument that the decline in fertility in the course of the demographic
transition is a by-product of the rise in income per capita that preceded the demographic transition. He
argues that the rise in income induced a fertility decline because the positive income eﬀect on fertility
that was generated by the rise in wages was dominated by the negative substitution eﬀect that was
brought about by the rising opportunity cost of children. Similarly, Becker and Lewis (1973) argue that
the income elasticity with respect to child quality is greater than that with respect to child quantity,
and hence a rise in income led to a decline in fertility along with a rise in the investment in each child.
This theory, however, is counter-factual. It suggests that the timing of the demographic transition
across countries in similar stages of development would reﬂect diﬀerences in income per capita. However,
remarkably, as depicted in Figure 2.22, the decline in fertility occurred in the same decade across
Western European countries that diﬀered signiﬁcantly in their income per capita. In 1870, on the eve
of the demographic transition, England was the richest country in the world, with a GDP per capita of
$3191.64 In contrast, Germany that experienced the decline in fertility in the same years as England,
had in 1870 a GDP per capita of only $1821 (i.e., 57% of that of England). Sweden’s GDP per capita
of $1664 in 1870 was 48% of that of England, and Finland’s GDP per capita of $1140 in 1870 was only
36% of that of England, but their demographic transitions occurred in the same decade as well.
The simultaneity of the demographic transition across Western European countries that diﬀered
signiﬁcantly in their income per capita suggests that the high level of income that was reached by
Western Europeans countries in the Post-Malthusian regime had a very limited role in the demographic
transition.65 Furthermore, a quantitative analysis of the demographic transition in England, conducted
by Fernandez-Vilaverde (2003), demonstrates that Becker’s theory is counter-factual. In contrast to
Becker’s theory, the calibration suggests that a rise in income would have resulted in an increase in
fertility rates, rather than in the observed decline in fertility.
Interestingly, and consistent with subsequent theories that underlined the critical role of tech-
nological progress in the demographic transition, despite the large diﬀerences in the levels of income
63An additional force that operates against the decline in the number of surviving oﬀspring is the physiological constraint
on the feasible number of birth per woman. If this constraint is binding for some households in a high mortality regime,
a reduction in mortality would operate towards an increase the number of surviving oﬀspring.
64Source: Maddison (2001). GDP per capita is measured in 1990 international dollars.
65Furthermore, cross-section evidence within countries suggest that the elasticity of the number of surviving oﬀspring
with respect to wage income was positive prior to the demographic transition (e.g., Clark (2003)), in contrast to Becker’s
argument that would require a hump-shaped relationship.
47per capita across European countries that experiences the demographic transition in the same time
period, the growth rates of income per capita of these European countries were rather similar during
their demographic transition, ranging from 1.9% per year over the period 1870-1913 in the UK, 2.12%
in Norway, 2.17% in Sweden, and 2.87% in Germany.
3.3.3 The Rise in the Demand for Human Capital
The gradual rise in the demand for human capital in the second phase of the Industrial Revolution as
well as in the process of industrialization of less developed economies, as documented in section 2.3.3,
and its close association with the timing of the demographic transitions, has led researchers to argue that
the increasing role of human capital in the production process (rather than the rise in income) induced
households to increase their investment in the human capital of their oﬀspring, ultimately leading to
the onset of the demographic transition.
Galor and Weil (1999, 2000), argue that the acceleration in the rate of technological progress
increased gradually the demand for human capital in the second phase of the Industrial Revolution,
inducing parents to invest in the human capital of their oﬀspring. The increase in the rate of technological
progress and the associated increase in the demand for human capital brought about two eﬀects on
population growth. On the one hand, improved technology eased households’ budget constraints and
provided more resources for quality as well as quantity of children. On the other hand, it induced
a reallocation of these increased resources toward child quality. In the early stages of the transition
from the Malthusian regime, the eﬀect of technological progress on parental income dominated, and the
population growth rate as well as the average quality increased. Ultimately, further increases in the rate
of technological progress that were stimulated by human capital accumulation induced a reduction in
fertility rates, generating a demographic transition in which the rate of population growth declined along
with an increase in the average level of education. Thus, consistent with historical evidence, the theory
suggests that prior to the demographic transition, population growth increased along with investment
in human capital, whereas the demographic transition brought about a decline in population growth
along with a further increase in human capital formation.66
Moreover, Galor and Weil’s theory suggests that a universal rise in the demand for human capital
in Western Europe (as documented in section 2.3.3) followed by a rapid growth rates of output per-capita
generated the observed simultaneous onset of the demographic transition across Western European
countries that diﬀered signiﬁcantly in their levels of income per capita. The simultaneous increase
in educational attainment across Western European countries in the second phase of the Industrial
Revolution appears as a plausible common cause that brought about the demographic transition. The
rise in the demand for human capital in the second phase of the Industrial Revolution in some Western
European countries (as documented in section 2.3.3) and the expectations for an imminent increase in
the demand for human capital in the other Western European countries led to a signiﬁcant increase in
the investment in children’s education and therefore to a decline in fertility.
In particular, as depicted in Figure 3.2, the demographic transition in England was associated
with a signiﬁcant increase in the investment in child quality as reﬂected by years of schooling. Quantita-
tive evidence provided by Doepke (2004) suggests that indeed, educational policy played an important
role in the demographic transition in England.
66Quantitative evidence provided by Greenwood and Seshadri (2002) is supportive of the role of the rise in the demand
for skilled labor in the demographic transition in the US. They demonstrate that technological progress in an industrial,
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Figure 3.2. Investment in Human Capital and the Demographic Transition, England, 1730-1935
Sources: Flora et al. (1983) and Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1983)
Reinforcing Mechanisms
The Decline in Child Labor
The eﬀect of the rise in the demand for human capital on the reduction in the desirable number
of surviving oﬀspring was magniﬁed via its adverse eﬀect on child labor. It gradually increased the
wage diﬀerential between parental labor and child labor inducing parents to reduce the number of their
children and to further invest in their quality (Hazan and Berdugo 2002).67 Moreover, the rise in
the importance of human capital in the production process induced industrialists to support education
reforms (Galor and Moav 2004) and thus laws that abolish child labor (Doepke and Zilibotti 2003),
inducing a reduction in child labor and thus in fertility. Doepke (2004) provides quantitative evidence
that suggests that indeed, child labor law, and to a lesser extent educational policy, played an important
role in the demographic transition.
The Rise in Life Expectancy
The impact of the increase in the demand for human capital on the decline in the desirable
number of surviving oﬀspring may have been reinforced by the rise in life expectancy.
The decline in mortality rates in developed countries since the 18th century, as depicted in Figure
2.24, and the recent decline in mortality rates in less developed countries, as depicted in Figure 2.25,
corresponded to a gradual increase in life expectancy. As depicted in Figure 2.26, life expectancy in
England increased at a stable pace from 32 years in the 1720s to about 41 years in the 1870. This pace
of the rise in life expectancy increased and life expectancy reached 50 years in 1900, 69 years in 1950
and 77 years in 1999. Similarly, life expectancy increased in Western Europe during the 19th century
from 36 in 1820 to 46 in 1900, 67 in 1950 and 78 in 1999. In less developed economies life expectancy
increased markedly in the 20th century, as depicted in Figure 2.27.
67Hazan and Berdugo (2002)’s hypothesis is consistent with existing historical evidence. For instance, Horrell and
Humphries (1995) suggest, based on data from the United Kingdom, that the earnings of children age 10-14 as a percentage
of father’s earning declined from the period 1817-1839 to the period 1840-1872 by nearly 50% if the father was employed
in a factory. Interestingly, the eﬀect is signiﬁcantly more pronounced if the father was employed in skilled occupations
(i.e., high wage agriculture) rather than low skilled occupations (i.e., mining), reﬂecting the rise in the relative demand
f o rs k i l l e dw o r k e r sa n di t se ﬀect on the decline in the relative wages of children.
49Despite the gradual rise in life expectancy prior to the demographic transition investment in
human capital was rather insigniﬁcant as long as a technological demand for human capital had not
emerged. In particular, the increase in life expectancy in England occurred 150 years prior to the
demographic transition and may have resulted in a gradual increase in literacy rates, but not at a
suﬃcient level to induce a reduction in fertility. Similar l y ,t h er i s ei nl i f ee x p e c t a n c yi nl e s sd e v e l o p e d
regions in the ﬁrst half of the 20th century has not generated a signiﬁcant increase in education and a
demographic transition.
In light of the technologically based rise in the demand for human capital in the second phase of
the Industrial Revolution, as documented in section 2.3.3, the rise in the expected length of productive
life has increased the potential rate of return to investments in children’s human capital, and thus re-
enforced and complemented the inducement for investment in education and the associated reduction
in fertility rates.68
Changes in Marriage Institutions.
The eﬀect of the rise in the demand for human capital on the desirable quality of children, and
thus on the decline in fertility was reinforced by changes in marriage institutions. Gould, Moav and
Simhon (2003) suggest that the rise in the demand for human capital increased the demand for quality
women who have a comparative advantage in raising quality children, increasing the cost of marriage.
Polygamy therefore became less aﬀordable, inducing the transition from polygamy to monogamy, and
reinforcing the decline in fertility. Edlund and Lagerlof (2002) suggest that love marriage, as opposed
to arranged marriage, redirected the payment for the bride from the parent to the couple, promoting
investment and human capital accumulation and thus reinforcing the decline in fertility.
Natural Selection and the Evolution of Preference for Oﬀspring’s Quality
The impact of the increase in the demand for human capital on the decline in the desirable
number of surviving oﬀspring may have been magniﬁed by cultural or genetic evolution in the attitude
of individuals toward child quality. An evolutionary change in the attitude of individuals towards human
capital could have generated a swift response to the increase in demand for human capital, generating
a decline in fertility along with an increase in human capital formation.
Human beings, like other species, confront the basic trade-oﬀ between oﬀspring’s quality and
quantity in their implicit Darwinian survival strategies. Preference for child quantity as well as for
child quality reﬂects the well-known variety in the quantity-quality survival strategies (or in the K and
r strategies) that exists in nature (e.g., MacArthur and Wilson 1967) and the allocation of resources
between oﬀspring quantity and quality is subjected to evolutionary changes (Lack 1954).
Galor and Moav (2002) propose that during the epoch of Malthusian stagnation that characterized
most of human existence, individuals with a higher valuation for oﬀspring quality gained an evolutionary
advantage and their representation in the population gradually increased. The agricultural revolution
facilitated the division of labor and fostered trade relationships across individuals and communities,
68This mechanism was outlined by Galor and Weil (1999) and was examined in diﬀe r e n ts e t t i n g sb yE r l i c ha n dL u i
(1991), and Hazan and Zoabi (2004). It should be noted, however, that as argued by Moav (2005), the rise in the
potential return to investment in child quality due to the prolongation of the productive life is not as straightforward
as it may appear. It requires that the prolongation of life would aﬀect the return to quality more than the return to
quantity. For example, if parents derive utility from the aggregate wage income of their children, prolongation of life
would increase the return to quantity and quality symmetrically. Hence, additional mechanism that would increase the
relative complementarity between life expectancy and human capital would be needed to assure the rise in the return to
human capital. For instance, Hazan and Zoabi (2004) assume that an increase in life expectancy, and thus the health
of students, enhances the production process of human capital and thus increases the relative return to child quality.
Alternatively, Moav (2005) argues that an increase in life expectancy, while having no eﬀect on parental choice between
quality and quantity, induce the oﬀspring to increase their own human capital bringing about lower fertility rates in the
next generation due to the comparative advantage of educated parents in educating their children.
50enhancing the complexity of human interaction and raising the return to human capital. Moreover, the
evolution of the human brain in the transition to Homo sapiens and the complementarity between brain
capacity and the reward for human capital has increased the evolutionary optimal investment in the
quality of oﬀspring. The distribution of valuation for quality lagged behind the evolutionary optimal
level and individuals with traits of higher valuation for their oﬀspring’s quality generated higher income
and, in the Malthusian epoch when income was positively associated with aggregate resources allocated
to child rearing, a larger number of oﬀspring. Thus, the trait of higher valuation for quality gained
the evolutionary advantage, and the Malthusian pressure gradually increased the representation in the
population of individuals whose preferences were biased towards child quality.
This evolutionary process was reinforced by its interaction with economic forces. As the fraction
of individuals with high valuation for quality increased, technological progress intensiﬁed, raising the
rate of return to human capital. The increase in the rate of return to human capital along with the
increase in the bias towards quality in the population reinforced the substitution towards child quality,
setting the stage for a more rapid decline in fertility along with a signiﬁcant increase in investment in
human capital.
This mechanism is consistent with the gradual rise in literacy rates prior to the Industrial Revo-
lution, as depicted in Figure 5.1. It suggests that the increase in the investment in human capital prior
to the Industrial Revolution was a reﬂection of changes in the composition of preference for quality in
the population that stimulated investment in human capital, prior to the increase in the demand for
human capital in the second phase of the Industrial Revolution.
3.3.4 The Decline in the Gender Gap
The rise in women’s relative wages in the last two centuries and its potential impact on the rise in female
labor force participation and the associated decline in fertility rates have been the center of another
theory of the demographic transition that generates the observed hump-shaped relationship between
income per capita and population growth, as depicted in Figure 2.15.
The rise in women’s relative wages along with declining fertility rates has been observed in a
large number of developed and less developed economies. In particular, as depicted in Figure 3.3, this




















































































Figure 3.3. Female Relative Wages and Fertility Rates
United States 1800-1990
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, (1975), Goldin (1990), and Hernandez (2000)
Galor and Weil (1996) argue that technological progress and capital accumulation increased the
relative wages of women in the process of industrialization. They maintain that technological progress
along with physical capital accumulation complemented mental-intensive tasks rather than physical-
intensive tasks and thus, in light of the comparative advantage of women in mental-intensive tasks, the
demand for women’s labor input gradually increased in the industrial sector, increasing the absolute
wages of men and women but decreasing the gender wage gap. As long as the rise in women wages was
insuﬃcient to induce a signiﬁcant increase in women’s labor force participation, fertility increased due
t ot h er i s ei nm e n ’ sw a g e s . 69 Ultimately, however, the rise in women’s relative wages was suﬃcient to
induce a signiﬁcant increase in labor force participation, generating a demographic transition.70 Unlike
the single-parent model in which an increase in income generates conﬂicting income and substitution
eﬀect that cancel one another if preferences are homothetic, in the two-parent household model, if
most of the burden of child rearing is placed on women, a rise in women’s relative wages increases the
opportunity cost of raising children more than the household income, generating a pressure towards a
reduction in fertility.
Moreover, the process of development in the Post-Malthusian Regime was associated with a
gradual decline in the human capital gap between male and female. As depicted in Figure 3.4, literacy
rates among women which were in 1840 only 76% of those among men, grew faster in the 19th century
69The U-shaped pattern of female labor force participation in the process of industrialization follows from the coexistence
of an industrial sector and a non-modern production sector that is not fully rival with child rearing. Women’s marginal
product in non-modern sector was not aﬀected by capital accumulation in the industrial sector, while women’s potential
wages in the modern sector increased. In the early process of industrialization, therefore, capital accumulation increased
labor productivity in the industrial sector, family income increased via men’s wages, while female wages, based on the
production of market goods in the home sector did not change. Fertility increased due to the income eﬀect and female labor
force participation fell. Once capital accumulation and technological progress increases female relative wages suﬃciently,
capital accumulation raised women’s relative wages, inducing a rise in female labor force participation in the industrial
sector and reducing fertility.
70Cavalcanti and Tavares (2003) demonstrate theoretically and empirically that the decline in the gender wage gap
and the increase in labor force participation increase government expenditure on public goods reducing the cost of child
rearing, further enhancing the decline in fertility.

























Figure 3.4. The Decline in the Human Capital Gap between Male and Female: England 1840-1900
Source: Cipolla(1969)
Lagerlof (2003b) argues that the process of development permitted a gradual improvement in the level
of female education, raising the opportunity cost of children and initiating a fertility decline.
3.3.5 Other Theories
The Old-Age Security Hypothesis
The old-age security hypothesis has been proposed as an additional mechanism for the onset of
the demographic transition. suggests that in the absence of capital markets that permit intertemporal
lending and borrowing, children are assets that permit parents to smooth consumption over their life-
time.71 The process of development and the establishment of capital markets reduce this motivation for
rearing children, contributing to the demographic transition.
Although old-age support is a plausible element that may aﬀect the level of fertility, it appears
as a minor force. The importance of the decline in the role of children as assets in the onset of the
demographic transition is questionable. The rise in fertility rates prior to the demographic transition, in
a period of improvements in the credit markets, raises doubts about the signiﬁcance of the mechanism.
Furthermore, cross-section evidence does not indicate that wealthier individuals that presumably had
a better access to credit markets had a small number of surviving oﬀspring. On the contrary, fertility
rates in the pre-demographic transition era are positively related to skills, income and wealth (e.g., Lee
1997 and Clark 2003).72
Exogenous Shocks - Luck
Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990) advance a theory that emphasizes the role of a major exoge-
nous shock in triggering the demographic transition, underlying the role of luck in the determination of
the relative timing of the demographic transition across nations as well as the wealth of nations.73.T h e y
71See Neher (1971) and Caldwell (1976) for earlier studies and Boldrin and Jones (2002) for a recent quantitative
analysis.
72Moreover, examples of species in nature in which oﬀspring support their parent in old age are very rare.
73As they argue in page S13, “Many attempts to explain why some countries have had the best economic performance
in the past several centuries give too little attention to accidents and good fortune”.
53argue that a major shock shifted economies from the low-output high-fertility steady-state equilibrium
towards the high-output low-fertility steady-state equilibrium, triggering a demographic transition.
This theory suﬀers from critical deﬁciencies in the micro-structure and it generates predictions
that are inconsistent with the evidence.74 Moreover, even if economically plausible micro-foundations for
the presence of multiple steady-state equilibria would be established, a major shock that would shift the
economy from the basin of attraction of a high-fertility to a low-fertility steady-state equilibrium would
not account for the main characteristics of the demographic transition and the transition to modern
growth. In contrast to existing evidence that shows that for a large number of countries population
growth rates increased prior to their decline in the course of the demographic transition and that the
rise in income per capita preceded the decline in fertility,.a major shock that would shift the economy
from the basin of attraction of a high-fertility to a low-fertility steady-state equilibrium would generate,
counterfactually, a monotonic decline in fertility rates along with a simultaneous rise in income per
capita.
4U n i ﬁed Growth Theory
The inconsistency of exogenous and endogenous neoclassical growth models with the process of devel-
opment along most of human history, induc e dg r o w t ht h e o r i s t st od e v e l o pau n i ﬁed theory of economic
growth that would capture in a single framework the epoch of Malthusian stagnation, the era of modern
growth, and the principal factors that brought about the transition between these regimes.75
T h ee s t a b l i s h m e n to fau n i ﬁed growth theory has been a great intellectual challenge, requiring
major methodological innovations in the construction of dynamical systems that would capture the
complexity that has characterized the evolution of economies from a Malthusian epoch to a state of
sustained economic growth. Historical evidence suggests that the take-oﬀ from the Malthusian epoch
to a state of sustained economic growth, rapid as it may appear, was a gradual process and thus could
not plausibly (and meaningfully) be viewed as the outcome of a major exogenous shock that shifted the
economy from the basin of attraction of the Malthusian epoch into the basin of attraction of the Modern
growth regime.76 The simplest methodology for the generation of this phase transition - a major shock
in an environment characterized by multiple locally stable equilibria - is therefore not applicable for the
generation of the transition from stagnation to growth.
An alternative methodology, however, was rather diﬃcult to establish since a uniﬁed growth
74The source of multiplicity of equilibria in their model is the implausible assumption that the return to education
increases with the aggregate level of education in society. (Browing, Hansen and Heckman (1998), for instance, show that
there is weak empirical evidence in favor of this assumption.) Moreover, they deﬁne erroneously the low-output, high
population growth, steady-state as a Malthusian steady-state equilibrium. Their “Malthusian” steady-state, however,
has none of the features of a Malthusian equilibrium. In contrast to the historical evidence about the Malthusian era,
in this equilibrium (in the absence of technological change) population growth rate is not at the reproduction level.
Moreover, counter-factually population growth in their “Malthusian” steady-state is higher than the that in the beginning
of the demographic transition. Furthermore, a small positive shock to income when the economy is in the ”Malthusian”
steady-state initially decreases fertility in contrast to the central aspect of the Malthusian equilibrium.
75Growth theories that capture the evolution of population, technology, and output from stagnation to sustained eco-
nomic growth have been established by Galor and Weil (1999, 2000), Galor and Moav (2002), Hansen and Prescott
(2002), Jones (2001), Kogel and Prskawetz. (2001), Hazan and Berdugo (2002), Tamura (2002), Lagerlof (2003a, 2003b),
Fernandez-Vilaverde (2003), Doepke (2004), as well as others. The Great Divergence and its association with the transition
from stagnation to growth was explored in a uniﬁed setting by Galor and Mountford (2003).
76As established in section 2, and consistently with the revisionist view of the Industrial Revolution, neither the take-oﬀ
of the currently developed world in the 19th century, nor the recent take-oﬀ of less developed economies provide evidence
for an unprecedented shock that generated a quantum leap in income per-capita. Moreover, technological progress could
not be viewed as a shock to the system. As argued by Mokyr (2002) technological progress during the Industrial Revolution
was an outcome of a gradual endogenous process that took place over this time period. Moreover, technological progress in
less developed economies was an outcome of a deliberate decision by entrepreneurs to adopt existing advanced technologies.
54theory in which economies take-oﬀ gradually but swiftly from an epoch of a stable Malthusian stagnation
would necessitate a gradual escape from an absorbing (stable) steady-state equilibrium, in contradiction
to the essence of a stable steady-state equilibrium. Ultimately, it has become apparent that the observed
gradual, rapid, and continuos phase transition would be captured by a single dynamical system, only
if the set of steady-state equilibria and their stability would be altered qualitatively in the process of
development. As proposed by Galor and Weil (2000), during the Malthusian epoch, the dynamical
system would have to be characterized by a stable Malthusian steady-state equilibrium, but ultimately
due to the evolution of latent state variables in this epoch, the Malthusian steady-state equilibrium
would vanish endogenously leaving the arena to the gravitational forces of the emerging Modern Growth
Regime.
Uniﬁed growth theories that permit a phase transition and do not rely on the existence of a
major exogenous shock, have to be founded on a dynamical system in which economies are for an
epoch in the vicinity of a temporary stable Malthusian steady-state equilibrium, but the evolution of
latent state variables (i.e., the rise in a latent demand for human capital in Galor and Weil (2000)
and the evolution of the distribution of genetic characteristics in Galor and Moav (2002)) ultimately
generates a structural change in the dynamical system that causes this Malthusian steady state to
vanish endogenously, permitting the economy to take-oﬀ a n dt oc o n v e r g et oam o d e r ng r o w t hs t e a d y -
state equilibrium.
The role of the demographic transition in the transition from the Post-Malthusian Regime to
the Sustained Growth Regime adds to the complexity of the desirable dynamical system. Capturing
this additional transition would require the uniﬁed theory to generate endogenously a reversal in the
positive Malthusian eﬀect of income on population once the take-oﬀ occurs and to provide the reduction
in fertility a special role in the transition to a state of sustained economic growth.
This section explores mechanisms that can account for the complexities of these long transitions
from stagnation to growth and the emergence of the Great Divergence, focusing on the role of population,
technology, income distribution and education in this intricate process. It describes several uniﬁed
growth theories that encompass the transition between three distinct regimes that have characterized
the process of economic development: The Malthusian Epoch, The Post-Malthusian Regime, and the
Sustained Growth Regime.77 Imposing the constraint that a uniﬁed theory would account for the entire
intricate process of development in the last thousands of years is a discipline that would enhance the
viability of growth theory. A uniﬁed theory of economic growth would reveal the underlying micro-
foundations that are consistent with the process of economic development alon gt h ee n t i r es p e c t r u mo f
human history, rather that with the last century only. It would therefore enhance the conﬁdence in the
viability of growth theory, its predictions and policy implications, while improving the understanding
of the origin of the recent transition from stagnation to growth and the associated phenomenon of the
great divergence.
4.1 From Stagnation to Growth
The ﬁrst uniﬁed growth theory in which the endogenous evolution of population, technology, and income
per capita is consistent with the process of development in the last thousands of years was advanced by
Galor and Weil (2000). The theory captures the three regimes that have characterized the process of
77Although the emphasis is on the experience of Europe and its oﬀshoots, since these were the areas that completed the
transition from the Malthusian regime to modern growth, these theories could be modiﬁed to account for the incomplete
transition of the less developed countries, integrating the drastic inﬂuence of the import of pre-existing production and
health technologies.
55development as well as the fundamental driving forces that generated the transition from an epoch of
Malthusian stagnation to a state of sustained economic growth.
The theory proposes that in early stages of development the economy was in a stable Malthusian
steady state equilibrium. Technology advanced rather slowly, and generated proportional increases in
output and population. The inherent positive interaction between population and technology in this
epoch, however, gradually increased the pace of technological progress and the delayed adjustment of
population permitted output per capita to creep forward at a miniscule rate. The slow pace of techno-
logical progress in the Malthusian epoch provided a limited scope for human capital in the production
process and parents therefore had no incentive to reallocate resources towards child quality during this
era.
The Malthusian interaction between technology and population accelerated the pace of techno-
logical progress permitting a take-oﬀ to the Post-Malthusian regime. The expansion of resources was
partially counterbalanced by the enlargement of population and the economy was characterized by rapid
growth rates of income per capita and population. The acceleration in technological progress increased
the demand for human capital, while having two opposing eﬀects on population growth. On the one
hand, it eased households’ budget constraints, allowing the allocation of more resources for raising chil-
dren. On the other hand, it induced a reallocation of these additional resources toward child quality.
In the Post-Malthusian regime, due to the limited demand for human capital, the ﬁrst eﬀect dominated
and the rise in real income permitted households to increase their family size as well the quality of each
child.
As investment in human capital took place the Malthusian steady state equilibrium vanished
and the economy started to be attracted by the gravitational forces of the Modern Growth Regime.
The interaction between investment in human capital and technological progress generated a virtuous
circle: human capital generated faster technological progress, which in turn further raised the demand
for human capital, inducing further investment in child quality, and ultimately initiating a demographic
transition.78 The oﬀsetting eﬀect of population growth on the growth rate of income per capita was elim-
inated and the interaction between human capital accumulation and technological progress permitted a
transition to a state of sustained economic growth.
The theory suggests that the transition from stagnation to growth is an inevitable by-product of
the Malthusian interaction between population and technology and its ultimate impact on the demand
for human capital and the demographic transition . The timing of the transition diﬀer however across
countries and regions due to initial variations in geographical factors and historical accidents and their
manifestation in variations in institutional, demographic, and cultural factors, trade patterns, colonial
status, as well as in disparity in public policy.79
4.1.1 Central Building Blocks
The theory is based upon the interaction between the several building blocks: the Malthusian elements,
the engines of technological progress, the origin of human capital formation, and the determinants of
parental choice regarding the quantity and quality of oﬀspring.
First, the Malthusian elements. Individuals are subjected to a subsistence consumption constraint
and as long as the constraint is binding, an increase in income results in an increase in population
growth. Technological progress, which brings about temporary gains in income per capita , triggers
78In less developed countries the stock of human capital determines the pace of adaptation of existing technologies
whereas in developed countries it determined the pace of the advancement of the technological frontier.
79A fertile land in a Malthusian environment, for instance, would generate a larger population density and a scale eﬀect.
56therefore in early stages of development an increase in the size of the population that oﬀsets the gain in
income per capita due to the existence of decreasing returns to labor. Growth in income per capita is
generated ultimately, despite decreasing returns to labor, since technological progress outpaces the rate
of population growth.
Second, the forces behind technological progress in the process of development. The size of the
population stimulates technological progress in early stages of development (Boserup (1965)), whereas
investment in human capital is the prime engine of technological progress in more advanced stages of
development. In the Malthusian era, the technological frontier was not distant from the working environ-
ment of most individuals, and the scale of the population aﬀected the rate of technological progress due
to its eﬀect on: (a) the supply of innovative ideas, (b) the demand for new technologies, (c) technological
diﬀusion, (d) the division of labor, and (e) trade.80 As the distance from the technological frontier gets
larger, however, the role of human capital becomes more signiﬁcant in technological advancement (e.g.,
Nelson and Phelps (1966)) and individuals with high levels of human capital are more likely to advance
the technological frontier.
Third, the origin of human capital formation. The introduction of new technologies is mostly
skill-biased although in the long run, these technologies may be either “skill biased” or “skill saving.”
The “disequilibrium” brought about by technological change raises the demand for human capital.81
Technological progress reduces the adaptability of existing human capital for the new technological en-
vironment and educated individuals have a comparative advantage in adapting to the new technological
environment.82
Fourth, the determination of paternal decisions regarding the quantity and quality of their oﬀ-
spring. Individuals choose the number of children and their quality in the face of a constraint on the
total amount of time that can be devoted to child-raising and labor market activities. The rise in the
demand for human capital induces parents to substitute quality for quantity of children.83
4.1.2 The Basic Structure of the Model
Consider an overlapping-generations economy in which activity extends over inﬁnite discrete time. In
every period the economy produces a single homogeneous good using land and eﬃciency units of labor
as inputs. The supply of land is exogenous and ﬁx e do v e rt i m ew h e r e a st h en u m b e ro fe ﬃciency units
of labor is determined by households’ decisions in the preceding period regarding the number and level
of human capital of their children.
80The positive eﬀect of the scale of the population on technological progress in the Malthusian epoch is supported by
Boserup (1965) and recent evidence (e.g., Kremer (1993)). The role of the scale of the population in the modern era is,
however, controversial. The distance to the technological frontier is signiﬁcantly larger and population size per-se may
have an ambiguous eﬀect on technological progress, if it comes on the account of population quality.
81If the return to education rises with the level of technology the qualitative results would not be aﬀected. Adopting
this mechanism, however, would be equivalent to assuming that changes in technology were skill-biased throughout human
history. Although on average technological change may have been skilled biased, Galor and Weil’s mechanism is consistent
with periods in which the characteristics of new technologies could be deﬁned as unskilled-biased (most notably, the ﬁrst
phase of the industrial revolution).
82Schultz (1975) cites a wide range of evidence in support of this theory. Similarly, Foster and Rosenzweig (1996) ﬁnd
that technological change during the green revolution in India raised the return to schooling, and that school enrollment
rates responded positively to this higher return. This element is central in the analysis of Galor and Tsiddon (1997), Galor
and Moav (2000), and Hassler and Mora (2000).
83The existence of a trade-oﬀ between quantity and quality of children is supported empirically (e.g., Hanushek (1992)
and Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980)).
57Production of Final Output Production occurs according to a constant-returns-to-scale technology
that is subject to endogenous technological progress. The output produced at time t, Yt, is
Yt = Hα
t (AtX)1−α, (1)
where Ht is the aggregate quantity of eﬃciency units of labor employed in period t, X is land employed
in production in every period t, At represents the endogenously determined technological level in period
t, AtX are therefore the “eﬀective resources” employed in production in period t, and α ∈ (0,1).





where ht ≡ Ht/Lt is the level of eﬃciency units of labor per worker, and xt ≡ (AtX)/Lt is the level
of eﬀective resources per worker at time t.
Suppose that there are no property rights over land.84 The return to land is therefore zero, and
the wage per eﬃciency unit of labor is therefore equal to the output per eﬃciency unit of labor.
wt =( xt/ht)1−α. (3)
Preferences and Budget Constraints In each period t, a generation that consists of Lt identical
individuals joins the labor force. Each individual has a single parent. Members of generation t (those
who join the labor force in period t) live for two periods. In the ﬁrst period of life (childhood), t − 1,
individuals consume a fraction of their parental unit time endowment. The required time increases with
children’s quality. In the second period of life (parenthood), t, individuals are endowed with one unit of
time, which they allocate between child rearing and labor force participation. They choose the optimal
mixture of quantity and quality of (surviving) children and supply their remaining time in the labor
market, consuming their wages.
Individuals’ preferences are represented by a utility function deﬁned over consumption above a
subsistence level ˜ c>0, as well as over the quantity and quality (measured by human capital) of their
(surviving) children.85
ut =( ct)1−γ(ntht+1)γ γ ∈ (0,1), (4)
where ct is the consumption of individual of generation t, nt is the number of children of individual
t, and ht+1 is the level of human capital of each child.86 The utility function is strictly monotonically
increasing and strictly quasi-concave, satisfying the conventional boundary conditions that assure that,
for a suﬃciently high income, there exists an interior solution for the utility maximization problem.
84The modeling of the production side is based upon two simplifying assumptions. First, capital is not an input in the
production function, and second the return to land is zero. Alternatively it could have been assumed that the economy is
small and open to a world capital market in which the interest rate is constant. In this case, the quantity of capital will
be set to equalize its marginal product to the interest rate, while the price of land will follow a path such that the total
return on land (rent plus net price appreciation) is also equal to the interest rate. Allowing for capital accumulation and
property rights over land would complicate the model to the point of intractability, but would not aﬀect the qualitative
results.
85For simplicity parents derive utility from the expected number of surviving oﬀspring and the parental cost child rearing
is associated only with surviving children. A more realistic cost structure would not aﬀect the qualitative features of the
theory.
86Alternatively, the utility function could have been deﬁned over consumption above subsistence rather than over a
consumption set that is truncated from below by the subsistence consumption constraint. In particular, if ut =( ct −
˜ c)(1−γ)(ntht+1)γ. the qualitative analysis would not be aﬀected, but the complexity of the dynamical system would be
greatly enhanced. The income expansion path would be smooth, transforming continuously from being nearly vertical for
low levels of potential income to asymptotically horizontal for high levels of potential income. The subsistence consumption
constraint would therefore generate the Malthusian eﬀect of income on population growth at low income levels.
58However, for a suﬃciently low level of income the subsistence consumption constraint is binding and
there is a corner solution with respect to the consumption level.87
Individuals choose the number of children and their quality in the face of a constraint on the
total amount of time that can be devoted to child-raising and labor market activities. For simplicity,
only time is required in order to produce child quantity and quality.88 Let τ +et+1 b et h et i m ec o s tf o r
am e m b e ri of generation t of raising a child with a level of education (quality) et+1.T h a ti s ,τ is the
fraction of the individual’s unit time endowment that is required in order to raise a child, regardless of
quality, and et+1 is the fraction of the individual’s unit time endowment that is devoted for the education
of each child.89
Consider members of generation t who are endowed with ht eﬃciency units of labor at time t.
Deﬁne potential income, zt, as the potential earning if the entire time endowment is devoted to labor
force participation, earning the competitive market wage, wt, per eﬃciency unit. The potential income,
zt ≡ wtht, is divided between consumption, ct, and expenditure on child rearing (quantity as well as
quality), evaluated according to the value of the time cost, wtht[τ + et+1], per child. Hence, in the
second period of life (parenthood), the individual faces the budget constraint
wthtnt(τ + et+1)+ct ≤ wtht ≡ zt. (5)
The Production of Human Capital Individuals’ level of human capital is determined by their
quality (education) as well as by the technological environment. Technological progress is assumed
to raise the value of education in the production of human capital.90 Technological progress reduces
the adaptability of existing human capital for the new technological environment (the ‘erosion eﬀect’).
Education, however, lessens the adverse eﬀects of technological progress. That is, skilled individuals
have a comparative advantage in adapting to the new technological environment. In particular, the time
required for learning the new technology diminishes with the level of education and increases with the
rate of technological change.
The level of human capital of children of a member i of generation t, hi
t+1, is an increasing strictly
concave function of their parental time investment in education, ei
t+1, and a decreasing strictly convex
function of the rate of technological progress, gt+1 :
ht+1 = h(et+1,g t+1), (6)
where gt+1 ≡ (At+1 − At)/At. Education lessens the adverse eﬀect of technological progress. That
is, technology complements skills in the production of human capital (i.e., heg(ei
t+1,g t+1) > 0). In the
absence of investment in quality, each individual has a basic level human capital that is normalized to
1 in a stationary technological environment, i.e., h(0,0) = 1.91
87The subsistence consumption constraint generates the positive income elasticity of population growth at low income
levels, since higher income allows individuals to aﬀord more children.
88If both time and goods are required in order to produce child quality, the process we describe would be intensiﬁed. As
the economy develops and wages increase, the relative cost of a quality child will diminish and individuals will substitute
quality for quantity of children.
89τ is assumed to be suﬃciently small so as to assure that population can have a positive growth rate. That is, τ < γ.
90Schultz [1975] cites a wide range of evidence in support of this assumption. More recently, Foster and Rosenzweig
[1996] ﬁnd that technological change during the green revolution in India raised the return to schooling, and that school
enrollment rate responded positively to this higher return. The eﬀect of technological transition on the return to human
capital is at the center of the theoretical approach of Galor and Tsiddon (1997), Caselli (1999), Galor and Moav (2000),
and Hassler and Rodriguez Mora (2002).
91For simplicity, investment in quality is not beneﬁcial in a stationary technological environment, i.e., he(0,0) = 0, and
in the absence of investment in education, there exists a suﬃciently rapid technological progress, that due to the erosion
eﬀect renders the existing human capital obsolete (i.e., limg→∞ h(0,g t+1)=0 ) . Furthermore, although the potential
59Optimization Members of generation t choose the number and quality of their children, and therefore
their own consumption, so as to maximize their intertemporal utility function subject to the subsistence
consumption constraint. Substituting (5)-(6) into (4), the optimization problem of a member of gener-
ation t is:
{nt,e t+1} = argmax{wtht[1 − nt(τ + et+1)]}1−γ{(nth(et+1,g t+1)}γ (7)
Subject to:
wtht[1 − nt(τ + et+1)] ≥ ˜ c;
(nt,e t+1) ≥ 0.
Hence, as long as potential income at time t is suﬃc i e n t l yh i g hs oa st oa s s u r et h a tct > ˜ c (i.e.,
as long as zt ≡ wtht, is above the level of potential income at which the subsistence constraint is just
binding, (i.e., zt > ˜ z ≡ ˜ c/(1−γ))), the fraction of time spent by individual t raising children is γ, while
1−γ is devoted for labor force participation. However, if zt ≤ ˜ z , the subsistence constraint is binding,
t h ef r a c t i o no ft i m en e c e s s a r yt oa s s u r es u b s i s t e n c ec o n s u m p t i o n ,˜ c, is larger than 1−γ and the fraction





γ if zt ≥ ˜ z
1 − [˜ c/wtht]i f zt ≤ ˜ z.
(8)
Figure 4.1 shows the eﬀect of an increase in potential income zt on the individual’s allocation
of time between child rearing and consumption. The income expansion path is vertical as long as the
subsistence consumption constraint is binding. As the wage per eﬃciency unit of labor increases in
this income range, the individual can generate the subsistence consumption with a smaller labor force
participation and the fraction of time devoted to child rearing increases. Once, the level of income is
suﬃciently high such that the subsistence consumption constraint is not binding, the income expansion
path becomes horizontal at a level γ in terms of time devoted for child rearing.




















Figure 4.1. Preferences, Constraints, and Income Expansion Path
number of eﬃciency units of labor is diminished due to the transition from the existing technological state to a superior
o n e( d u et ot h ee r o s i o ne ﬀect), each individual operates with a superior level of technology and the productivity eﬀect is
assumed to dominate. That is, ∂yt/∂gt > 0.
60Furthermore, the optimization with respect to et+1 implies that the level of education chosen by





=0 i f gt+1 ≤ ˆ g
> 0i f gt+1 > ˆ g
(9)
where e0(gt+1) > 0a n de00(gt+1) < 0 ∀gt+1 > ˆ g>0.92 Hence, regardless of whether potential income is
above or below ˜ z, increases in wages will not change the division of child-rearing time between quality
and quantity. However, the division between time spent on quality and time spent on quantity is aﬀected
by the rate of technological progress, which changes the return to education.






τ+e(gt+1) ≡ nb(gt+1)i f zt ≥ ˜ z
1−[˜ c/zt]
τ+e(gt+1) ≡ na(gt+1,z(et,gt,x t)) if zt ≤ ˜ z.
(10)
where zt ≡ wtht = z(et,gt,x t)a sf o l l o w sf r o m( 3 )a n d( 6 )
Hence, as follows from the properties of e(gt+1),n b(gt+1), and na(gt+1,z t):
(a) An increase in the rate of technological progress reduces the number of children and increases their
quality, i.e.,
∂nt/∂gt+1 ≤ 0 and ∂et+1/∂gt+1 ≥ 0.
(b) If the subsistence consumption constraint is binding (i.e., if parental potential income is below ˜ z),a n
increase in parental potential income raises the number of children, but has no eﬀect on their quality,
i.e.,
∂nt/∂zt > 0 and ∂et+1/∂zt =0 if zt < ˜ z.
(c) If the subsistence consumption constraint is not binding (i.e., if parental potential income is above
˜ z), an increase in parental potential income does not aﬀect the number of children or their quality, i.e.,
∂nt/∂zt = ∂et+1/∂zt =0 if zt > ˜ z.
Technological Progress Suppose that technological progress, gt+1, that takes place between periods
t and t + 1 depends upon the education per capita among the working generation in period t, et, and




= g(et,L t), (11)
where for et ≥ 0a n das u ﬃciently large population size Lt,g (0,L t) > 0,g i(et,L t) > 0, and gii(et,L t) <
0,i = et,L t.94 Hence, for a suﬃciently large population size, the rate of technological progress between
92e00(gt+1) depends upon the third derivatives of the production function of human capital. e00(gt+1)i s a s s u m e d t o
be concave, which appears plausible.
93W h i l et h er o l eo ft h es c a l ee ﬀect in the Malthusian epoch, is essential, none of the existing results depend on the
presence or the absence of the scale eﬀect in the modern era. The functional form of technological progress given in (11)
can capture both the presence and the absence of the scale eﬀect in the modern era. In particular, the scale eﬀect can be
removed, once investment in education is positive, assuming for instance that limL→∞gL(et,L)=0f o ret > 0.
94For a suﬃciently small population the rate of technological progress is strictly positive only every several periods.
Furthermore, the number of periods that pass between two episodes of technological improvement declines with the size
of population. These assumptions assure that in early stages of development the economy is in a Malthusian steady-state
with zero growth rate of output per capita, but ultimately the growth rates is positive and slow. If technological progress
would occur in every time period at a pace that increases with the size of population, the growth rate of output per capita
would always be positive, despite the adjustment in the size of population.
61time t and t + 1 is a positive, increasing, strictly concave function of the size and level of education
of the working generation at time t. Furthermore, the rate of technological progress is positive even if
labor quality is zero.
The state of technology at time t +1 ,A t+1, is therefore
At+1 =( 1+gt+1)At, (12)
where the state of technology at time 0 is given at a level A0.
Population T h es i z eo fp o p u l a t i o na tt i m et +1 ,L t+1, is
Lt+1 = ntLt, (13)
where Lt is the size of population at time t and nt is the number of children per person; L0 is given.





nb(gt+1)Lt if zt ≥ ˜ z
na(gt+1,z(et,gt,x t))Lt if zt ≤ ˜ z.
(14)
Eﬀective Resources The evolution of eﬀective resources per worker, xt ≡ (AtX)/Lt, is determined












γ xt ≡ φ
b(et,L t)xt if zt ≥ ˜ z
[1+g(et,Lt)][τ+e(g(et,Lt))]
1−[˜ c/z(et,gt,xt)] xt ≡ φ




e(et,L t) > 0, and φ
a
x(et,g t,x t,L t) < 0 ∀et ≥ 0.
4.1.3 The Dynamical System
The development of the economy is fully determined by a sequence {et,g t,x t,L t}∞
t=0 that satisﬁes (9),
(11), 14), and (16), in every period t and describe the joint evolution of education, technological progress,
eﬀective resources per capita, and population over time.
The dynamical system is characterized by two regimes. In the ﬁrst regime the subsistence con-
sumption constraint is binding and the evolution of the economy is governed by a four dimensional







gt+1 = g(et,L t)
Lt+1 = na(g(et,L t),z (et,gt,x t))Lt,
for zt ≤ ˜ z (17)
where the initial conditions e0,g 0,x 0 are historically given.
62In the second regime the subsistence consumption constraint is not binding and the evolution of







Lt+1 = nb(g(et,L t))Lt.
for zt ≥ ˜ z (18)
In both regimes, however, the analysis of the dynamical system is greatly simpliﬁed by the fact
that the evolution of et and gt is independent of whether the subsistence constraint is binding, and by the
fact that, for a given population size L, the joint evolution of et and gt is determined independently of
the xt. The education level of workers in period t+1 depends only on the level of technological progress
expected between period t and period t +1 , while technological progress between periods t and t +1
depends only on the level of education of workers in period t. Thus the dynamics of technology and
education can be analyzed independently of the evolution resources per capita.
A. The Dynamics of Technology and Education The evolution of technology and education, for
a given population size L, is characterized by the sequence {gt,e t;L}∞
t=0 that satisﬁes in every period t
the equations gt+1 = g(et;L), and et+1 = e(gt+1). Although this dynamical sub-system consists of two
independent one dimensional, non-linear ﬁrst-order diﬀerence equations, it is more revealing to analyze
them jointly.
In light of the properties of the functions e(gt+1)a n dg(et;L) this dynamical sub-system is
characterized by three qualitatively diﬀerent conﬁgurations, which are depicted in Figures 4.2.A, 4.3.A
and 4.4.A. The economy shifts endogenously from one conﬁguration to another as population increases
and the curve g(et;L) shifts upward to account for the eﬀect of an increase in population.
In Figure 4.2.A, for a range of small population size, the dynamical system is characterized by
globally stable steady-state equilibria, (¯ e(L), ¯ g(L)) = (0,gl(L)), where gl(L)i n c r e a s e sw i t ht h es i z e
of the population while the level of education remains unchanged. In Figure 4.3.A, for a range of
moderate population size, the dynamical system is characterized by three steady state equilibria, two
locally stable steady-state equilibria: (¯ e(L),¯ g(L)) = (0,gl(L)) and (¯ e(L),¯ g(L)) = (eh(L),gh(L)), and
an interior unstable steady-state (¯ e(L),¯ g(L)) ≡ (eu(L),gu(L)), where (eh(L),gh(L)) and gl(L)i n c r e a s e
monotonically with the size of the population. Finally, in Figure 4.4.A, for a range of large population
sizes, the dynamical system is characterized by globally stable steady-state equilibria, (¯ e(L),¯ g(L)) =
(eh(L),gh(L)),where eh(L)a n dgh(L) increases monotonically with the size of the population.
B. Global Dynamics This section analyzes the evolution o ft h ee c o n o m yf r o mt h eM a l t h u s i a n
Regime, through the Post-Malthusian Regime, to the demographic transition and Modern Growth.
The global analysis is based a sequence of phase diagrams that describe the evolution of the system,
within each regime, for a given population size, and the transition between these regimes as population
increases in the process of development. Each of the phase diagrams is a two dimensional projection in
the plain (et,x t;L),of the three dimensional system in the space {et,g t,x t;L}.
The phase diagrams, depicted in Figure 4.2.B, 4.4.B, and 4.5.B contain three elements: the
Malthusian Frontier, which separates the regions in which the subsistence constraint is binding from
those where it is not; the XX locus, which denotes the set of all triplets (et,g t,x t;L)f o rw h i c he ﬀective
resources per worker are constant; and the EE locus, which denotes the set of all pairs (et,g t;L)f o r
which the level of education per worker is constant.
The Malthusian Frontier
63As was established in (17) and (18) the economy exits from the subsistence consumption regime
when potential income, zt, exceeds the critical level ˜ z. This switch of regime changes the dimensionality
of the dynamical system from three to two.
Let the Malthusian Frontier be the set of all triplets of (et,x t,g t;L) for which individuals’ income
equal ˜ z.95 Using the deﬁnitions of zt and ˜ z, it follows from (3) and (6) that the The Malthusian Frontier,
MM ≡ {(et,x t,g t;L):x
1−α
t h(et,g t)α =˜ c/(1 − γ)}.
Let the Conditional Malthusian Frontier be the set of all pairs (et,x t;L) for which, conditional
on a given technological level gt, individuals incomes equal ˜ z. Following the deﬁnitions of zt and ˜ z,
equations (3) and (6) imply that the Conditional Malthusian Frontier, MM|gt, is MM|gt ≡ {(et,x t;L):
x
(1−α)
t h(et,g t)α =˜ c/(1 − γ) | gt}, where xt is a decreasing strictly convex function of et along the
MM|gtlocus.
Hence, the Conditional Malthusian Frontier, as depicted in Figures 4.2.B-4.4.B, is a strictly con-
vex, downward sloping, curve in the (et,x t) space. Furthermore, it intersects the xt axis and approaches
asymptotically the et axis as xt approaches inﬁnity. The frontier shifts upward as gt increases in the
process of development.
The XX Locus
Let XX be the locus of all triplets (et,g t,x t;L) such that the eﬀective resources per worker, xt,
is in a steady-state: XX ≡ {(et,x t,g t;L): xt+1 = xt}.
As follows from (15), along the XX locus the growth rates of population and technology are
equal. Above the Malthusian frontier, the fraction of time devoted to child-rearing is independent of
the level of eﬀective resources per worker. In this case, the growth rate of population will just be a
negative function of the growth rate of technology, since for higher technology growth, parents will spend
more of their resources on child quality and thus less on child quantity. Thus there will be a particular
level of technological progress which induces an equal rate population growth. Since the growth rate of
technology is, in turn, a positive function of the level of education, this rate of technology growth will
correspond to a particular level of education, denoted ˆ e. Below the Malthusian Frontier, the growth rate
of population depends on the level of eﬀective resources per capita, x, as well as on the growth rate of
technology. The lower is x, the smaller the fraction of the time endowment devoted to child-rearing,
and so the lower is population growth. Thus, below the Malthusian frontier, a lower value of eﬀective
resources per capita would imply that lower values of technology growth (and thus education) would be
consistent with population growth being equal to technology growth. Thus, as drawn in Figures 4.2.B,
4.3.B, and 4.4.B, lower values of x are consistent with lower values of e on the part of the XX locus
that is below the Malthusian Frontier.
If the subsistence consumption constraint is not binding, it follows from (16) that for zt ≥ ˜ z,





> 0 if et > ˆ e(L)
=0 if et =ˆ e(L)
< 0 if et < ˆ e(L)
(19)
Hence, the XX Locus, as depicted in Figures 4.2.B, 4.3.B, and 4.4.B is a vertical line above the Condi-
95Below the Malthusian Frontier, the eﬀect of income on fertility will be positive, while above the frontier there will be
no eﬀect of income on fertility. Thus the Malthusian Frontier separates the Malthusian and Post-Malthusian regimes, on
the one hand, from the Modern Growth regime, on the other, and crossing this frontier is associated with the demographic
transition.
96In order to simplify the exposition without aﬀecting the qualitative nature of the dynamical system, the parameters
of the model are restricted so as to assure that the XX Locus is non-empty when zt ≥ ˜ z. That is, ˆ g<(γ/τ) − 1 <
g(eh(L0),L 0).
64tional Malthusian Frontier at a level ˆ e(L).
If the subsistence constraint is binding, the evolution of xt, is based upon the rate of technological
change, gt, the eﬀective resources per-worker, xt as well as the quality of the labor force, et. Let
XX|gt be the locus of all pairs (et,x t;L) such that xt+1 = xt, for a given level of gt. That is,
XX|gt ≡ {(et,x t;L): xt+1 = xt | gt} It follows from (16 that for zt ≤ ˜ z, and for 0 ≤ et ≤ ˆ e(L), there





< 0 if (et,x t) > (et,x(et)) for 0 ≤ et ≤ ˆ e(L),
=0 if xt = x(et) for 0 ≤ et ≤ ˆ e(L),
> 0 if [(et,x t) < (et,x(et)) for 0 ≤ et ≤ ˆ e(L),] or [et > ˆ e(L)]
(20)
Hence, without loss of generality, the locus XX|gt is depicted in Figure 4.2, as an upward slopping
c u r v ei nt h es p a c e( et,x t), deﬁned for et ≤ ˆ e(L).X X |gt is strictly below the Conditional Malthusian
Frontier for value of et < ˆ e(L), and the two coincides at ˆ e(L). Moreover, the Conditional Malthusian
Frontier, the XX Locus, and the XX|gt Locus, coincide at (ˆ e(L), ˆ x(L)).
The EE Locus
Let EE be the locus of all triplets (et,g t,x t;L) such that the quality of labor, et, is in a steady-
state: EE ≡ {(et,x t,g t;L): et+1 = et}.
As follows from (9) and (11), et+1 = e(g(et;L) and thus, for a given population size, the steady-
state values of et are independent of the values of xt and gt. The locus EE evolves through three
phases in the process of development, corresponding to the three phases that describe the evolution of
education and technology, as depicted in Figures 4.2.A, 4.3.A, and 4.4.A.
In early stages of development, when population size is suﬃciently small, the joint evolution
of education and technology is characterized by a globally stable temporary steady-state equilibrium,
(¯ e(L), ¯ g(L)) = (0,gl(L)), as depicted in Figure 4.2.A. The corresponding EE Locus, depicted in the
space (et,x t;L) in Figure 4.2.B, is vertical at the level e =0 , for a range of small population sizes.
Furthermore, for this range, the global dynamics of et are given by:
et+1 − et
½
=0 if et =0
< 0 if et > 0. (21)
In later stages of development as population size increases suﬃciently, the joint evolution of
education and technology is characterized by multiple locally stable temporary steady-state equilibria,
as depicted in Figure 4.3.A. The corresponding EE Locus, depicted in the space (et,x t;L)i nF i g u r e
4.3.B, consists of 3 vertical lines corresponding the three steady-state equilibria for the value of et. That
is, e =0 ,e = eu(L), and e = eh(L). The vertical lines e = eu(L), and e = eh(L) shift rightward as





< 0 if 0 <e t <e u(L) or et >e h(L)
=0 if et =( 0 ,e u(L),e h(L))
> 0 if eu(L) <e t <e h(L).
(22)
In mature stages of development when population size is suﬃciently large, the joint evolution of
education and technology is characterized by a globally stable steady-state equilibrium, (¯ e(L),¯ g(L)) =
(eh(L),gh(L)), as depicted in Figure 4.4.A. The corresponding EE Locus, as depicted in Figure 4.4.B in
the space (et,x t;L), is vertical at the level e = eh(L). This vertical line shifts rightward as population





> 0 if 0 ≤ et <e h(L)
=0 if et = eh(L).
< 0 if et >e h(L).
(23)
Conditional Steady-State Equilibria
In early stages of development, when population size is suﬃciently small, the dynamical system,
as depicted in Figure 4.2.B is characterized by a unique and globally stable conditional steady-state
equilibrium.97 It is given by a point of intersection between the EE Locus and the xt+1 = xt Locus. That
is, conditional on a given technological level, gt, the Malthusian steady-state (0, ¯ x(L)) is globally stable.98
In later stages of development as population size increases suﬃciently, the dynamical system as depicted
in Figure 4.3.B is characterized by two conditional steady-state equilibria. The Malthusian conditional
steady-state equilibrium is locally stable, whereas the steady-state equilibrium (eu(L),x u(L)) is a
saddle point.99 For education levels above eu(L) the system converges to a stationary level of education
eh(L) and possibly to a steady-state growth rate of xt. In mature stages of development when population
size is suﬃciently large, the system convergence globally to an educational level eh(L) and possibly to
a steady-state growth rate of xt.
4.1.4 From Malthusian Stagnation to Sustained Growth
The economy evolves from an epoch of Malthusian stagnation through the Post-Malthusian regime to
the demographic transition and a Modern Growth regime. This pattern and the prime driving forces in
this transition emerge from the phase diagrams depicted in Figures 4.2-4.4.
Consider an economy in early stages of development. Population size is relatively small and the
implied slow rate of technological progress does not provide an incentive to invest in the education of
children. As depicted in Figure 4.2.A,the interaction between education, et, and the rate of technological
change, gt, for a constant small population, Ll, is characterized by a globally stable steady-state equilib-
rium (0,gl(L)), where education is zero and the rate of technological progress is slow. This steady-state
equilibrium corresponds to a globally stable conditional Malthusian steady-state equilibrium, depicted in
Figure 4.2.B. For a constant small population, Ll,and for a given rate of technological progress, eﬀective
resources per capita, as well as the level of education are constant, and output per capita is therefore
constant as well. Moreover, shocks to population or resources will be resolved in a classic Malthusian
fashion.
As population grows slowly in reaction to technological progress, the g(et+1,L l)l o c u s ,d e p i c t e di n
Figure 4.2.A, gradually shifts upward and the steady-state equilibrium shifts vertically upward reﬂecting
small increments in the rate of technological progress, while the level of education remains constant at
a zero level. Similarly, the conditional Malthusian steady-state equilibrium drawn in Figure 4.2.B shifts
vertically upward , as the XX locus shifts upward. However, output per capita remains initially constant
at the subsistence level and ultimately creeps forward at a miniscule rate.
97Since the dynamical system is discrete, the trajectories implied by the phase diagrams do not necessarily approximate
the actual dynamic path, unless the state variables evolve monotonically over time. As shown, the evolution of et is
monotonic, whereas the evolution and convergence of xt may be oscillatory. Non-monotonicity in the evolution of xt may
arise only if e<ˆ e and it does not aﬀect the qualitative description of the system. Furthermore, if φa
x(et,g t,x t)xt > −1
the conditional dynamical system is locally non-oscillatory. The phase diagrams in Figures 4.3.A-4.5.A are drawn under
the assumptions that assure that there are no oscillations.
98The local stability of the steady-state equilibrium (0,x(gt)) can be derived formally. The eigenvalues of the Jacobian
matrix of the conditional dynamical system evaluated at the conditional steady-state equilibrium are both smaller than
one (in absolute value)
99Convergence to the saddle point takes place only if the level of education is eu. That is, the saddle path is the entire
vertical line that corresponds to et = eu.
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Figure 4.2. The Evolution of Technology, gt, Education, et,and Eﬀective Resources, xt
Small Population
Over time, the slow growth in population that takes place in the Malthusian regime raises the rate
of technological progress and shift the g(et+1,L l) locus in Figure 4.2.A suﬃciently upward, generating
a qualitative change in the dynamical systems depicted in Figure 4.3.A.
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Figure 4.3. The Evolution of Technology, gt, Education, et,and Eﬀective Resources, xt :
Moderate Population
The dynamical system of education and technology, for a moderate population, is characterized
by multiple, history-dependent, stable steady state equilibria: The steady-state equilibria (0,gl(L)) and
(eh(L),gh(L)) are locally stable, whereas (eu(L),gu(L)) is unstable. Given the initial conditions, in
the absence of large shocks the economy remains in the vicinity of the low steady-state equilibrium
(0,gl(L)), where education is still zero but the rate of technological progress is moderate. This steady-
state equilibria correspond to a multiple locally stable conditional Malthusian steady-state equilibrium,
depicted in Figure 4.3.B. A Malthusian steady-state, characterized by constant resources per capita, slow
67technological progress, and no education, and a modern growth steady state, characterized by a high
level of education, rapid technological progress, growing income per capita, and moderate population
growth. However, since the economy starts in the vicinity of Malthusian steady state, it remains there.100
As the rate of technological progress continue to rise in reaction to the increasing population
size, the g(et+1,L t) locus shifts upward further and ultimately, as depicted in Figure 4.4, the dynamical
system experiences another qualitative change. The Malthusian steady state equilibrium vanishes, and
the economy is the system is characterized by a unique globally stable modern steady-state equilibrium
(eh(L),gh(L)) characterized by high levels of education and technological progress.
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Figure 4.4. The Evolution of Technology, gt, Education, et,and Eﬀective Resources, xt
Large Population
Increases in the rate of technological progress and the level of education feed back on each other
until the economy converges rapidly to the stable modern steady state equilibrium. The increase in the
pace of technological progress has two opposing eﬀects on the evolution of population. On the one hand,
it eased households’ budget constraints, allowing the allocation of more resources for raising children.
On the other hand, it induced a reallocation of these additional resources toward child quality. In the
Post-Malthusian regime, due to the limited demand for human capital, the ﬁrst eﬀect dominated and
the rise in real income permitted households to increase their family size as well the quality of each
child.101 The interaction between investment in human capital and technological progress generate a
virtuous circle: human capital formation prompted faster technological progress, which in turn further
raised the demand for human capital, inducing further investment in child quality, and ultimately, as
the economy crosses the Malthusian frontier triggering a demographic transition. The oﬀsetting eﬀect
of population growth on the growth rate of income per capita is eliminated and the interaction between
human capital accumulation and technological progress permitted a transition to a state of sustained
economic growth.
100Large shock to education or technological progress would permit the economy to jump to the Modern Growth steady
state, but this possibility appears inconsistent with the evidence.
101Literally, income per capita does not change during the Post-Malthusian regime. It remains ﬁxed at the subsistence
level. This is an artifact of the assumption that the only input into child (quality and quantity) is parental time, and
that this time input does not produce measured output. If child-rearing, especially the production of quality, requires
goods or time supplied through a market (e.g., schooling), the shift toward higher child quality that takes place during
the post-Malthusian regime would be reﬂected in higher market expenditures (as opposed to parental time expenditures)
and rising measured income.
68In the modern growth regime, resources per capita rise, as technological progress outstrips pop-
ulation growth. Provided that population size is constant (i.e., population growth is zero), the levels of
education and technological progress and the growth rates of resources per capita, and thus the output
per capita are constant in the modern growth steady state equilibrium.102
4.1.5 Major Hypotheses and their Empirical Validity
The theory generates several hypotheses about the evolution of population, human capital and income
per capita in the process of development, underlying the roles of the inherent interaction between
population and technology in the Malthusian epoch, as well as the formation of human capital in the
second phase of the Industrial Revolution and the associated demographic transition, in the emergence
of a state of sustained economic growth.
Main Hypotheses:
• During the initial phases of the Malthusian epoch the growth rate of output per capita is nearly
zero and the growth rate of population is miniscule, reﬂecting the sluggish pace of technological
progress and the full adjustment of population to the expansion of resources. In the later phases
of the Malthusian epoch, the increasing rate of technological progress, along with the inherent
delay in the adjustment of population to the rise in income per capita, generated a positive but
very small growth rates of output per capita and population.
The hypothesis is consistent with the evidence provided in section 2.1 about the evolution of the world
economy in the Malthusian epoch. In particular, the inﬁnitesimal pace of resource expansion in the ﬁrst
millennium was reﬂected in a miniscule increase in the Western European population from 24.7 million
people in the year 1 to 25.4 million in the year 1000, along with a zero average growth rate of output per
capita. The more rapid (but still very slow) expansion of resources in the period 1000-1500, permitted
the Western European population to grow at a slow average rate of 0.16% per year, from 25 million in
the year 1000 to 57 million in the year 1500, along with a slow average growth rate of income per capita
at a rate of about 0.13% per year. Resource expansion over the period 1500-1820 had a more signiﬁcant
impact on the Western European population that grew at an average pace of 0.26% per year, from 57
million in the year 1500 to 133 million in the year 1820, along with a slightly faster average growth rate
of income per capita at a rate of about 0.15% per year.
• The reinforcing interaction between population and technology during the Malthusian epoch, in-
creased the size of the population suﬃciently so as to support a faster pace of technological progress,
generating the transition to the Post-Malthusian Regime. The growth rates of output per capita in-
creased signiﬁcantly, but the positive Malthusian eﬀect of income per capita on population growth
was still maintained, generating a sizeable increase in population growth, and oﬀsetting some of
the potential gains in income per capita. Moreover, human capital accumulation did not play
as i g n i ﬁcant role in the transition to the Post-Malthusian Regime and thus in the early take-oﬀ
in the ﬁrst phase of the Industrial Revolution. It emerged in the midst of the Post-Malthusian
Regime, inducing further technological progress.
102If population growth is positive in the Modern Growth regime, then education and technological progress continue to
rise, and, similarly, if population growth is negative they fall. In fact, the model makes no ﬁrm prediction about what
t h eg r o w t hr a t eo fp o p u l a t i o nw i l lb ei nt h eM o d e r nG r o w t hr e g ime, other than that population growth will fall once the
economy exits from the Malthusian region. If the growth rate of technology is related to the growth rate of population,
rather than to its level, then there exists a steady state modern growth regime in which the growth rates of population
and technology would be constant. Further, such a steady state would be stable: if population growth fell, the rate of
technological progress would also fall, inducing a rise in fertility.
69The hypothesis is consistent with the evidence provided in section 2.2 about the evolution of the world
economy in the Post-Malthusian regime. In particular, the acceleration in the pace of resource expansion
in the period 1820-1870 increased the Western European population from 133 million people in the year
1820 to 188 million in the year 1870, and the average growth rate of output per capita over this period
increased signiﬁcantly to 0.95% per year. Furthermore, the evidence suggest that the industrial demand
for human capital increased only in the second phase of the of the Industrial Revolution. As shown
by Clark (2003) human capital formation prior to the Industrial Revolution as well as in its ﬁrst phase
occurred in an era in which the market rewards for skill acquisition were at historically low levels.103
• The acceleration in the rate of technological progress increased the demand for human capital in
the Post-Malthusian Regime, inducing signiﬁcant investment in human capital, and triggering the
demographic transition and a rapid pace of economic growth.
The hypotheses is consistent with the evidence, provided in section 2.3 and depicted partly in Figure 4.5,
about the signiﬁcant rise in the industrial demand for human capital in the second phase of the Industrial
Revolution and a marked increased in educational attainment, in association with a decline in fertility
rates, and a transition to a state of sustained economic growth. In particular, it is consistent with the
revisionist view on the British Industrial Revolution (e.g., Crafts and Harley 1992, Clark 2001, and Voth
2003) that argue that the ﬁrst phase of the Industrial Revolution in England was characterized by a
moderate increase in the growth rate of output per capita, and the standard of living and the “take-oﬀ”,
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Figure 4.5. The Sharp Rise in Real GDP Per Capita and it association with Investment in Education
and Fertility Decline: England 1865-1920
Source: Clark (2001), Feinstein (1972), Flora et al. (1983), Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1981)
Furthermore, quantitative analysis of uniﬁed growth theories by Fernandez-Vilaverde (2003), Doepke
(2004), and Pereira (2004) suggests that indeed the rise in the demand for human capital was a signiﬁcant
force behind the demographic transition and the emergence of a state of sustained economic growth104
103The rise in human capital formation over this period may reﬂect religious, cultural and social forces, as well as the
rise in valuation for oﬀspring quality due to the forces of natural selection, as discussed in section 5.2.
104The rise in the demand for human capital in Fernandez-Vilaverde (2003) is based on capital-skill complementarity,
and is indistinguishable from the complementarity between technology and skills (in the short run) that is maintained by
Galor and Weil (2000).
70Moreover, the theory is consistent with the observed simultaneous onset of the demographic
transition across Western European countries that diﬀered signiﬁcantly in their income per capita. It
suggests that a universal rise in the demand for human capital in Western Europe (as documented in
section 2.3.3) generated this simultaneous transition. It should be noted that the lack of clear evidence
about the increase in the return to human capital in the second phase of the Industrial Revolution does
not indicate the absence of a signiﬁcant increase in the demand for human capital over this period. The
signiﬁcant increase in schooling that took place in the 19th century and in particular the introduction
of public education (e.g., The Education Act of 1870) that lowered the cost of education, generated
signiﬁcant increase in the supply of educated workers that may have prevented a signiﬁcant rise in the
return to education.105
• a. The growth process is characterized by stages of development and the evolution of the growth
rates of output per capita is nonlinear. Technological leaders experienced a monotonic increase
in the growth rates of their income per capita. Their growth was rather slow in early stages
of development, it increased rapidly during the take-oﬀ from the Malthusian epoch, and then
continued to rise at a lower pace, possibly stabilizing at higher level. Technological followers
that made the transition to sustained economic growth, in contrast, experienced a non-monotonic
increase in the growth rates of their income per capita. Their growth rates rather slow in early
stages of development, it increased rapidly in the early stages of the take-oﬀ from the Malthusian
epoch and was boosted by the adoption of technologies from the existing technological frontier,
and then once the economy reached the technological frontier, the growth rates dropped to the
level of the technological leaders.
b. The diﬀerential timing of the take-oﬀ between economies generated convergence clubs charac-
terized by a group of poor countries in the vicinity of the Malthusian equilibrium, a group of rich
countries in the vicinity of the sustained growth equilibrium, and others that are in the attempting
to shift from one camp to another.106
These hypotheses are consistent the Maddison (2001)’s evidence about the growth process in
the last 2000 years, as well as with contemporary cross section evidence that suggest that the growth
process is characterized by multiple growth regimes (e.g., Duraluf and Johnson 1995) and thus with
non-linearities in the growth process (e.g., Duraluf and Quah 1998, and Bloom, Canning and Silva
2003), and that divergence along with a twin peak have emerged in the distribution of income across
countries in the world (Quah 1996, 1997, Jones 1997, and Prichett 1997).107
4.2 Complementary Theories
Subsequent theories of economic growth in the very long run demonstrate that the uniﬁed theory of
economic growth can be augmented and fortiﬁed by additional characteristics of the transition from
stagnation to growth without altering the fundamental hypothesis regarding the central roles played
by the emergence of human capital formation and the demographic transition in this process. Various
qualitative and quantitative uniﬁed theories explore plausible mechanisms for the emergence of human
capital and the onset of the demographic transition such as, the rise in the demand for human capital
105Some of this supply response was a direct reaction of the potential increase in the return to human capital, and thus
may only operate to partially oﬀset the increase in the return to human capital, but the reduction in the cost of education
via public schooling, generated an additional force that operated towards a reduction in the return to human capital.
106For the deﬁnition and the theory of club convergence see Azariadis (1996) and Galor (1996).
107Other studies that focused on nonlinearity of the growth process includes Fiaschi and Lavezzi (2003). Other research
on the emergence of twin peak is Feyrer (2003).
71(due to: technological acceleration, capital-skill complementarity, skilled biased technological change,
and reallocation of resources towards skilled intensive sectors), the decline in child and infant mortality,
the rise in life expectancy, the emergence of public education, the decline in child labor, as well as cultural
and genetic evolution in the valuation of human capital. They suggest that indeed the emergence of
human capital formation, and the onset of the demographic transition played a central role in the shift
from stagnation to growth.
4.2.1 Alternative Mechanisms for the Emergence of Human Capital Formation
The emergence of human capital formation and its impact on the demographic transition and the tech-
nological frontier is a central element in the transition from the Post-Malthusian Regime to the state of
sustained economic growth in all uniﬁed theories of economic growth in which population, technology
and income per capita are endogenously determined.108 Various complementary mechanisms that gen-
erate or reinforce the rise in human capital formation have been proposed and examined quantitatively,
demonstrating the robustness and the empirical plausibility of this central hypothesis.
The Rise in the Industrial Demand for Human Capital
The rise in industrial demand for human capital in advanced stages of industrialization, as doc-
umented in section 2.3.3, and its impact on human capital formation led researchers to incorporate it
as a central feature in uniﬁed theories of economic growth.
The link between industrial development and the demand for human capital have been modeled
in various complementary ways. Galor and Weil (2000) modeled the rise in the demand for human
capital as an outcome of the acceleration in technological progress, underlying the role of educated
individuals in coping with a rapidly changing technological environment. Their mechanism is founded
on the premise that the introduction of new technologies increases the demand for skilled labor in the
short-run, although in some periods the characteristics of new technologies may be complementarity to
unskilled labor, as was the case in the ﬁrst phase of the Industrial Revolution.109
Subsequent uniﬁed theories of economic growth have demonstrated that the rise in the demand
for human capital in association with advanced stages of industrialization could emerge from alternative
mechanisms, without altering the fundamental insights of the theory. Fernandez-Vilaverde (2003) bases
his quantitative uniﬁed theory on capital-skill complementarity, Doepke (2004) constructs his uniﬁed
theory on the basis of a rising level of skilled-intensive industrial technology, and Galor and Mountford
(2003) generate the rise in the demand for human capital via an increased specialization in the production
of skilled-intensive goods due to international trade.
The rise in the demand for human capital stimulated public policy designed to enhance investment
in human capital. In particular, as established in the quantitative uniﬁed theory of Doepke (2004),
educational policy and child labor laws in England played an important role in human capital formation
and the demographic transition.
Mortality Decline, the Rise in Life Expectancy, and Human Capital Formation
Several uniﬁed theories of economic growth demonstrated that the basic mechanism for the
emergence of human capital proposed by Galor and Weil (2000) can be augmented and reinforced
by the incorporation of the eﬀect of the decline in mortality rates and the rise in life expectancy (as
108Even in the multiple-regime structure of Lucas (2002) a shock to the return to human capital is suggested in order to
generate the switch from the Malthusian Regime to the Modern Growth Regime.
109Evidence for the complementarity between technological progress (or capital) and skills is provided by Katz and Goldin
(1988) and on the basis of cross-section studies by Duﬀy, Papageorgiou and Perez-Sebastain (2004).
72documented in section 2.3.2) on the rise in human capital formation, the decline in the desirable number
of surviving oﬀspring, and thus on the transition from stagnation to growth.110
The signiﬁcant decline in mortality rates in developed countries since the 18th century, as depicted
in Figure 2.24, and the recent decline in mortality rates in less developed countries, as depicted in Figure
2.25, corresponded to an acceleration in the rise in life expectancy and a signiﬁcant rise in human capital
formation, towards the end of the 19th century in developed countries (Figures 2.26 and 2.28) and
towards the middle of the 20th century in less developed countries (Figures 2.27 and 2.31). The rise in
the expected length of the productive life may have increased the potential rate of return to investments
in children’s human capital, and thus could have induced an increase in human capital formation along
with a decline in fertility. However, despite the gradual rise in life expectancy in developed and less
developed countries, investment in human capital has been insigniﬁcant as long as the industrial demand
for human capital has not emerged. Thus, it appears that the industrial demand for human capital, as
documented in section 2.3.3, provided the inducement for investment in education and the associated
reduction in fertility rates, whereas the prolongation of life may have re-enforced and complemented
this process.
Galor and Weil (1999) argue that the Malthusian interaction between technology and population
accelerated the pace of technological progress, improving industrial technology as well as medical and
health technologies. Consistent with the historical evidence provided in section 2.3.3, the improvements
in the industrial technology increased the demand for human capital, whereas the development of medical
technology and health infrastructure generated a signiﬁcant rise in life expectancy. The expected rate
of return to human capital investment increased therefore due to the prolongation of life, as well as
the rise in industrial demand for human capital, enhancing the positive interaction between schooling
and technological progress, bringing about a demographic transition and the emergence of the state of
sustained economic growth.
Various theories formally examined mechanisms that capture the interaction between human
capital formation, the decline in mortality rate, and the rise in life expectancy, in the process of de-
velopment.111 Cervellati and Sunde (2003) and Boucekkine, de la Croix and Licandro (2003) focus on
the plausible role of the reinforcing interaction between life expectancy and human capital formation
in the transition from stagnation to growth, abstracting from its eﬀect on fertility decisions. Others
suggest that a decline in mortality rates increased the return to investment in human capital via: (a)
increased population density and thus eﬃciency of the transmission of human capital (Lagerlof 2003a),
(b) increased population growth and the advancement of skill-biased technologies (Weisdorf 2004), and
(c) improved healthiness and thus the capacity to absorb human capital (Hazan and Zoabi 2004), gen-
erating a substitution of quality for quantity, a demographic transition and a transition to a state of
sustained economic growth.112
Capital-Skill Complementarity and the Emerging Incentives for Capitalists to Support
Education Reforms
The accumulation of physical capital in the early stages of industrialization enhanced the im-
portance of human capital in the production process and generated an incentive for the capitalists to
support the provision of public education for the masses.113 Consistent with the evidence provided in
110The eﬀect of an increase in life expectancy on the incentive of individuals to invest in their own human capital is well
established since Ben-Porath (1967). See Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder and Weil (2000), as well.
111As argued in section 3.2.3, qualitative and quantitative evidence do not lend credence to the theory that a decline in
infant and child mortality rates triggered the decline in the number of surviving oﬀspring and the increase in the investment
in oﬀspring’s human capital.
112See Iyigun (2003) as well.
113Attentively, other argued that increased polarization induced the elite to enact costly educational reforms. Grossman
73section 2.3.3, Galor and Moav (2004) argue that due to capital-skill complementarity, the accumula-
tion of physical capital by the capitalists in the ﬁrst phase of the Industrial Revolution increased the
importance of human capital in sustaining the rate of return to physical capital inducing capitalists to
support the provision of public education for the masses.114
The Decline in Child Labor
Other theories that focused on the transition from stagnation to growth suggested that the central
role of human capital formation and the demographic transition can be augmented and reinforced by
the incorporation of the adverse eﬀect of the rise in the demand for human capital on child labor.
Hazan and Berdugo (2002) suggest that technological change increased the wage diﬀerential between
parental labor and child labor inducing parents to reduce the number of their children and to further
invest in their quality, stimulating human capital formation, a demographic transition, and a shift to a
state of sustained economic growth.115 Alternatively, the rise in the importance of human capital in the
production process, as documented in section 2.3.3, induced industrialists to support laws that abolish
child labor (Doepke and Zilibotti (2003)), inducing a reduction in child labor, and stimulating human
capital formation and a demographic transition.
Cultural and Genetic Evolution in the Valuation of Human Capital
Human capital formation and its impact on the decline in the desirable number of surviving
oﬀspring may have been reinforced by cultural or genetic evolution in the attitude of individuals towards
human capital formation. Consistent with the gradual rise in literacy rates prior to the Industrial
Revolution, Galor and Moav (2002), argue that during the epoch of Malthusian stagnation that had
characterized most of human existence, individuals with a higher valuation for oﬀspring quality generated
an evolutionary advantage and their representation in the population gradually increased. The increase
in the rate of return to human capital along with the increase in the bias towards quality in the population
reinforced the substitution towards child quality, setting the stage for a signiﬁcant increase in human
capital formation along with a rapid decline in fertility.
4.2.2 Alternative Triggers for the Demographic Transition
The demographic transition that separated the Post-Malthusian Regime and the Sustained Growth
Regime is a central element in quantitative and qualitative uniﬁed theories of economic growth in which
population, technology and income per capita are endogenously determined. As discussed in section
2.3.2, the demographic transition brought about a reversal in the unprecedented increase in population
growth that occurred during the Post-Malthusian Regime, leading to a signiﬁcant reduction in fertility
rates and population growth in various regions of the world, and enabling economies to convert a larger
share of the fruits of factor accumulation and technological progress into growth of output per capita.116
The demographic transition enhanced the growth process reducing the dilution of the stock of capital
and land, enhancing the investment in the human capital of the population, and alternating the age
and Kim (1999) argue that education decreases predation, and Bowles and Gintis (1975) suggest that educational reforms
are designed to sustain the existing social order, by displacing social problems into the school system. In contrast,
Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) suggest that if political participation is determined by the education (socioeconomic
status) of citizens, the elite may not ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to subsidize universal public education despite the existence of
positive externalities from human capital.
114Since ﬁrms have limited incentive to invest in the general human capital of their workers, in the presence of credit
market imperfections, the level of education would be suboptimal unless it would be ﬁnanced publicly (Galor and Zeira
(1993), Duraluf (1996), Fernandez and Rogerson (1996) Benabou (2000), Mookherjee and Ray (2003), and Galor and
Moav (2004)). Moreover, a mixture of vocational and general education would be enacted (Bertocchi and Spagat 2004).
115The decline in the relative wages of children is documented empirically (e.g., Horrell and Humphries (1995)).
116Demographic shocks generate a signiﬁcant eﬀect on economic growth in Connolly and Peretto (2003) as well.
74distribution of the population, increasing temporarily the size of the labor force relative to the population
as a whole.117
Various complementary mechanisms for the demographic transition have been proposed in the
context of uniﬁed growth theories, establishing, theoretically and quantitatively the importance of this
central hypothesis in the understanding of the transition from stagnation to growth.118
The Emergence of Human Capital Formation
The gradual rise in the demand for human capital in the process of industrialization, as doc-
umented in section 2.3.3, and its close association with the timing of the demographic transition has
led researchers to argue that the increasing role of human capital in the production process induced
households to increase their investment in the human capital of their oﬀspring, ultimately leading to
the onset of the demographic transition.
The link between the rise in the demand for human capital and the demographic transition have
been modeled in various complementaries ways. Galor and Weil (2000) argue that the gradual rise
in the demand for human capital induced parents to invest in the human capital of their oﬀspring.
In the early stages of the transition from the Malthusian regime, the eﬀect of technological progress
on parental income permitted the rise in population growth as well as the average quality. Further
increases in the rate of technological progress ultimately induced a reduction in fertility rates, generating
a demographic transition in which the rate of population growth declined along with an increase in the
average level of education. Thus, consistent with historical evidence, the theory suggests that prior
to the demographic transition, population growth increased along with investment in human capital,
whereas the demographic transition brought about a decline in population growth along with a further
increase in human capital formation.
Other uniﬁed theories examine several reinforcing mechanisms that could have triggered the
demographic transition and the transition to sustained economic growth, such as the decline in child
labor (Hazan and Berdugo 2002, Doepke 2004 and Doepke and Zilibotti 2003), the decline in mortality
rates and the rise in life expectancy (Lagerlof 2003a, and Weisdorf 2004), and the evolution of preferences
for oﬀspring quality (Galor and Moav 2002)), as discussed in section 4.1. The quantitative uniﬁed
theories of Fernandez-Villaverde (2003) and Doepke (2004) conﬁrm the signiﬁcance of these various
channels in originating the demographic transition and the shift from stagnation to growth.
The Decline in the Gender Gap
The observed decline in the gender gap in the last two centuries, as discussed in section 3.3.4,
is an alternative mechanism that could have triggered a demographic transition and human capital
f o r m a t i o ni no t h e ru n i ﬁed theories.
A uniﬁed theory based upon the decline in the gender wage gap and the associated increase in
female labor force participation and fertility decline was explored by Galor and Weil (1996, 1999), as
elaborated in section 3.3.4. They argue that technological progress and capital accumulation comple-
mented mental intensive tasks and substituted for physical-intensive tasks in the industrial production
process. In light of the comparative physiological advantage of men in physical-intensive tasks and
women in mental-intensive tasks, the demand for women’s labor input gradually increased in the indus-
trial sector, decreasing monotonically the wage deferential between men and women. In early stages of
117Bloom and Williamson (1998) suggest that the cohort eﬀect played a signiﬁcant role in the growth ”miracle” of East
Asian countries in the time period 1960-1990.
118As established in section 3.3, some mechanisms that were proposed for the demographic transition, such as the decline
in infant and child mortality, as well as the rise in income, are inconsistent with the evidence. These mechanisms were
excluded in the formulation of uniﬁed growth theory.
75industrialization, wages of men and women increased, but the rise in female’s relative wages was insuﬃ-
cient to induce a signiﬁcant increase in women’s labor force participation. Fertility, therefore increased
due to the income eﬀect that was generated by the rise in men’s absolute wages. Ultimately, however,
the rise in women’s relative wages was suﬃcient to induce a signiﬁcant increase in labor force partici-
pation, increasing the cost of child rearing proportionally more that households income and triggering
a demographic transition and a shift from stagnation to growth.
Similarly, a transition from stagnation to growth based upon a declining gender gap in human
capital formation was proposed by Lagerlof (2003b). He argues that the process of development per-
mitted a gradual improvement in the relative level of female education, raising the opportunity cost of
children and initiating a fertility decline.119
4.2.3 Alternative Modeling of the Transition from Agricultural to Industrial Economy
The shift from agriculture to industry that accompanied the transition from stagnation to growth,
as described in section 2.2.3, inﬂuenced the speciﬁcations of the production structure of most uniﬁed
theories of economic growth. In some uniﬁed theories (e.g., Galor and Weil (2000)) the structure of
the aggregate production function and its interaction with technological progress, reﬂects implicitly a
transition from an agricultural to an industry economy in the process of development. In other theories
(e.g., Hansen and Prescott 2002, Kogel and Prskawetz 2001, Hazan and Berdugo 2002, Tamura 2002,
Doepke 2004, Galor and Mountford 2003, Bertocchi 2003, and Galor, Moav and Vollrath 2003) the
process of development generates explicitly a transition from an agricultural sector to an industrial
sector.
In Galor and Weil (2000) production occurs according to a constant-returns-to-scale technol-
ogy that is subject to endogenous technological progress. The output produced at time t, is Yt =
Hα
t (AtX)1−α, where Ht is the aggregate quantity of eﬃciency units of labor employed in period t, X
is land employed in production in every period t,a n dAt represents the endogenously determined tech-
nological level in period t. Hence AtX are the “eﬀective resources” employed in production in period t.
In early stages of development, the economy is agricultural (i.e., the ﬁxed amount of land is a binding
constraint on the expansion of the economy). Population growth reduces labor productivity since the
rate of technological progress is not suﬃciently high to compensate for the land constraint. However as
the rate of technological progress intensiﬁes in the process of development the economy becomes indus-
trial. Technological progress counterbalanced the land constraint, the role of land gradually diminishes,
and “eﬀective resources” are expanding at a rate that permit sustained economic growth.
Hansen and Prescott (2002) develop a model that captures explicitly the shift from an agri-
cultural sector to an industrial sector in the transition from stagnation to growth. In early stages of
development, the industrial technology is not suﬃciently productive and production takes place solely
in an agricultural sector, where population growth (that is assumed to increase with income) oﬀset
increases in productivity. An exogenous technological progress in the latent industrial technology ulti-
mately makes the industrial sector economically viable and the economy gradually shifts resources from
the agricultural sector to the industrial one. Assuming that the positive eﬀect of income on population
is reversed, the rise in productivity in the industrial sector is not counterbalanced by population growth
permitting the transition to a state of sustained economic growth.
119Alternatively, one could have adopted the mechanism proposed by Fernandez, Fogli and Olivetti (2004) for the gradual
decline in the education gap and labor force participation between men and women. They suggest that it reﬂects a dynamic
process in which the home experience of sons of working, educated mothers makes them more likely to prefer educated and
working wives, inducing a gradual increase in investment in education as well as labor force participation among women.
76Unlike most uniﬁed theories in which the time paths of technological progress, population growth,
and human capital formation are endogenously determined and are determined on the basis on ex-
plicit micro-foundations, in Hansen and Prescott (2002) technological progress is exogenous, population
growth is assumed to follow the hump-shaped pattern that is observed along human history and hu-
man capital formation that appears central in the transition is absent. Based upon this reduced form
approach, they demonstrate that there exists a rate of technological progress in the latent industrial
sector and a well speciﬁed reduced form relationship between population and output under which the
economy will shift from Malthusian stagnation to sustained economic growth. Unfortunately, however,
this methodology does not advance us in identifying the underlying micro-foundations that led to the
transition from stagnation to growth - the ultimate goal of uniﬁed growth theory.
Formally, the transition from stagnation to growth in Hansen and Prescott (2002) does not rely
on the forces of human capital in the transition. However, the lack of a role for human capital in their
structure is an artifact of the reduced form analysis that does not identify the economic factors behind
the process of technological change in the latent industrial technology, as well as the forces behind
the assumed hump shaped pattern of population dynamics. If the micro-foundations of these critical
factors behind the transition would have been properly established, human capital would have played a
central role sustaining the rate of technological progress in the industrial sector and in generating the
demographic transition that is assumed in their setting.
Thus, no major insight has been generated from this explicit modeling of the transition from
agriculture to industry in a closed economy setting. In contrast, the two-sector framework is instrumental
in the exploring of the eﬀect of international trade on the diﬀerential timing of the transition from
stagnation to growth and the associate phenomenon of the great divergence (Galor and Mountford
2003), as discussed in section 6.1. Moreover, this two-sector setting would be necessary in order to
examine the incentives of land owners to block education reforms and the process of industrialization
(Galor, Moav, and Vollrath 2003), and the evolution of property rights and their impact on political
reforms (Bertocchi 2003).
5U n i ﬁed Evolutionary Growth Theory
“It is not the strongest of the species that survive, nor the most intelligent, but the one most responsive
to change.” Charles Darwin
5.1 Human Evolution and Economic Development
This section explores the dynamic interaction between human evolution and the process of economic
development. It focuses on a recent development of a uniﬁed evolutionary growth theory that, based
on historical evidence, generates innovative hypotheses about the interplay between the process of
development and human evolution, shedding new light about the origin of modern economic growth and
the observed intricate evolution of health, life expectancy, human capital, and population growth since
the Neolithic revolution.
The uniﬁed evolutionary growth theory advances a novel analytical methodology that is designed
to capture the complexity of the dynamic interaction between the economic, social, and behavioral as-
pects of the process of development and evolutionary processes in the human population. The proposed
hybrid between Darwinian methodology and the methodology of uniﬁed theories of economic growth
permits the exploration of the dynamic reciprocal interaction between the evolution of the distribu-
tion of genetic traits and the process of economic development. It captures potential non-monotonic
77evolutionary processes that were triggered by major socioeconomic transitions, and may have played
as i g n i ﬁc a n tr o l ei nt h eo b s e r v e dt i m ep a t ho fh e a l t h ,l i f e expectancy, human capital, and population
growth.120
Humans were subjected to persistent struggle for existence for most of their history. The Malthu-
sian pressure aﬀected the size of the population (as establish e di ns e c t i o n2 . 1 . 2 ) ,a n dc o n c e i v a b l yv i a
natural selection, the composition of the population as well. Lineages of individuals whose traits were
complementary to the economic environment generated higher income, a larger number of surviving
oﬀspring and the representation of their traits in the population gradually increased, contributing sig-
niﬁcantly to the process of development.
Consistent with the historical evidence presented in section 2, the proposed uniﬁed evolutionary
growth theory demonstrates that the Malthusian epoch that characterized most of human existence
stimulated a process of natural selection that generated an evolutionary advantage to human traits
that were complementary to the growth process, and ultimately generating a take-oﬀ from an epoch of
Malthusian stagnation to a state of sustained economic growth.
Evidence suggests that evolutionary processes in the composition of existing genetic traits may
be rather rapid and the time period between the Neolithic Revolution and the Industrial Revolution
that lasted about 10,000 years is suﬃcient for signiﬁcant evolutionary changes. There are numerous
examples of rapid evolutionary changes among various species.121 In particular, evidence establishes
that evolutionary changes occurred in the Homo sapiens within the time period that is the focus of our
analysis. For instance, lactose tolerance was developed among European and Near Easterners since the
domestication of dairy animals in the course of the Neolithic revolution, whereas in regions that were
exposed to dairy animals in later stages a larger proportion of the adult population suﬀers from lactose
intolerance. Furthermore, genetic immunity to malaria provided by the sickle cell trait is prevalent
among descendents of Africans whose engagement in agriculture improved the breeding ground for
mosquitoes and thereby raised the incidence of malaria, whereas this trait is absent among descendents
of nearby populations that have not made the transition to agriculture.122
Despite the existence of compelling evidence about the interaction between human evolution
and the process of economic development, only few attempts have been made to explore the reciprocal
interaction between the process of development and human evolution.123 This exploration is likely to
revolutionize our understanding of the process of economic development as well as the process of human
120The conventional methodology of evolutionary stable strategies that has been employed in various ﬁelds of economics,
ignores the dynamics of the evolutionary process, and is thus inappropriate for the understanding of the “short-run”
interaction between human evolution and the process of development since the Neolithic revolution. As will become
apparent the dynamics of the evolutionary process are essential for the understanding of the interaction between human
evolution and economic growth since the Neolithic revolution that was marked by fundamental non-monotonic evolutionary
processes.
121The color change that peppered moths underwent during the 19th century is a classic example of evolution in nature
[See Kettlewell 1973]. Before the Industrial Revolution light-colored English peppered moths blended with the lichen-
c o v e r e db a r ko ft r e e s .B yt h ee n do ft h e1 9 t hc e n t u r yab l a c kv a r i a n to ft h em o t h ,ﬁrst recorded in 1848, became far more
prevalent than the lighter varieties in areas in which industrial carbon removed the lichen and changed the background color.
Hence, a signiﬁcant evolutionary change occurred within a time period that correspond to only hundreds of generations.
Moreover, evidence from Daphne Major in the Galapagos suggests that signiﬁcant evolutionary changes in the distribution
of traits among Darwin’s Finches occurred within few generations due to a major drought [Grant and Grant 1989]. Other
evidence, including the dramatic changes in the color patterns of guppies within 15 generations due to changes in the
population of predators, are surveyed by Endler [1986].
122See Levingston [1958], Weisenfeld [1967] and Durham [1982].
123Notable exceptions are Galor and Moav (2002)’s exploration of the interaction between human evolution and the
transition from stagnation to growth, Saint Paul (2003)’s examination of the eﬀect of the emergence of markets on the
evolution of heterogeneity in the human population , Clark and Hamilton (2003) analysis of the relationship between the
evolution of time preference and the sharp decline in interest rate in England in the 14th and 15th centuries, and Galor and
Moav (2004)’s exploration of the eﬀect of an increased population density in the process of development on the evolution
of life expectancy.
78evolution.
5.2 Natural Selection and the Origin of Economic Growth
The ﬁrst evolutionary growth theory that captures the interplay between human evolution and the
process of economic development in various phases of development, was developed by Galor and Moav
(2002). The theory suggests that during the epoch of Malthusian stagnation that had characterized most
of human existence, traits of higher valuation for oﬀspring quality generated an evolutionary advantage
and their representation in the population gradually increased. This selection process and its eﬀect
on investment in human capital stimulated technological progress and ultimately initiated a reinforcing
interaction between investment in human capital and technological progress that brought about the
demographic transition and the state of sustained economic growth.124
The theory maintains that during the Malthusian epoch, the distribution of valuation for quality
lagged behind the evolutionary optimal level. The evolution of the human brain in the transition to
Homo sapiens and the complementarity between brain capacity and the reward for human capital has
increased the evolutionary optimal investment in the quality of oﬀspring (i.e., the level that maximizes
reproduction success).125 Moreover, the increase in the return to human capital in the aftermath of
the Neolithic revolution increased the evolutionary optimal levels of investment in child quality. The
agricultural revolution facilitated the division of labor and fostered trade relationships across individuals
and communities, enhancing the complexity of human interaction and raising the return to human
capital. Thus, individuals with traits of higher valuation for oﬀspring’s quality generated higher income
and, in the Malthusian epoch when child rearing was positively aﬀected by aggregate resources, a larger
number of oﬀspring. Traits of higher valuation for quality gained the evolutionary advantage and their
representation in the population increased over time.
T h eM a l t h u s i a np r e s s u r ei n c r e a s e dt h er e p r e s e n t ation of individuals whose preferences are biased
towards child quality, positively aﬀecting investment in human capital and ultimately the rate of techno-
logical progress. In early stages of development, the proportion of individuals with higher valuation for
quality was relatively low, investment in human capital was minimal, resources above subsistence were
devoted primarily to child rearing, and the rate of technological progress was rather slow. Technological
progress therefore generated proportional increases in output and population and the economy was in
the vicinity of a Malthusian equilibrium, where income per capita is constant, but the proportion of
individuals with high valuation for quality was growing over time.126
As the fraction of individuals with high valuation for quality continued to increase, technological
progress intensiﬁe d ,r a i s i n gt h er a t eo fr e t u r nt oh u m a nc a p i t a l. The increase in the rate of technological
progress generated two eﬀe c t so nt h es i z ea n dt h eq u a l i t yo ft h ep o p u l a t i o n .O nt h eo n eh a n d ,i m p r o v e d
124The theory is applicable for either social or genetic intergenerational transmission of traits. A cultural transmission is
likely to be more rapid and may govern some of the observed diﬀerences in fertility rates across regions. The interaction
between cultural and genetic evolution is explored by Boyd and Richardson (1985) and Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981),
and a cultural transmission of preferences is examined by Bisin and Verdier (2000).
125The evolutionary process in valuation for quality that was triggered by the evolution of the human brain has not
reached a new evolutionary stable state prior to the Neolithic period because of the equality that characterized resource
allocation among hunter-gatherers tribes. Given this tribal structure, a latent attribute of preferences for quality, unlike
observable attributes such as strength and intelligence, could not generate a disproportionate access to sexual mates and
resources that could aﬀect fertility rates and investment in oﬀspring’s quality, delaying the manifestation of the potential
evolutionary advantage of these traits. It was the emergence of the nuclear family in the aftermath of the agricultural
revolution that fostered intergenerational links, and thereby enhanced the manifestation of the potential evolutionary
advantage of this trait.
126Unlike Galor and Weil (2000) in which the adverse eﬀect of limited resources on population growth delays the process
of development, in the proposed theory the Malthusian constraint generates the necessary evolutionary pressure for the
ultimate take-oﬀ.
79technology eased households’ budget constraints and provided more resources for quality as well as
quantity of children. On the other hand, it induced a reallocation of these increased resources toward
child quality. In the early stages of the transition from the Malthusian regime, the eﬀect of technological
progress on parental income dominated, and the rate of population growth as well as the average quality
increased, further accelerating technological progress. Ultimately, the rate of technological progress
induced universal investment in human capital along with a reduction in fertility rates, generating
ad e m o g r a p h i ct r a n s i t i o ni nw h i c ht h er a t eo fp o p u l ation growth declined along with an increase in
the average level of education. The positive feedback between technological progress and the level of
education reinforced the growth process, setting the stage for the transition to a state of sustained
economic growth.127
During the transition from the Malthusian epoch to the sustained growth regime, once the eco-
nomic environment improved suﬃciently, the signiﬁcance of quality for survival (fertility) declined, and
traits of higher valuation for quantity gained the evolutionary advantage. Namely, as technological
progress brought about an increase in income, the Malthusian pressure relaxed and the domination of
wealth in fertility decisions diminished. The inherent advantage of higher valuation for quantity in re-
production has started to dominate, and individuals whose preferences are biased towards child quantity
gained the evolutionary advantage. Nevertheless, the growth rate of output per worker has remained
positive since the high rate of technological progress sustained an attractive return to investment in
human capital even from the viewpoint of individuals whose valuation for quality is relatively low.
The transition from stagnation to growth is an inevitable by product of the interaction between
the composition of the population and the rate of technological progress in the Malthusian epoch.
However, for a given composition of population, the timing of the transition may diﬀer signiﬁcantly
across countries and regions due to historical accidents, as well as variation in geographical, cultural,
social and institutional factors, trade patterns, colonial status, and public policy, that have aﬀected the
relationship between human capital formation and technological progress.
5.2.1 Primary Ingredients
The theory is based upon the interaction between several building blocks: the Darwinian elements, the
Malthusians elements, the nature of technological progress, the determinants of human capital formation,
and the factors that aﬀect parental choice regarding the quantity and quality of oﬀspring.
The Darwinian elements. The theory incorporates the main ingredients of Darwinian evolution
(i.e., variety, intergenerational transmission of traits, and natural selection) into the economic environ-
ment. Inspired by fundamental components of the Darwinian theory (Darwin 1859, 1871), individuals do
not operate consciously so as to assure their evolutionary advantage. Nevertheless, their preferences (or
strategies) assure that those individuals whose operations are most complementary to the environment
would ultimately dominate the population.
Individuals’ preferences are deﬁned over consumption above a subsistence level as well as over
the quality and the quantity of their children.128 These preferences capture the Darwinian survival
127The theory suggests that waves of rapid technological progress in the Pre-Industrial Revolution era did not generate
sustained economic growth due to the shortage of preferences for quality in the population. Although technological progress
increased the return to quality temporarily, in these previous episodes, the level of human capital that was generated by
the response of the existing population was insuﬃcient to sustain technological progress and economic growth.
128The subsistence consumption constraint is designed to capture the fact that the physiological survival of the parent
is a pre-condition for the survival of the lineage (dynasty). Resources allocated to parental consumption beyond the
s u b s i s t e n c el e v e lm a yb ev i e w e da saf o r c et h a tr a i s e sp a r e n t a lp roductivity and resistance to adverse shocks (e.g., famine
and disease), generating a positive eﬀect on the ﬁtness of the parent and the survival of the lineage. This positive eﬀect,
however, is counterbalanced by the implied reduction in resources allocated to the oﬀspring, generating a negative eﬀect
on the survival of the lineage.
80strategy as well as the most fundamental trade-oﬀs that exist in nature: namely, the trade-oﬀ between
the resources allocated to the parent and the oﬀspring, and the trade-oﬀ between the number of oﬀspring
and resources allocated to each oﬀspring.129 The economy consists of a variety of types of individuals
distinguished by the weight given to child quality in their preferences.130 This trait is assumed to be
transmitted intergenerationally, the economic environment determines the type with the evolutionary
advantage (i.e., the type characterized by higher fertility rates), and the distribution of preferences in
the population evolves over time due to diﬀerences in fertility rates across types.131
The signiﬁcance that individuals attribute to child quantity as well as to child quality reﬂects
the well-known variety in the quality-quantity survival strategies (or in the K and r strategies) that
exists in nature (e.g., MacArthur and Wilson 1967). Human beings, like other species, confront the
basic trade-oﬀ between oﬀspring’s quality and quantity in their implicit Darwinian survival strategies.
Although a quantity-biased preference has a positive eﬀect on fertility rates and may therefore generate
a direct evolutionary advantage, it adversely aﬀects the quality of oﬀspring, their income, and their
ﬁtness and may therefore generate an evolutionary disadvantage. “Increased bearing is bound to be
paid for by less eﬃcient caring.” (Dawkins 1989, p. 116). As was established in the evolutionary biology
literature since the seminal work of Lack (1954), the allocation of resources between oﬀspring “caring”
and “bearing” is subjected to evolutionary changes.132
The Malthusian elements. Individuals are subjected to a subsistence consumption constraint and
as long as the constraint is binding, an increase in income results in an increase in population growth
along with an increase in the average quality of a minor segment of the population. Technological
progress, which brings about temporary gains in income per capita, triggered therefore in early stages
of development an increase in the size of the population that oﬀset the gain in income per capita due
to the existence of diminishing returns to labor. Growth in income per capita is generated ultimately,
despite decreasing returns to labor, since technological progress induces investment in human capital
among a growing minority.
The determinants of technological progress. The composition of the population as reﬂected by
the average level of human capital is the prime engine of technological progress.133
129Resources allocated to quality of oﬀspring in diﬀerent stages of development take diﬀerent forms. In early stages of
development it is manifested in investment in the durability of the oﬀspring via better nourishment and parental guidance,
whereas in mature stages, investment in quality may capture formal education.
130The analysis abstracts from heterogeneity in the degree of the trade-oﬀ between resources allocated to parent and
oﬀspring. The introduction of this element would not alter the qualitative results. On the evolution of preferences see the
survey by Bowles (1998).
131Recent research across historical and modern data from the United States and Europe suggests that fertility behavior
has a signiﬁcant hereditary component [Rogdgers et al. 2001a]. For instance, as established recently by Kohler et al.
(1999) and Rodgers et al. (2001b), based on the comparison of fertility rates among identical and fraternal twins born
in Denmark during the periods 1870-1910 and 1953-1964, slightly more than one-quarter of the variance in completed
fertility is attributable to genetic inﬂuence. These ﬁndings are consistent with those of Rodgers and Doughty [2000] based
on kinship data from the United States.
132Lack (1954) suggests that clutch sizes (i.e., number of eggs per nest), among owls and other predatory vole-eating
birds, for instance, are positively related to food abundance. He argues that the clutch size is selected such that under
any feeding conditions fertility rates ensure the maximal reproductive success. Furthermore, Cody (1966) documents the
existence of signiﬁcant diﬀerences between clutch sizes of the same bird species on islands and nearby mainland localities
of the same latitude. In temperate regions where food is more abundant in the mainland than on islands, the average
clutch size is smaller on the islands. For instance, for Cyanoramphus novaezelandeae, the average mainland clutch is 6.5
whereas the average in the island is 4.
133This link between education and technological change was proposed by Nelson and Phelps (1966) and was supported
empirically by Easterlin (1981), Doms et al. (1997), as well as others. Consistently with Mokyr (2002) who argues that
the eﬀect of human capital accumulation on technological progress became signiﬁcant only in the course of the Scientiﬁc
Revolution that preceded the Industrial Revolution, the eﬀect of human capital accumulation on the rate of technological
progress, need not be signiﬁcant prior to the scientiﬁc revolution as long as it becomes signiﬁcant prior to the Industrial
Revolution. In order to focus on the role of the evolutionary process, the model abstracts from the potential positive eﬀect
of the size of the population on the rate of technological progress. Adding this scale eﬀect would simply accelerate the
81The origin of human capital formation. Technological change raises the demand for human capi-
tal. Technological progress reduces the adaptability of existing human capital for the new technological
environment and educated individuals (and thus oﬀspring of parent with high valuation for quality)
have a comparative advantage in adapting to the new technological environment.134
The determination of paternal decision regarding oﬀspring quantity and quality. Individuals
choose the number of children and their quality based upon their preferences for quality as well as
their time constraint.135 The rise in the (genetic or cultural) bias towards quality in the population, as
well as the rise in the demand for human capital, induce parents to substitute quality for quantity of
children.136
5.2.2 Main Hypotheses and their Empirical Assessment
The theory generates several hypotheses about human evolution and the process of development, un-
derlying the role of natural selection in: (i) the gradual process of human capital formation and thus
technological progress prior to the Industrial Revolution, and (ii) the acceleration of the interaction
between human capital and technological progress in the second phase of the Industrial Revolution, the
associated demographic transition, and the emergence of a state of sustained economic growth.
The Main Hypotheses:
• During the initial phases of the Malthusian epoch, the growth rate of output per capita is nearly
zero and the growth rate of population and literacy rates is minuscule, reﬂecting the sluggish
pace of technological progress, the low representation of individuals with high valuation for child
quality, and the slow pace of the evolutionary process.
This hypothesis is consistent with the characteristics of the Malthusian epoch, as described in section
2.1.
• In the pre-demographic transition era, traits for higher valuation for oﬀspring quality generated an
evolutionary advantage. Namely, individuals with higher valuation for the quality of children had
a larger number of surviving oﬀspring and their representation in the population increased over
time. In contrast, in the post-demographic transition era, when income per capita has no longer
been the binding constraint on fertility decisions, individuals with higher valuation for oﬀspring
quantity have had an evolutionary advantage, bearing a lager number of surviving oﬀspring. Thus,
in the pre-demographic transition era, the number of surviving oﬀspring was aﬀected positively
by parental education and parental income whereas in the post-demographic transition era, in
contrast, this pattern is reversed and more educated, higher income individuals have a smaller
number of surviving oﬀspring.
transition process (e.g., Galor and Weil 2000).
134See Schultz (1964) and Nelson and Phelps (1966). If the return to education rises with the level of technology rather
than with the rate of technological progress, the qualitative analysis would not be aﬀected. However, this alternative
would imply that changes in technology were skill-biased throughout human history in contrast to those periods in which
technological change was skilled-saving, notably, in the ﬁrst phase of the Industrial Revolution.
135Anthropological evidence suggests that fertility control was indeed exercised even prior to the Neolithic Revolution.
Reproductive control in hunter-gatherer societies is exempliﬁed by “pacing birth” (e.g., birth every four years) conducted
by tribes who live in small, semi nomadic bands in Africa, Southeast Asia, and New Guinea in order to prevent the burden
of carrying several children while wandering. They abstained from sexual intercourse for a three-year period after each
birth. Similarly, Nomadic women of the Kung (a group of the San people of Southern Africa), use no contraceptives but
nurse their babies frequently, suppressing ovulation and menstruation for two to three years after birth, and reaching a
mean interval between births of 44 months.
136The existence of a trade-oﬀ between quantity and quality of children is supported empirically (e.g., Rosenzweig and
Wolpin (1980) and Hanushek (1992)).
82Clark and Hamilton (2003) examine empirically this hypothesis on the basis of data that they have
constructed from wills written in England in the time period 1620-1636. The wills that were written in
a closed proximity to the death of a person in urban and rural areas, across a large variety of occupations
and wealth, contain information about the number of surviving oﬀspring, literacy of testator (measured
by whether the will was signed), occupation of testator (if male), the amount of money bequeathed and
to whom (spouse, children, the poor, unrelated persons), and houses and land that were bequeathed.
Based on this data, Clark and Hamilton ﬁnd a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of literacy
(and wealth) on the number of surviving oﬀspring.137 They conﬁrm the hypothesis that literate people
(born, according to the theory, to parents with quality-bias) had an evolutionary advantage in this (pre-
demographic transition) period.138 The negative relationship between education and fertility within a
country in the post-demographic transition era was documented extensively.139
• The process of natural selection prior to the Industrial Revolution increased the representation of
individuals with higher valuation for quality, gradually increasing the average level of investment
in human capital,140 permitting a slow growth of output per capita.
The prediction about the rise in literacy rates prior to the Industrial Revolution is consistent with
historical evidence. Various measures of literacy rates demonstrate a signiﬁcant rise in literacy rates in
the 2 centuries that preceded the Industrial Revolution in England.141 As depicted in Figure 5.1, male
literacy rates increased gradually in the time period 1600-1760. Literacy rates for men doubled over this
period, rising from about 30% in 1600 to over 60% in 1760. Similarly, as reported by Cipolla (1968),
literacy rates of women more than tripled from less than 10% in 1640 to over 30% in 1760.142
137In addition, Boyer (1989) argues that in early nineteenth century England, agricultural laborers’ income had a positive
eﬀect on fertility: birth rates increased by 4.4 percent in response to a 10 percent increase in annual income. Further
evidence are surveyed by Lee (1997).
138Interestingly, in New France, where land was abundant, and thus fertility decisions were not constraint by the avail-
ability of resources, the number of surviving oﬀspring was higher among less educated individuals. These ﬁndings are
consistent with the theory as well. If resource constraint is not binding for fertility decisions (e.g., in the post-demographic
transition era, or due to a positive shock to income in the Malthusian era), individuals with higher valuation for quantity
gain an evolutionary advantage.
139See, for instance, Kremer and Chen (2002).
140In contrast to Galor and Weil (2000) in which the inherent positive interaction between population and technology
during the Malthusian regime is the force behind the increase in the rate of technological progress that induced investments
in human capital and led to further technological progress, a demographic transition, and sustained economic growth, Galor
and Moav (2002) is structured such that the gradual change in the composition of the population (rather than by the
size of the population) brings about the take-oﬀ from Stagnation to growth. Thus, a scale eﬀect is not needed for the
take-oﬀ. However, this is just a simplifying modelling devise and both forces could operated simultaneously in triggering
the take-oﬀ.
141Moreover, this hypothesis appears consistent with the increase in the number and size of universities in Europe
since the establishment of the ﬁrst university in Bologna in the 11th century, signiﬁcantly outpacing the growth rate of
population.
142This pattern is robust and is observed in various diocese over this period. For instance Cressy (1981, table 6.3 p. 113)
reports a gradual rise in average literacy rate of average of yeomen, husbandmen and tradesmen in Norwich from 30% in
1580 to nearly 61% in 1690, and Cressy (1980, table 7.1 p. 143) reports a gradual rise in Gentle literacy in the diocese of
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Figure 5.1 The Rise in Male Literacy Rates Prior and During the Industrial Revolution:
England: 1600-1900
Sources: Cipolla (1969), Stone (1969) and Schoﬁeld (1973)
Moreover, as argued by Clark (2003), human capital accumulation in England began in an era when the
market rewards to skill acquisition were at historically low levels, consistent with the argument that the
rise in human capital reﬂected a rise in the preference for quality oﬀspring.
• The acceleration in the rate of technological progress that was reinforced by the investment in
human capital of individuals with high valuation for oﬀspring quality, increased the demand for
human capital in the Post-Malthusian Regime, generating a universal investment in human capital,
a demographic transition and a rapid pace of economic growth.
The hypothesis is consistent with the evidence, provided in section 2.3 and depicted partly in Figure
4.1, about the signiﬁcant rise in the demand for human capital in the second phase of the Industrial
Revolution, the marked increased in educational attainment, and the emergence of universal education
towards the end of the 19th century in association with a decline in fertility rates, and a transition to a
s t a t eo fs u s t a i n e de c o n o m i cg r o w t h .
5.3 Complementary Mechanisms
The theory argues that during the Malthusian epoch hereditary human traits, physical or mental, that
generate higher earning capacity, and thereby potentially larger number of oﬀspring, would generate
an evolutionary advantage and would dominate the population in the long run. Hereditary traits that
stimulate technological progress or raise the incentive to invest in oﬀspring’s human capital (e.g., ability,
longevity, and a preference for quality), may trigger a positive feedback loop between investment in
human capital and technological progress that would bring about a take-oﬀ from an epoch of Malthusian
stagnation, a demographic transition and a shift to a state of sustained economic growth. Hence, the
struggle for existence that had characterized most of human history stimulated natural selection and
generated an evolutionary advantage to individuals whose characteristics are complementary to the
growth process, ultimately triggering a take-oﬀ from an epoch of stagnation to sustained economic
growth. Galor and Moav (2002) focus on the evolution of the trade-oﬀ between resources allocated to
84t h eq u a n t i t ya n dt h eq u a l i t yo fo ﬀspring. Their framework of analysis can be modiﬁed to account for
the interaction between economic growth and the evolution of other hereditary traits.
5.3.1 The Evolution of Ability and Economic Growth
Consider the model described earlier. Suppose that individual’s preferences, are deﬁned over consump-
tion above a subsistent level and over child quality and quantity. Individuals are identical in their
preferences, but diﬀer in their hereditary innate ability. Suppose further that oﬀspring’s level of human
capital is an increasing function of two complementary factors: innate ability and investment in qual-
ity. Thus, since the marginal return to investment in child quality increases with ability, higher ability
individuals and hence dynasties would allocate a higher fraction of their resources to child quality.
In the Malthusian era individuals with a higher ability generate more income and hence are able
to allocate more resources for child quality and quantity. High ability individuals, therefore, generate
higher income due to fact that their innate ability as well as their quality are higher. In the Malthusian
era fertility rates are positively aﬀected by the level of income and (under plausible conﬁgurations) the
high ability individuals have therefore an evolutionary advantage over individuals of lower ability. As the
fraction of individuals of the high ability type increases, investment in quality rises, and technological
progress intensiﬁed. Ultimately the dynamical system changes qualitatively, the Malthusian temporary
steady-state vanishes endogenously and the economy takes-oﬀ from the Malthusian trap. Once the
evolutionary process generates the positive feedback between the rate of technological progress and the
level of education, technological progress is reinforced, the return to human capital increases further,
setting the stage for the demographic transition and sustained economic growth.
5.3.2 The Evolution of Life Expectancy and Economic Growth
Suppose that individuals diﬀer in their level of health due to hereditary factors. Suppose further that
there exist a positive interaction between the level of health and economic well-being. Higher income
generates a higher level of health, whereas higher level of health increases labor productivity and life
expectancy. Parents that are characterized by high life expectancy and thereby expect their oﬀspring to
have a longer productive life, would allocate more resources toward child quality. In the Malthusian era
fertility rates are positively aﬀected by the level of income and individuals with higher life expectancy,
and therefore higher quality and higher income, would have (under plausible conﬁgurations) an evolu-
tionary advantage. Natural selection therefore, increases the level of health as well as the quality of
the population. Eventually, this process generates a positive feedback loop between investment in child
quality, technological progress and health, bringing about a transition to sustained economic growth
with low fertility rates and high longevity.
Alternatively, Galor and Moav (2004b) hypothesize that major socioeconomic and environmen-
tal changes in the process of development that were associated with signiﬁcant increases in population
density (e.g., the Neolithic Revolution and the process of urbanization) triggered evolutionary processes
that contributed signiﬁcantly to the long lasting improvements in longevity. Consistent with historical
evidence, the theory suggests that the rise in the extrinsic mortality rate, brought about by a denser pop-
ulation, led initially to a decline in life expectancy, as document for instance in Figure 2.8.143 However,
the evolutionary process that was originated by the rise in mortality, gradually increased the repre-
sentation of traits associated with resistance to diseases and thus higher life expectancy, contributing
143Moreover, the evolutionary forces that major epidemics (e.g., the Black Death) and climatic changes have triggered,
might have inﬂuenced the time path of human longevity and economic development in the subsequent centuries.
85signiﬁcantly to the observed rise in longevity. Moreover, this evolutionary process in life expectancy rein-
forced the interaction between investment in human capital, life expectancy, and technological progress
thereby expediting the demographic transition and enhancing the economic transition from stagnation
to growth.144
5.4 Assessment of the Various Mechanisms
The signiﬁcance of the evolution of various genetic traits in the transition from an epoch of Malthusian
stagnation to a state of sustained economic growth, ought to consider the possibility that some of these
traits may have completed most of their evolutionary change tens of thousands of years before the
take-oﬀ and may be therefore a pre-condition for the take-oﬀ rather than the trigger itself.
In particular, the conventional wisdom among evolutionary biologists is that intelligence has not
evolved markedly since the emergence of Homo Sapience (i.e., intelligence may have reached a temporary
evolutionary optimum, reﬂecting the trade-oﬀ between the beneﬁts and the energy cost associated with
a lager brain). In contrast, it is unlikely that preferences reﬂecting quality-bias would have reached a
an evolutionary stable state very early in the evolution of mankind. Prior to the Neolithic period, the
majority of people lived in tribes where resources as well as child rearing were shared by the community.
Given this tribal structure, the latent attribute of preferences for quality, unlike observable attributes
such as strength and intelligence, could not generate a disproportionate access to sexual mates and
resources that could aﬀect fertility rates and investment in oﬀspring’s quality, delaying the manifestation
of the potential evolutionary advantage of individuals with a quality-bias. It was the emergence of
the nuclear family in the aftermath of the agricultural revolution that fostered intergenerational links,
and thereby enhanced the manifestation of the potential evolutionary advantage of individuals with a
quality-bias.145
6D i ﬀerential Takeoﬀs and the Great Divergence
The last two centuries have witnessed dramatic changes in the distribution of income and population
across the globe. The diﬀerential timing of the take-oﬀ from stagnation to growth across countries and
the corresponding variations in the timing of the demographic transition have led to a great divergence
in income as depicted in Figure 2.32 and to signiﬁcant changes in the distribution of population around
the globe, as depicted in Figure 2.33. Some regions have excelled in the growth of income per capita,
while other regions have been dominant in population growth.146
Inequality in the world economy had been insigniﬁcant until the 19th century. The ratio of GDP
per capita between the richest region and the poorest region in the world was only 1.1:1 in the year 1000,
2:1 in the year 1500 and 3:1 in the year 1820. In contrast, the past two centuries have been characterized
144The evolution of the human brain along with the evolution of life expectancy in the prior to the Neolithic revolution
is examined by Robson and Kaplan (2003).
145An alternative explanation for the delay in the evolutionary process of the quality bias relative to the evolution of
ability is based on the notion of punctuated equilibria (Gould 1977). A sequence of mutations, which result in a gradual
increase in the variance in the distribution of the (latent) quality bias trait, had not aﬀected investment in oﬀspring’s
quality for a long period due to the low rate of return to human capital. Ultimately, however, mutations increased
t h ev a r i a n c es u ﬃciently so as to induce investment in oﬀspring’s quality, despite the low return, and brought about an
evolutionary advantage for the quality type. In contrast, a gradual increase in the variance of non-latent variables, such
as ability, would have an immediate eﬀect on the evolutionary process.
146Some researchers (e.g., Jones (1997) and Pritchett (1997)) have demonstrated that the great divergence that has been
witnessed in the last two centuries has been maintained in the last decades as well, across countries. Interestingly, however,
as established by Sala-i-Martin (2002), the phenomena has not been maintained across people in the world, (i.e., when
national boundaries are removed).
86by a ‘Great Divergence’ in income per capita among countries and regions. In particular, the ratio of
GDP per capita between the richest and the poorest regions has widened considerably from a modest
3:1 ratio in 1820, to a large 18:1 ratio in 2001. An equally impressive transformation occurred in the
distribution of world population across regions, as depicted in Figure 2.33. The earlier take-oﬀ of Western
European countries generated a 16% increase in the share of their population in the world economy within
the time period 1820-1870. However, the early onset in the Western European demographic transition,
and the long delay in the demographic transition of less developed regions well into the second half
of the twentieth century, led to a 55% decline in the share of Western European population in the
world in the time period 1870-1998. In contrast, the prolongation of the Post-Malthusian period of less
developed regions and the delay in their demographic transition, generated a 84% increase in Africa’s
share of world population, from 7% in 1913 to 12.9% in 1998, an 11% increase in Asia’s share of world
population from 51.7% in 1913 to 57.4% in 1998, and a four-fold increase in Latin American’s share in
world population from 2% in 1820 to 8.6% in 1998.
The phenomenon of the Great Divergence in income per capita across regions of the world in
the past two centuries, that was associated with the take-oﬀ from the epoch of near stagnation to a
state of sustained economic growth, presents intriguing questions about the growth process. How does
one account for the sudden take-oﬀ from stagnation to growth in some countries in the world and the
persistent stagnation in others? Why has the positive link between income per capita and population
growth reversed its course in some economies but not in others? Why have the diﬀerences in per capita
incomes across countries increased so markedly in the last two centuries? Has the transition to a state
of sustained economic growth in advanced economies adversely aﬀected the process of development in
less-developed economies?
6.1 Non-Uniﬁed Theories
The origin of the Great Divergence has been a source of controversy. The relative role of geographical
and institutions factors, ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization, colonialism and globalization
has been in the center of a debate about the origins of this remarkable change in the world income
distribution in the past two centuries.
The role of institutional and cultural factors has been the focus of inﬂuential hypotheses regarding
the origin of the great divergence. North (1981), Landes (1998), Mokyr (1990, 2002), Hall and Jones
(1999), Parente and Prescott (2000), and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002) have argued that
institutions that facilitated the protection of property rights and enhanced technological research and
the diﬀusion of knowledge, have been the prime factors that enabled the earlier European take-oﬀ and
the great technological divergence across the globe.147
The eﬀect of geographical factors on economic growth and the great divergence have been empha-
sized by Jones (1981), Diamond (1997) and Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1998).148 The geographical
hypothesis suggests that advantageous geographical conditions made Europe less vulnerable to the risk
associated with climate and diseases, leading to the early European take-oﬀ, whereas adverse geograph-
ical conditions (e.g. harsh climate, prevalence of diseases, scarcity of natural resources, high transporta-
tion costs, limited regional diﬀusion of knowledge and technology) in disadvantageous regions, generated
permanent hurdles for the process of development, contributing to the great divergence.149
147Barriers to technological adoption that may lead to divergence are explored by Caselli and Coleman (2002), Howitt
and Mayer-Foulkes (2002) and Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2003) as well.
148See Hall and Jones (1999), Masters and McMillan (2001) and Hibbs and Olson (2004) as well.
149Bloom, Canning and Sevilla (2003) cross section analysis rejects the geographical determinism, but maintain never-
theless that favorable geographical conditions have mattered for economic growth since they increase the likelihood of an
87Recent research by Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2000) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002)
propose that initial geographical conditions had a persistent eﬀect on the quality of institutions, leading
to divergence and overtaking in economic performance. Engerman and Sokolof (2000) provide descriptive
evidence that geographical conditions that led to income inequality, brought about oppressive institu-
tions designed to preserve the existing inequality, whereas geographical characteristics that generated an
equal distribution of income led to the emergence of growth promoting institutions. Acemoglu, Johnson
and Robinson (2002) provide evidence that reversals in economic performance across countries have a
colonial origin, reﬂecting institutional reversals that were introduced by European colonialism across the
globe.150 “Reversals of fortune” reﬂect the imposition of extractive institutions by the European colo-
nialists in regions in which favorable geographical conditions led to prosperity, and the implementation
of growth enhancing institutions in poorer regions.151
Furthermore, the role of ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization in the emergence of
divergence and “growth tragedies” has been linked to their eﬀect on the quality of institutions. Easterly
and Levine (1997) and Alesina et al. (2003) demonstrate that geopolitical factors brought about a high
degree of fractionalization in some regions of the world, leading to the implementation of institutions
that are not conducive for economic growth and thereby to diverging growth paths across regions.
Empirical research suggests that indeed initial geographical conditions aﬀected the current eco-
nomic performance primarily via their eﬀect on institutions. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002),
Easterly and Levine (2003), and Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004) provide evidence that varia-
tions in the contemporary growth processes across countries can be attributed to institutional factors
whereas geographical factors are secondary, operating primarily via variations in institutions.
A theory that uniﬁes the geographical and the institutional paradigms, capturing the transition
from the domination of the geographical factors in the determination of productivity in early stages of
development to the domination of the institutional factors in mature stages of development has been
proposed by Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2003). The theory identiﬁes and establishes the empirical valid-
ity of a novel channel through which favorable geographical conditions that were inherently associated
with inequality aﬀected the emergence of human capital promoting institutions (e.g., public schooling,
child labor regulations, abolishment of slavery, etc.), and thus the pace of the transition from an agricul-
tural to an industrial society.152 They suggest that the distribution of land within and across countries
aﬀected the nature of the transition from an agrarian to an industrial economy, generating diverging
growth patterns across countries. The accumulation of physical capital in the process of industrializa-
tion has raised the importance of human capital in the growth process, reﬂecting the complementarity
between capital and skills. Investment in human capital, however, has been sub-optimal due to credit
markets imperfections, and public investment in education has been growth enhancing. Nevertheless,
human capital accumulation has not beneﬁted all sectors of the economy. Due to a low degree of com-
plementarity between human capital and land, universal public education has increased the cost of labor
beyond the increase in average labor productivity in the agricultural sector, reducing the return to land.
Landowners, therefore, had no economic incentives to support these growth enhancing educational poli-
cies as long as their stake in the productivity of the industrial sector was insuﬃcient. Land abundance,
which was beneﬁcial in early stages of development, brought about a hurdle for human capital accu-
economy to escape a poverty trap.
150Additional aspects of the role of colonialism in comparative development are analyzed by Bertocchi and Canova (2002).
151Brezis, Krugman and Tsiddon (1993) attribute technological leapfrogging to the acquired comparative advantage (via
learning by doing) of the current technological leaders in the use of the existing technologies.
152As established by Chanda and Dalgaard (2003), variations in the structural composition of economies and in particular
the allocation of scarce inputs between the agriculture and the non-agriculture sectors are important determinants of
international diﬀerences in TFP, accounting for between 30 and 50 percents of these variations.
88mulation and economic growth among countries that were marked by an unequal distribution of land
ownership.153
6.2 A Uniﬁed Theory - Globalization and the Great Divergence
Uniﬁed theories of economic growth generate direct hypotheses about the factors that determine the
timing of the transition from stagnation to growth and thus the factors that contributed to the Great
Divergence. The timing of the transition may diﬀer signiﬁcantly across countries and regions due to
historical accidents, as well as variation in geographical, cultural, social and institutional factors, trade
patterns, colonial status, and public policy, that have aﬀected the relationship between human capital
formation and technological progress.154
This section explores a uniﬁed growth theory that generates a transition from stagnation to
growth along with a great divergence, focusing on the asymmetric eﬀect of globalization on the timing
of the take-oﬀ from the Malthusian epoch of developed and less developed countries. Galor and Mount-
ford (2003) suggest that sustained diﬀerences in income and population growth across countries may be
attributed to the contrasting eﬀect of international trade on industrial and non-industrial nations. Con-
sistent with the evidence provided in section 2, their theory suggests that the expansion of international
trade in the 19th century and its eﬀect on the pace of individualization has played a major role in the
timing of demographic transitions across countries and has thereby been a signiﬁcant determinant of
the distribution of world population and a prime cause of the ‘Great Divergence’ in income levels across
countries in the last two centuries. International trade had an asymmetrical eﬀect on the evolution of
industrial and non-industrial economies. While in the industrial nations the gains from trade were di-
rected primarily towards investment in education and growth in output per capita, a signiﬁcant portion
of the gains from trade in non-industrial nations was channeled towards population growth.155
In the second phase of the Industrial Revolution, international trade enhanced the specialization
of industrial economies in the production of industrial, skilled intensive, goods. The associated rise in
the demand for skilled labor has induced a gradual investment in the quality of the population, expedit-
ing a demographic transition, stimulating technological progress and further enhancing the comparative
advantage of these industrial economies in the production of skilled intensive goods. In non-industrial
economies, in contrast, international trade has generated an incentive to specialize in the production
of unskilled intensive, non-industrial, goods. The absence of signiﬁcant demand for human capital has
provided limited incentives to invest in the quality of the population and the gains from trade have been
utilized primarily for a further increase in the size of the population, rather than the income of the ex-
isting population. The demographic transition in these non-industrial economies has been signiﬁcantly
delayed, increasing further their relative abundance of unskilled labor, enhancing their comparative dis-
153An alternative mechanism is explored by Berdugo, Sadik and Sussman (2003).
154Related to the uniﬁed paradigm, Pomeranz (2000) has suggested that the discovery of the New World enabled Europe,
via Atlantic trade, to overcome ‘land constraints’ and to take-oﬀ technologically. The inﬂow of grain and other commodities
as well as the outﬂow of migrants during the Nineteenth century may have played a crucial role in Europe’s development.
By easing the land constraint at a crucial point – when income per capita had begun to rise rapidly, but before the
demographic transition had gotten under way – the “ghost acres” of the New World provided a window of time which
allowed Europe to pull decisively away from the Malthusian equilibrium.
155In contrast to the recent literature on the dynamics of comparative advantage (e.g., Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983),
Grossman and Helpman (1991) Matsuyama (1991), Young (1991), Mountford (1998), and Baldwin et. al (2001) the focus
on the interaction between population growth and comparative advantage and the persistent eﬀect that this interaction may
have on the distribution of population and income in the world economy generates an important new insight regarding
the distribution of the gains from trade. The theory suggests that even if trade aﬀects output growth of the trading
countries at the same rate, (due to the terms of trade eﬀect) income per capita of developed and less developed economies
will diverge since in less developed economies growth of total output will be generated primarily by population growth,
whereas in developed economies it will be generated by an increase in output per capita.
89advantage in the production of skilled intensive goods and delaying their process of development. The
research suggests, therefore, that international trade aﬀected persistently the distribution of popula-
tion, skills, and technologies in the world economy, and has been a signiﬁcant force behind the ‘Great
Divergence’ in income per capita across countries.156
The historical evidence described in section 2 suggests that the fundamental hypothesis of this
theory is consistent with the process of development of the last two centuries. As implied by the trade
patterns reported in Table 2.1, and the evolution of industrialization depicted in Figure 2.14, trade over
this period induced the specialization of industrialized economies in the production of industrial goods
whereas non-industrial economies specialize in the production of primary goods. The asymmetric eﬀect
of international trade on the process of industrialization of developed and less developed economies, as
depicted in Figure 2.14, aﬀected the demand for human capital as analyzed in section 2.3.3, and thus
the timing of the demographic transition in developed and less-developed economies, generating a great
divergence in output per capita as well as signiﬁcant changes in the distribution of world population, as
depicted in Figure 2.33.157
The diverging process of development of the UK and India since the 19th century in terms
of the levels of income per capita and population growth is consistent with the theory of Galor and
Mountford (2003) and provides an interesting case study. During the nineteenth century the UK traded
manufactured goods for primary products with India.158 Trade with Asia constituted over 20% of
UK total exports and 23.2% of total imports throughout the nineteenth century (Bairoch 1974). 159
Consistent with the proposed hypothesis, as docum e n t e di nF i g u r e2 . 1 4 ,i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o ni nt h eU K
accelerated, leading to a signiﬁcant increase in the demand for skilled labor in the second phase of
the Industrial Revolution, a demographic transition and a transition to a state of sustained economic
growth.
For India, however, international trade played the reverse role. The period 1813-1850 was char-
acterized by a rapid expansion in the volume of exports and imports which gradually transformed India
from being an exporter of manufactured products — largely textiles — into a supplier of primary com-
modities (Chaudhuri 1983). Trade with the UK was fundamental in this process, with the UK supplying
over two thirds of its imports for most of the nineteenth century and being the market for over a third
of India’s exports. As depicted in Figure 2.14, the rapid industrialization in the UK in the nineteenth
century was associated with a decline in the per capita level of industrialization in India.160 The delay
in the process of industrialization and consequently the lack of demand for skilled labor delayed the de-
156Consistent with the thesis that human capital has reinforced the existing patterns of comparative advantage, Taylor
(1999) argues that human capital accumulation during the late Nineteenth Century was not a source of convergence even
among the advanced ‘ Greater Atlantic’ trading economies. The richer economies - U.S.A. and Australia — had greater
levels of school enrollments than the poorer ones, Denmark and Sweden.
157Consistent with the viewpoint the trade has not been uniformly beneﬁcial across time and regions, recent research
by Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) has indicated that the relationship between openness and growth changed in the last
century. Moreover, Clemens and Williamson (2004) ﬁnd a positive relationship between average tariﬀ levels and growth for
the period 1870-1913 and a negative relationship for the period 1970-1998. Similarly Vamvakadis (2002) ﬁnds a positive
relationship between several measures of openness and growth after 1970 and some evidence of a negative relationship in
the period 1870-1910.
158The colonial power of the UK may have encouraged the specialization of India in the production of primary goods
beyond the degree dictated by market forces. However, these forces would have just reinforced the adverse eﬀects described
in this paper.
159In contrast, trade with Asia constituted only 5% or less of French, German or Italian exports and 12.1% of total
imports of continental Europe.
160Furthermore, Bairoch (1974) found that industries that employed new technologies made up between 60 and 70 percent
of the UK manufacturing industry in 1860 but less than 1 percent of manufacturing industries in the developing countries.
This contrasts with the experience of the non-UK European economies which produced more of the ‘new technology’ goods
and which traded with themselves to a greater extent, (Bairoch, 1974).
90mographic transition and the process of development.161 Thus, while the gains from trade were utilized
in the UK primarily towards an increase in output per capita, in India they were channeled towards an
increase in the size of the population. The ratio of output per capita in the UK relative to India grew
from 3:1 in 1820 to 11:1 in 1998, whereas the ratio of India’s population relative to the UK’s population
grew from 8:1 in 1870 to 16:1 in 1998.162
7 Concluding Remarks
The transition from stagnation to growth and the associated phenomenon of the great divergence have
been the subject of an intensive research in the growth literature in recent years. The discrepancy
between of exogenous and endogenous neoclassical growth models and the process of development along
most of human history, induced growth theorists to advance an alternative theory that captures in a
single uniﬁed framework the contemporary era of sustained economic growth, the epoch of Malthusian
stagnation that had characterized most of human history, and the fundamental driving forces of the
recent transition between these distinct regimes.
The understanding of the contemporary growth process is fragile and incomplete unless growth
theory would be based on proper micro-foundations that would reﬂect the qualitative aspects of the
growth process in its entirety. Moreover, a comprehensive understanding of the hurdles faced by less
developed economies in reaching a state of sustained economic growth would be futile unless the origin
the transition of the currently developed economies into a state of sustained economic growth would be
identiﬁed and their implications would be modiﬁed to account for the diﬀerences in the structure of less
developed economies in an interdependent world.
Imposing the constraint that a single uniﬁed theory account for the entire intricate process of
development in the last thousands of years is a discipline that enhances the viability of growth theory.
A uniﬁed theory of economic growth reveals the underlying micro foundations that are consistent with
the process of economic development along the entire spectrum of human history, rather than with the
last century only, enhancing the conﬁdence in the viability of growth theory, its predictions and policy
implications, while improving the understanding of the sources of the recent transition from stagnation
to growth and the associated phenomenon of the great divergence.
Uniﬁed growth theory suggests that the transition from stagnation to growth is an inevitable
by-product of the inherent Malthusian interaction between population and technology and its ultimate
impact on the demand for human capital and thereby on the onset of the demographic transition . Varia-
tions in the timing of the transition across countries and regions reﬂect initial diﬀerences in geographical
161Unlike the rise in the industrial demand for education in the UK, education was not expanded to a similar degree
in India in the 19th Century. As noted by Aparna Basu (1974), during the nineteenth century the state of education
in India was characterized by a relatively large university sector, aimed at producing skilled bureaucrats rather than
industrialists, alongside widespread illiteracy of the masses. The literacy rate was very low, (e.g., 10% in Bengal in 1917-
8) but nevertheless, attempts to expand primary education in the twentieth century were hampered by poor attendance
a n dh i g hd r o po u tr a t e s ,w h i c hm a y s u g g e s tt h a tt h er a t eo freturn to education was relatively low. The lack of broad
based education in India can also be seen using the data of Barro and Lee (2000). Despite an expansion of education
throughout the twentieth century Barro and Lee report that in 1960 72.2 percent of Indians aged 15 and above had “no
schooling” compared with 2 percent in the UK.
162Another interesting case study providing supporting evidence for the proposed hypothesis is the economic integration
of the Israeli and the West Bank economies in the aftermath of the 1967 war. Trade and factor mobility between the
skilled abundant economy of Israel and the unskilled abundant economy of the West Bank shifted the West Bank economy
toward further specialization in the production of primary goods, and possibly triggered the astonishing increase in crude
births rates from 22 per 1000 people in 1968 to 42 per 1000 in 1990, despite a decline in mortality rates. The gains from
trade and development in the West Bank economy were converted primarily into an increase in population size, nearly
doubling the population in those two decades. Estimates of the growth rates of output per capita over this period are less
reliable and suggest that the increase was about 30%. Consistent with the proposed theory, the Palestinian uprising in
the early 1990s and the gradual disintegration of the two economies resulted in the reduction in the crude birth rates.
91factors and historical accidents and their manifestation in variations in institutional, demographic, and
cultural factors, trade patterns, colonial status, and public policy.
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